Nicolas de Montigny

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

He argued the trial judge erred in inferring from circumstantial evidence that he was the driver of the vehicle and that he was impaired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and concluding that the totality of the evidence supported the findings that the appellant was the driver and was impaired.

C.C. appealed his 6-year global sentence for human trafficking, assault, and child pornography, arguing for a reduction based on harsh pre-trial bail conditions (Downes credit) and fresh evidence of rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised discretion regarding bail conditions and that the fresh evidence, while commendable, did not warrant a sentence reduction given the gravity of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offenses including assault, pimping, and material benefit from sexual services.

He sought leave to appeal his 55-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of evidence regarding the appellant's strategy to induce the complainant back into sex work as an aggravating factor.

The Court also found the sentence was not demonstrably unreasonable, considering both aggravating factors (domestic violence, significant injuries) and mitigating factors (limited duration of events, complainant's prior involvement in sex work, low financial gain), and the appellant's extensive criminal record indicating a high risk of recidivism.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD), appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) disposition requiring his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), seeking an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the ORB's decision as reasonable.

The court found that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety due to his mental health diagnoses, substance abuse, history of non-compliance with community privileges, and the violent nature of his index offences.

The court also rejected the argument that the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated a conditional discharge, emphasizing that public safety remains the paramount consideration and that a detention order provides essential early intervention capabilities beyond those available under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant, Jeremey Ceasor, appealed a sentencing judge's decision regarding pre-sentence custody credit.

After pleading guilty to weapons offences, he was released on bail.

He was later charged with breaching his release order and pleaded guilty, with parties proposing time served (33 days).

However, his guilty plea to the breach charge was subsequently struck.

The defence sought to apply the 33 days of pre-sentence custody to the earlier weapons charges, but the sentencing judge denied this.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that section 719(3) of the Criminal Code does not permit "banking" custodial time for unrelated offences, and credit must relate to the specific offence under consideration.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to a summary conviction offence under s. 286.1(1)(b)(i)(A) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion and quashed the appeal, holding that appeals from summary conviction offences lie to the Superior Court of Justice, not the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed her conviction for breaking and entering and theft of a dog, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and based on misapprehended circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including the complainant's testimony and corroborating evidence from neighbours.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant, Zi-Yue Huang, appealed a 12-month sentence for three counts of robbery, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not crediting pre-sentence custody and by treating his mental health as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in failing to credit pre-sentence custody without providing reasons, which impacted the sentence.

However, the court found no error in how the sentencing judge considered the appellant's mental health.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was adjusted to reflect credit for pre-sentence custody.

The English-speaking appellants, having obtained orders under s. 530(1) of the Criminal Code for trials before English-speaking judges and juries, sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(f) on the ground of insufficient English language proficiency.

The trial judges dismissed these applications, concluding that a s. 530 order alone did not automatically entitle an accused to such a challenge without an "air of reality" or "realistic potential" for language competency issues.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judges' decisions, finding that the s. 530 orders were not necessary in these cases as the trials were already in English, and the purpose of s. 530 is to assist official language minorities, not to enforce minimum fair trial conditions for majority language speakers.

The court affirmed that a threshold showing of realistic potential is required for challenges for cause under s. 638(1)(f), similar to s. 638(1)(b), and that existing jury selection processes (Juries Act qualifications, pre-vetting) adequately address language competency.

The appeals were dismissed, and convictions affirmed.

The appellant, a dangerous offender, appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed for breaching his long-term supervision order (LTSO).

The breach involved pursuing a young woman without reporting contact, a behaviour similar to his past criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the principles of proportionality and mitigating factors, and reasonably concluded that an indeterminate sentence was necessary for public protection given the appellant's high risk of recidivism and history of non-compliance with treatment.

The court did, however, set aside a victim surcharge in accordance with R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant, J.J., appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly used transcripts of the complainant's police statement and preliminary inquiry evidence for credibility assessments.

The transcripts were provided to the trial judge solely to assist in recalling portions put to the complainant during viva voce evidence.

However, the trial judge considered the entirety of the transcripts, including passages not introduced in evidence, to find the complainant's "three interrogations" internally consistent, thereby preferring her evidence and rejecting the accused's.

The Court of Appeal found this improper use rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by treating his false vilification of the victim during his testimony as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the trial judge made this error, it had no impact on the sentence.

The four-year sentence was fully justified by the aggravating features, including the planning and the fact that the appellant overpowered the victim in her own home.

The applicant, serving a five-year sentence for incest, applied for bail pending his sentence appeal.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in upholding the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence under the Nur framework and that his sentence was unfit.

The motions judge dismissed the application, finding that while the constitutional challenge was not without merit, the applicant failed to demonstrate that a successful appeal would result in a significantly lower sentence such that he would have already served it by the time the appeal is heard.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, unlawful confinement, and breach of recognizance, as well as his 4.5-year sentence, arising from a home invasion.

He argued the unlawful confinement conviction violated the Kienapple principle as it was not a separate delict from the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence of domination and coercive restraint distinct from the robbery.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 4.5-year sentence reflected no error in principle and fell within the fit range, though the victim surcharge was set aside.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition dated January 24, 2019, concerning a detention order for the appellant.

The appellant sought to include a term allowing community living at the Hospital's discretion, arguing it was a viable prospect within the year and would allow placement on a waiting list for community living.

The Board rejected these arguments after full consideration of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, noting that the Board had expanded the order to permit community access under indirect supervision, which the appellant was utilizing.

An appeal by an NCR (not criminally responsible) accused against the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing his conditional discharge.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, arguing the Board erred in finding he continued to pose a significant risk to public safety.

The appellant had been living unsupervised in the community for over a decade with stable mental health and medication compliance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable based on the appellant's lack of insight into his illness, his history of violence when unmedicated, and concerns that the civil mental health system could not adequately manage the risk of treatment non-compliance.