OCA 2016

The offender was convicted of cocaine trafficking and related offences, receiving a 6.5-year sentence.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentencing judge erred in interpreting aggravating factors under the CDSA and in refusing a half-parole order.

The offender cross-appealed, seeking pre-trial custody credit for time spent in custody on unrelated charges that were later stayed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the sentencing judge properly weighed the aggravating factors, appropriately exercised discretion regarding parole eligibility, and correctly refused to credit time served on unrelated charges.

The appellant, a former medical resident, appealed an order striking her conspiracy claim against two individual defendants as time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in applying the presumption of knowledge under s. 5(2) of the Act before the issue of discoverability was properly developed in the pleadings.

The Court held that a limitation defence should generally be pleaded in a statement of defence, allowing the plaintiff to reply with facts regarding discoverability, rather than being determined on a motion to strike prior to the filing of a defence.

The appellants, out-of-province franchisors, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their challenge to the Ontario Superior Court's jurisdiction to hear an action brought by eight Saab dealerships, five of which were located outside Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding of jurisdiction simpliciter based on the appellants carrying on business in Ontario, noting that joining the out-of-province plaintiffs promoted commercial efficiency.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's forum non conveniens analysis and costs award.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant guaranteed a loan made by the respondent bank to a corporation.

After the corporation defaulted on its obligations, the bank demanded payment and successfully moved for summary judgment against the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge misinterpreted the guarantee, failed to consider whether the corporation was given a reasonable time to pay, and erred in rejecting his claim for an equitable discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's interpretation of the guarantee and concluding that the appellant failed to establish that the bank's conduct caused the corporation's default.

The respondents purchased a property to convert into a commercial business and experienced a five-year delay in obtaining necessary permits from the appellant municipality.

The trial judge found the municipality liable in negligence for the unreasonable conduct of its Chief Building Officer and awarded damages for business losses.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the negligence finding and the damages award, arguing the respondents failed to mitigate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the municipality acted unreasonably and that the respondents were not required to mitigate by spending money they did not have due to the municipality's conduct.

The young person appealed a conviction for attempted robbery arising from a meeting arranged through an online classified ad.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were insufficient regarding the identification evidence, which included surveillance video and IP address tracking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the identification and the trial judge's reasons were adequate.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the Belleville Police respondents for false arrest and false imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for possession of stolen property, and that the police were not required to accept the appellants' innocent explanation before laying charges.

The Court also agreed that the intentional tort claims were statute-barred as the limitation period commenced on the date of arrest, and that summary judgment was appropriate as the liability of the Belleville respondents was severable from the other defendants.

The appeal and motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The moving parties sought to review an order of a single judge dismissing their motion to extend the time to perfect their appeal.

The motion judge had dismissed the extension request on the basis that the appeal lacked merit.

The Court of Appeal held that because no formal judgment had been taken out from the underlying application, it was not possible to properly assess the merits of the putative appeal.

The court set aside the single judge's order without prejudice to the moving parties' right to renew their motion for an extension of time once the formal judgment is filed.

The appellant appealed a decision granting the passing of accounts and approving compensation for the respondent as attorney for property and estate trustee.

The appellant argued the claim for compensation as attorney for property was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and that the quantum was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an application for the passing of accounts does not constitute a 'claim' within the meaning of the Limitations Act, 2002, as it does not seek to remedy an injury, loss, or damage.

The court also found no error in the application judge's assessment of the compensation.

The appellant appealed a libel judgment arising from nine online blog posts published during and after a human rights tribunal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s findings that multiple statements were defamatory, that the appellant acted with malice, and that malice defeated any otherwise available fair comment defence.

Although the court held that describing the respondent as an anti-Semite was opinion rather than fact, that error did not affect the outcome because the malice finding remained dispositive.

The court also upheld the damages award of $50,000 in general damages and $30,000 in aggravated damages, together with appeal costs to the respondent.

The appellants purchased a swine farm from the respondent but suffered a loss when they could not secure a supply of pigs due to adverse market conditions.

They appealed the trial judge's dismissal of their claim for damages, arguing breach of good faith, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract because the barn was empty on closing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had waived a condition regarding the supply of pigs and thereby assumed the risk of market changes.

The court also found no negligent misrepresentation due to an entire agreement clause and the appellants' direct discussions with the supplier, and concluded the contract did not require pigs to be in the barn on closing.

The appellants, the City of Ottawa and a city bus driver, appealed a trial judgment finding them 20% liable for a fatal intersection collision.

The bus driver, travelling on a green light, collided with a vehicle that entered the intersection on a red light.

The trial judge found the bus driver negligent for speeding and momentary inattention, concluding the accident could have been avoided had he driven at the speed limit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's articulation of the standard of care or her causation analysis.

The appeal regarding the trial judge's costs award was also dismissed.

The appellant homeowner appealed an order confirming a master's report that allowed the respondent contractor's action for unpaid renovation work and dismissed the appellant's counterclaim.

The appellant argued the master failed to address allegations of post-contractual misrepresentations and breach of the duty of honest performance, and that the motion judge erred in finding the entire agreement clause excluded these claims.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the entire agreement clause could not exclude the duty of honesty, but dismissed the appeal because the master's factual findings—that the parties had agreed to the charges for extra work—disposed of the factual underpinnings of the appellant's claims.

The appellant clinic and respondent chiropractor had a business arrangement that broke down over a fee-splitting dispute.

The respondent abruptly left the clinic, leading to claims and counterclaims.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent for loss of income.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by granting summary judgment in the face of conflicting evidence without explaining how the conflict was resolved or deploying the fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04.

The judgment was set aside and the parties were left to pursue their claims.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against two young children who attended his home daycare.

The trial judge had admitted the children's unsworn statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and rejected the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by relying on defence counsel's trial tactics to impugn the appellant's credibility and by finding the necessity criterion for hearsay met without expert evidence of psychological trauma or a proper voir dire on the children's ability to recollect.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon following a road rage incident.

On appeal, he argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached when police failed to provide a second opportunity to consult counsel after informing him of the additional assault charge.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the new charge significantly increased his jeopardy and moral blameworthiness.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the appellant's police statement under s. 24(2), allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a psychiatric facility, arguing he did not pose a significant threat to public safety and should receive an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board reasonably addressed conflicting medical evidence and properly considered a recent incident where the appellant brought methamphetamine into the facility.

The appeal was dismissed, as the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat was reasonable.

The testator's will directed his two children, appointed as co-executors and trustees, to set aside $100,000 in a trust fund for the benefit of their brother.

The brother was to receive $500 monthly, with the remainder to the testator's grandchildren.

The co-trustees transferred the funds to a non-registered investment plan in one trustee's name, who subsequently misappropriated the funds.

The application judge found both trustees jointly and severally liable for the breach of trust.

The appellant co-trustee appealed, arguing she had no active role in the misappropriation and should be relieved of liability under s. 35(1) of the Trustee Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a co-trustee cannot passively acquiesce to another trustee's actions and that her failure to ensure the trust was properly established constituted an unreasonable breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellant doctor appealed a Superior Court decision that reversed a Consent and Capacity Board finding that the respondent was incapable of consenting to proposed psychiatric treatment.

Following the commencement of the appeal, the respondent's NCR verdict was overturned, he was discharged from the facility, and the proposed treatment was never commenced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case as a decision would have no practical effect on the parties and the appellant's concerns regarding a prior capable wish could be addressed under section 36 of the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, a small distillery, challenged the LCBO's 139.7% mark-up on spirits sold at its on-site retail store, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax under sections 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The application judge dismissed the challenge, finding the mark-up was a proprietary charge and not a tax, and that the appellant had voluntarily agreed to it by contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the LCBO, as the owner of the spirits under the contract, was exercising its private law rights to determine prices in a commercial context.