Nick Devlin

The applicant, convicted of preventing electors from voting in the 2011 federal election and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, applied for bail pending his sentence appeal.

The Crown conceded the applicant would surrender into custody but argued the appeal was frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding the sentence appeal raised arguable issues given the novelty of the offence, and that the public interest favoured release to ensure the appeal would not be rendered moot before it could be heard.

The appellant appealed a decision granting an application for certiorari to quash a subpoena issued to Crown counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that motions raising trial-related matters should generally be heard by the trial court absent special circumstances.

On the merits, the Court agreed with the motion judge that there was no demonstration the proposed witness was likely to give material evidence, though the appellant was not precluded from raising the issue again at trial.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of his appeals from conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals as abandoned.

The appellant sought a new trial following a jury conviction, arguing that the jury's rejection of her evidence may have been influenced by hearsay evidence that she was subject to a drug look-out on arrival from Trinidad.

The Crown did not oppose the request.

The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the appeal should be allowed and ordered a new trial.

The conviction was quashed.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered after the trial judge quashed a CDSA search warrant and excluded drugs, firearms, and other seized evidence from an apartment searched during a nightclub drug-trafficking investigation.

The Court of Appeal held that refusal of leave to cross-examine the affiant did not bar a sub-facial challenge to the warrant, but concluded that the trial judge nevertheless exceeded the proper scope of Garofoli review by reweighing the amplified record, preferring inferences, and effectively conducting a de novo assessment.

The court reaffirmed that warrant review asks whether reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed remained on the basis of which the warrant could have issued.

The acquittals tied to the seizure at 306 Adelaide were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and argued that the trial judge erred in concluding there was no breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court agreed that the full period from charge to completion of trial must be considered in assessing inferred prejudice, including neutral time periods, and noted the trial judge's reasons were open to error on that point.

However, taking both inferred and actual prejudice into account, the court held that no s. 11(b) violation was made out.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and the appellant was directed to begin serving the intermittent sentence imposed at trial.

The appellant, an adjudicator with the Immigration and Refugee Board, was convicted of breach of trust for offering a positive decision to a refugee claimant in exchange for a sexual relationship.

He was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, the verdict was unreasonable, and the sentence should have been a conditional sentence due to his bipolar disorder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The majority also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly weighed the appellant's mental illness against the need for denunciation and deterrence for a serious breach of trust.

Laskin J.A. dissented on sentence, finding a conditional sentence appropriate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and the dismissal of his entrapment claim, arguing the trial judge's findings were unreasonable and the reasons inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's credibility and the evidence of an agreement to sell heroin to an undercover officer supported the conviction.

The court also held that the entrapment argument failed, as the police conduct was investigatory and followed by conduct amounting to trafficking.

Several civil liberties and HIV/AIDS organizations brought motions to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

The Crown opposed the interventions, arguing the appeal was fact-based and the interventions would be duplicative or prejudicial.

The court granted the motions to intervene, finding that the proposed interveners would provide unique viewpoints on the broader legal and constitutional issues without causing injustice to the parties or prejudicing the appeal process.

The appellant appealed a 25-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to two years less a day, less pre-trial custody, taking into account immigration ramifications that were not before the trial judge.

The appellant was committed to stand trial on charges of conspiracy to traffic in narcotics and conspiracy to traffic in association with a criminal organization.

The charges arose from his involvement in collecting payment for a drug deal after the drugs had already been delivered.

The appellant argued that the offence of trafficking was complete upon delivery, and therefore he could not have conspired to traffic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sale of drugs is a continuing transaction that includes the payment of consideration, and the appellant's involvement in arranging payment constituted participation in the conspiracy.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence of cocaine found in a knapsack the accused threw away while fleeing police, finding violations of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the accused was not detained when the police chase began, and by the time he was tackled, police had reasonable grounds for investigative detention.

Furthermore, the accused abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the knapsack when he threw it away.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant, convicted of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to six years' imprisonment, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The sole issue in dispute was whether the appeal was frivolous under s. 679(3)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the applicant's grounds of appeal, which included complaints about the form of the count and the prosecution's theory of liability, were arguable.

The application for release pending appeal was granted.

The appellant was convicted of importing 5.9 kilograms of opium into Canada and sentenced to five-and-a-half years' incarceration.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting opinion evidence from RCMP officers, misdirected the jury on wilful blindness, and failed to adequately explain the knowledge requirement.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice from the officers' testimony and concluding the jury instructions on wilful blindness and knowledge were sufficient.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the large quantity of drugs involved.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred by refusing to review the Crown's peremptory challenge of the only proposed black juror, and by failing to adequately emphasize in the jury charge that no drugs or buy money were found on him at arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no pattern of arbitrary challenges by the Crown and concluding that the trial judge properly reviewed the defence theory regarding the absence of drugs and money.

The appellant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order under the Extradition Act, arguing the Minister failed to give sufficient weight to his rehabilitation and the impact of extradition on his 15-year-old daughter, for whom he is the sole parent in Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister considered these factors appropriately and made no error of law, concluding the decision was reasonable given the goals of the international extradition regime.

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition, arguing an abuse of process based on an alleged agreement with Hong Kong authorities that he would not be prosecuted if he left the country after being released on bail.

The extradition judge found that the appellant failed to establish the existence of such an agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the extradition judge's finding of fact, concluding it was fully warranted on the evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport with liquor bottles containing the drug.

He claimed a man he met in Antigua asked him to deliver the bottles to an unknown person in Canada.

On appeal, he argued that evidence of his nervous demeanour at customs should not have been admitted and that the trial judge erred in leaving wilful blindness with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the demeanour evidence was contemporaneous with the offence and did not render the trial unfair, and that the inherently suspicious circumstances provided an air of reality to the wilful blindness instruction.

The applicant, sought by the United States for the attempted murder of a police officer in 1969, applied for judicial interim release pending his extradition appeal and the Minister's surrender decision.

The applicant had previously breached bail twice in the US and lived in Canada under a false identity for 30 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that despite a comprehensive supervision plan, the applicant posed a significant flight risk that was not adequately mitigated.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a serious drug offence, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found a s. 8 violation based on a search conducted at the scene.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to properly address relevant considerations.

The Court held that the search was minimally intrusive, conducted in private, and the officer reasonably believed he was complying with police procedures.

Given the seriousness of the offence and the critical nature of the evidence, its exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.