Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Danjing Han, setting aside a trial judgment that had awarded the respondents $302,000 for civil deceit and unjust enrichment.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in relying solely on admissions in the Statement of Defence to establish liability, without making any factual findings or determining the elements of the causes of action.

The court concluded that the admissions did not amount to admissions of liability and that the respondents had not met their burden of proof.

The appellant, L.M., appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside a costs award against the Children's Aid Society (CAS).

L.M. had successfully sought constitutional state funding for an appeal of a child protection order, which the CAS had opposed.

The motion judge awarded costs against the CAS, finding its opposition unreasonable and its rejection of an offer to settle improper.

The Divisional Court overturned this, finding the CAS's conduct reasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed L.M.'s appeal, reinstating the original costs award, finding the Divisional Court erred in its assessment of the CAS's unreasonableness in opposing the motion and rejecting the offer to settle.

The applicant sought an extension of time to perfect an appeal from an order dismissing an oppression application under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 255 of the Act specifies that appeals from such orders lie to the Divisional Court.

Despite finding that other factors for an extension of time (intention to appeal, brief delay, minimal prejudice) would have favoured the applicant, the motion was dismissed due to the fundamental lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant husband appealed an order striking his pleading in a matrimonial proceeding concerning equalization of assets.

The motion judge had struck the pleading for non-compliance with disclosure obligations in a consent order.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by relying on four items not contained in the consent order or the record.

The court set aside the striking order and gave the appellant 30 days to comply with the consent order, particularly regarding an accounting of $300,000 in cash removed from a bank account between 2013 and 2015.

The appellant commercial tenant suffered property damage from a flood and sued the respondent landlord for the uninsured balance of its loss.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that the lease required the tenant to maintain all-risks insurance and barred claims against the landlord for property damage.

On appeal, the tenant argued summary judgment was inappropriate, the expired lease terms did not apply, and the landlord retained liability for failing to repair the premises.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that summary judgment is appropriate for waiver of subrogation cases, the overholding tenant remained bound by the lease terms, and the lease shifted the risk of damage from an insured peril to the tenant regardless of the landlord's conduct.

A non-party purported to appeal a vesting order made in a Family Law Act proceeding, claiming he had purchased a 50% interest in the subject cottage property prior to the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had no standing as he was not a party to the original proceeding and had taken no steps in the Superior Court to be added as a party or to set aside the order.

The dismissal was without prejudice to any steps the appellant might take in the Superior Court.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent had loaned her a significant amount of money.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in accepting parts of the respondent's evidence while rejecting others, reversed the burden of proof, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the reasons were adequate.

Costs of $6,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their slip and fall action following a jury verdict finding no liability against the respondents.

The day after the jury was discharged, all six jurors returned to the courthouse, with one stating they were there to 'count the money', suggesting they misunderstood the effect of their verdict.

The trial judge dismissed a motion to inquire into the jury's return.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a trial judge has no jurisdiction to inquire into a jury's verdict post-discharge unless it involves a mere error in recording or transmitting the verdict.

Because the jury's written answers were clear and any error would involve a misunderstanding requiring further deliberations, the trial judge was functus officio.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action as statute-barred under the two-year limitation period in section 4 of the Limitation Act.

They argued the motion judge conflated fraudulent concealment with discoverability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cause of action was discoverable when counsel received OHIP reports, and the appellants failed to investigate for 28 months before filing their claim.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claims against a bank and its legal counsel regarding the enforcement of two mortgages on properties in default.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no basis for a claim against the bank's counsel, one appellant lacked standing, and the other appellant's claims should have been raised in the underlying enforcement proceedings.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action arising from the death of the patient due to a pulmonary embolism following arthroscopic knee surgery.

The appellants argued the respondent orthopaedic surgeon was negligent in failing to warn the patient about the symptoms of a pulmonary embolism upon discharge.

The trial judge found the respondent met the standard of care, as the patient was not at a heightened risk of a pulmonary embolism at the time of discharge.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and application of the standard of care.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order allowing a judgment creditor to garnish funds from an estate that were directed by the testatrix's will to be used to purchase a non-commutable life annuity for the judgment debtor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, holding that the legacy vested in the judgment debtor upon the testatrix's death and was therefore subject to garnishment.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs order and directed that the costs of the initial motion be paid out of the estate rather than by the appellant.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them negligent for failing to provide a required railing, which was determined to be a proximate cause of the respondent's accident.

The trial judge also allocated 33.3% contributory negligence to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's conclusions on causation and contributory negligence were fully supported by the evidence and within his discretion.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding liability under a bill of lading for multi-modal transportation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to address the argument that section 5(b)(3) of the bill of lading applied rather than section 5(b)(1).

The Court held that section 5(b)(3) specifically applies to the road portion of multi-modal transport in Canada, or alternatively, the default provision in section 5(b)(4) applies due to the respondent's negligence.

The appeal was allowed and judgment was granted in favour of the appellant.

The appellant condominium corporation brought an application to remove the respondent's cats from her unit, after a previous identical application by the unit owner was dismissed and not appealed.

The application judge dismissed the second application as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant was an active participant in the first application and that permitting the second application would be manifestly unfair to the respondent by forcing her to relitigate the same issue.

The infant plaintiff suffered severe brain injuries during birth following unsuccessful attempts by the defendant obstetrician to perform a forceps delivery in the labour room.

The trial judge found the obstetrician negligent for failing to transfer the mother to a delivery room where a c-section could be performed more quickly if the forceps failed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the obstetrician's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by basing liability on a 'risks management' theory that was not pleaded or argued by the plaintiffs, and by using hindsight to impute knowledge of severe fetal distress to the obstetrician at the critical time.

The plaintiff's personal injury action was settled before trial, and the trial proceeded solely to determine liability between the two defendants following a motor vehicle accident.

During the jury trial, the trial judge repeatedly intervened during the cross-examination and re-examination of the investigating police officer, expressing strong opinions that the officer had failed to conduct a thorough investigation.

The trial judge reiterated these criticisms in his charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's interventions and expressions of opinion crossed the line, usurped the role of counsel, and created an appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

In an addendum to an earlier decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs of $3,000 to the intervenor, payable by the appellant.

A cross-motion against the intervenor was dismissed as abandoned without costs.

The defendants appealed an order consolidating two proposed class actions and substituting a new representative plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the order was interlocutory because it did not dispose of any substantive rights between the parties.

As an interlocutory order, the appeal properly lies to the Divisional Court with leave, not to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant vendor agreed to sell commercial land to the respondent purchaser, conditional on obtaining severance approval under the Planning Act.

The Committee of Adjustment granted severance but required the vendor to construct and dedicate a road extension.

The vendor attempted to terminate the agreement, arguing the condition was unreasonable and frustrated the contract.

The purchaser sued for specific performance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision granting specific performance, finding that the contract clearly obligated the vendor to obtain necessary consents at its expense, the doctrine of frustration did not apply as the condition was foreseeable, and the property was unique.