Nicole Rozier

Two accused persons charged with possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000 sought to vary the conditions of their undertaking to permit travel to Pakistan to care for an elderly, ill parent and manage property interests.

The Crown opposed the variation, arguing the accused would not return to the jurisdiction.

The court granted the application, finding the Crown had not met its onus on a Crown onus case.

The court considered the accused's ties to Canada, their history of returning from previous Pakistan visits, their cooperation with the court process, and the presumption of innocence.

The court varied the undertaking to permit international travel subject to conditions including advance notice of travel itineraries and restrictions on contact with specified individuals and locations.

The appellants, charged with drug offences, sought disclosure of police policy directives regarding confidential informants during their preliminary inquiry.

After the Crown refused disclosure, the preliminary inquiry judge issued subpoenas duces tecum to the police chiefs.

A Superior Court judge quashed the subpoenas, finding the preliminary inquiry judge lacked jurisdiction to order what amounted to third-party disclosure.

The appellants appealed.

Although the appeal was moot because the appellants had since pleaded guilty, the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to hear it.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a preliminary inquiry judge cannot use a subpoena duces tecum to circumvent the jurisdictional limits on ordering production of third-party records, which must be sought before a trial judge under the O'Connor regime.

In a preliminary inquiry for second-degree murder, the court determined whether sufficient evidence existed to commit the accused to trial for the beating death of a rooming house resident.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on witness testimony, DNA evidence from shoes found at the scene, and circumstantial evidence of the accused's presence and conduct.

The court applied the test for committal, examining whether evidence could support reasonable inferences regarding both the requisite intent and the identity of the perpetrator.

The court found sufficient evidence on both issues to commit the accused to trial.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash a provincial offences information alleging contraventions of s. 122(1)(c) of the Securities Act, arguing that the Ontario Court of Justice exceeded jurisdiction when it refused to quash a second information sworn without obtaining new prosecutorial consent.

The court held that the impugned ruling concerned the validity of the information and therefore fell within matters for which certiorari relief is barred where an appeal route exists under s. 141(3) of the Provincial Offences Act.

In any event, the court found the justice properly determined that the second information merely split an existing count to reflect statutory amendments and introduced no new offences.

The original consent to prosecute therefore remained valid.

The certiorari application was dismissed.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 243 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits concealing the dead body of a child whether it died before, during, or after birth, arguing the provision is impermissibly vague in its application to a child that died before birth, thereby infringing s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 243 meets the minimum standard of precision required by the Charter when interpreted to apply only to a fetus that would likely have been born alive.

The Court adopted a likelihood standard from R. v. Berriman, finding the provision gives fair notice and sufficiently limits enforcement discretion.

The matter was remitted for a new trial.

The accused brought a pre‑trial Charter motion seeking to quash a telewarrant authorizing searches of two properties and to exclude the resulting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused argued the telewarrant was improperly issued because it was not impracticable to obtain a warrant in person, the information to obtain lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and the police failed to provide full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The court held that the threshold of impracticability under s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code was met after the officer attempted to obtain a warrant in person but was told the justice of the peace lacked time to review the application.

After reviewing alleged omissions and inaccuracies in the ITO, the court found they were either immaterial, typographical, or properly omitted and that the ITO contained sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the issuing justice’s decision.

Even if a Charter breach had occurred, the evidence would not have been excluded under the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of an application for a dangerous offender assessment order under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, adopting the interpretation of 'serious personal injury offence' from R. v. Goforth.

The court found that some of the respondent's offences met the definition and ordered an assessment, remitting the matter to the trial judge.