Nick Devlin

The appellant was convicted of three counts of knowingly making a false statement in a loan application under the Canada Small Business Financing Act and sentenced to a conditional sentence and a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $495,049.02.

He appealed the conviction, arguing it was unreasonable based on circumstantial evidence, and the sentence, arguing the fine exceeded the proceeds he personally benefited from.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the circumstantial evidence clearly established the invoices were false and prepared by the appellant.

The court also upheld the fine, noting the appellant had possession and control of the loan proceeds and transferred them out of the country, making it unnecessary to prove he personally benefited on a dollar-for-dollar basis.

The applicant was found guilty of trafficking marijuana and sought a stay of his upcoming sentencing from the Court of Appeal, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The applicant requested that sentencing be stayed pending his conviction appeal, or alternatively, that he be sentenced by a different judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to intervene prior to sentencing and holding that the proper course was for the applicant to raise the bias allegation with the trial judge.

The applicant, convicted of preventing electors from voting in the 2011 federal election and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, applied for bail pending his sentence appeal.

The Crown conceded the applicant would surrender into custody but argued the appeal was frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding the sentence appeal raised arguable issues given the novelty of the offence, and that the public interest favoured release to ensure the appeal would not be rendered moot before it could be heard.

The appellant appealed a decision granting an application for certiorari to quash a subpoena issued to Crown counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that motions raising trial-related matters should generally be heard by the trial court absent special circumstances.

On the merits, the Court agreed with the motion judge that there was no demonstration the proposed witness was likely to give material evidence, though the appellant was not precluded from raising the issue again at trial.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of his appeals from conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals as abandoned.

The appellant sought a new trial following a jury conviction, arguing that the jury's rejection of her evidence may have been influenced by hearsay evidence that she was subject to a drug look-out on arrival from Trinidad.

The Crown did not oppose the request.

The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the appeal should be allowed and ordered a new trial.

The conviction was quashed.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered after the trial judge quashed a CDSA search warrant and excluded drugs, firearms, and other seized evidence from an apartment searched during a nightclub drug-trafficking investigation.

The Court of Appeal held that refusal of leave to cross-examine the affiant did not bar a sub-facial challenge to the warrant, but concluded that the trial judge nevertheless exceeded the proper scope of Garofoli review by reweighing the amplified record, preferring inferences, and effectively conducting a de novo assessment.

The court reaffirmed that warrant review asks whether reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed remained on the basis of which the warrant could have issued.

The acquittals tied to the seizure at 306 Adelaide were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and argued that the trial judge erred in concluding there was no breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court agreed that the full period from charge to completion of trial must be considered in assessing inferred prejudice, including neutral time periods, and noted the trial judge's reasons were open to error on that point.

However, taking both inferred and actual prejudice into account, the court held that no s. 11(b) violation was made out.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and the appellant was directed to begin serving the intermittent sentence imposed at trial.

The appellant, an adjudicator with the Immigration and Refugee Board, was convicted of breach of trust for offering a positive decision to a refugee claimant in exchange for a sexual relationship.

He was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, the verdict was unreasonable, and the sentence should have been a conditional sentence due to his bipolar disorder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The majority also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly weighed the appellant's mental illness against the need for denunciation and deterrence for a serious breach of trust.

Laskin J.A. dissented on sentence, finding a conditional sentence appropriate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and the dismissal of his entrapment claim, arguing the trial judge's findings were unreasonable and the reasons inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's credibility and the evidence of an agreement to sell heroin to an undercover officer supported the conviction.

The court also held that the entrapment argument failed, as the police conduct was investigatory and followed by conduct amounting to trafficking.

Several civil liberties and HIV/AIDS organizations brought motions to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

The Crown opposed the interventions, arguing the appeal was fact-based and the interventions would be duplicative or prejudicial.

The court granted the motions to intervene, finding that the proposed interveners would provide unique viewpoints on the broader legal and constitutional issues without causing injustice to the parties or prejudicing the appeal process.