Nancy Jane Tourgis

The vendor appealed a trial judgment finding that an Agreement of Purchase and Sale terminated on its own terms, entitling the purchasers to a return of their deposit.

The vendor argued the trial judge erred in finding time was not of the essence and in placing the onus on the vendor to set a new closing date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the original agreement lacked a time of the essence clause and the vendor failed to provide a revised occupancy statement or address the purchasers' concerns as promised.

The vendor was estopped from claiming the agreement was not at an end.

The appellants purchased luxury hotel condominium units in the Trump International Hotel based on financial estimates provided by the developer, Talon.

The estimates projected significant returns but were based on uninformed opinions and understated expenses.

The appellants sued for misrepresentation.

The motion judge dismissed their claims, finding their reliance on the estimates unreasonable and barred by entire agreement clauses.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that reliance was reasonable and it would be unconscionable to enforce the exculpatory clauses given Talon's evasion of Securities Act protections.

The Court ordered rescission for one appellant and damages for the other.

The parties in multiple related actions jointly consented to have their actions case managed by a case management Master under Rule 77.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court, satisfied that the criteria under Rule 77.05(4) were met, referred the matter to Master McAfee for assignment of a case management master.

The defendants brought motions to stay or dismiss two related actions, arguing that the corporate plaintiff had not properly authorized the commencement of the proceedings.

The plaintiff brought cross-motions seeking leave to issue its statements of claim *nunc pro tunc*.

The court found that the actions were properly authorized by a director of the plaintiff corporation, emphasizing the liberal construction of the Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve disputes on their merits.

Consequently, the defendants' motions were dismissed, and the plaintiff's cross-motions were also dismissed as unnecessary.

The court also addressed the application of simplified procedure rules regarding examinations and awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The appellants appealed a Master's order requiring them to pay $49,767.47 into court as security for costs pursuant to Rule 56.01(1)(c).

The appellants argued the Master erred by effectively rescinding an agreement to pay the outstanding costs upon the closing of a real estate transaction and by failing to recognize that a $300,000 deposit held by the respondent was sufficient security.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the Master's exercise of discretion to order security for costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action against the defendant, who operated a cheque-cashing facility that allegedly processed funds from a massive investment fraud.

The court granted leave for the plaintiff's four-year delay in bringing the certification motion, finding the delay was reasonably explained and agreed to by the defendant.

The court also allowed amendments to the statement of claim.

Finally, the court certified the action as a class proceeding, finding that all requirements under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act were met, including identifiable class, common issues, preferability, and suitable representative.

The plaintiff, a Canadian distributor, brought an action against the defendants following the repudiation of a distribution agreement during US Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.

The defendants obtained a temporary restraining order from the US Bankruptcy Court enjoining the Canadian action.

The plaintiff then brought a motion in Ontario seeking to enforce an alleged undertaking made by the defendants to the US court to bring a motion to stay the Canadian action.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding it premature and noting that the US court had already considered the issue and was the appropriate forum to determine its own jurisdiction, emphasizing principles of comity in cross-border insolvencies.

The defendants moved to settle the order following a previous decision striking portions of the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The court addressed the sealing of motion materials and the impact of the Apology Act, 2009 on the pleadings.

The court ordered the contested documents sealed from the public file and confirmed that references to an apology in the statement of claim must be struck, as the Apology Act prevents such statements from being used to establish liability.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant lawyers for negligent misrepresentation, alleging they relied on the lawyers' confirmation that a financing condition had been met.

During discovery, the plaintiffs refused to answer questions about the legal advice they received from their own counsel regarding the alleged confirmation.

The motion judge ordered the plaintiffs to answer the questions, finding they had waived solicitor-client privilege by placing their state of mind and reliance in issue.

The Divisional Court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that fairness and consistency required disclosure of the legal advice to allow the defendants to adequately defend against the reliance claim.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found the testator had testamentary capacity and was not subjected to undue influence when executing his final will.

The Divisional Court found that while the trial judge properly analyzed the issue of testamentary capacity, there was no analysis or factual findings regarding the issue of undue influence, despite significant evidence suggesting it.

The appeal was allowed, the trial judgment was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new trial on all issues before a different judge.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing his payment obligations under a Share Purchase Agreement.

He argued the business was illegal and that the agreements contemplated an ongoing supply of movies, raising credibility issues requiring a trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant provided only bald statements without supporting evidence, and upheld the motion judge's decision.

Investors in real estate development projects brought an oppression application under ss. 161 and 248 of the Business Corporations Act seeking, among other relief, the appointment of an inspector to investigate the use of investor funds.

The evidence showed project funds had been commingled in a separate entity rather than segregated as investors had been led to expect, financial disclosure was deficient, audited financial statements were unavailable, and a dividend was withheld from one preferred shareholder.

The court held that these circumstances raised a prima facie case that reasonable security holder expectations had been defeated and that oppressive conduct may have occurred.

The court ordered the appointment of a court‑appointed inspector and granted additional relief including payment of an unpaid dividend, redemption of preferred shares, and production of a shareholder list.

In this family law proceeding, the moving party sought an extension of time to perfect an appeal from an order imposing conditions that had to be satisfied before a long motion to vary final support orders could proceed.

The responding party sought security for costs and additional conditions, and argued that the order under appeal was interlocutory.

Applying the jurisprudence distinguishing final from interlocutory orders, the court held that the order remained interlocutory notwithstanding that non-compliance could result in a permanent stay.

Because an appeal of an interlocutory order to this court was meritless, the extension motion was refused, the related motion became moot, and costs were fixed at $24,000 all inclusive.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants, including the opposing party's law firm, for negligent misrepresentation regarding an equity raise condition in a loan agreement.

During discovery, the defendants sought communications between the plaintiffs and their own counsel, arguing that the plaintiffs' allegation of detrimental reliance constituted a deemed waiver of solicitor-client privilege.

The Master upheld the privilege, but the appeal judge reversed, finding a deemed waiver.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, noting a conflict in the jurisprudence regarding whether alleging detrimental reliance equates to a waiver of privilege.

The plaintiff, a senior staff accountant, sued her former employer for wrongful dismissal, breach of contract, negligence, and intentional infliction of mental distress after her employment was terminated following a period of workplace conflict and medical leave.

The court found that the employer had acted professionally and in good faith throughout, dismissing the claims for bad faith, negligence, and intentional infliction of mental distress.

The court awarded the plaintiff 10 months' salary in lieu of notice.

Applying the principles from Sylvester, the court held that short-term disability benefits paid directly by the employer during the notice period should be deducted from the damages, but long-term disability benefits paid by a third-party insurer should not be deducted.

The respondent, having been successful in the appeal, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, citing criticisms of the appellant's counsel.

The Divisional Court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding that counsel's failure to remit a notice of hearing was minimally inconvenient and that punishing a party for their counsel's inaccurate time estimate was inappropriate.

Costs were awarded to the respondent fixed at 60% of actual costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellants brought two companion libel actions arising from an article in a corporate newsletter that was posted on a website.

The respondents, Shaw Satellite G.P. and Bell Expressvu Limited Partnership, successfully moved for summary judgment, and the actions against them were dismissed.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motions judge erred by failing to draw an adverse inference from refusals given on cross-examinations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding it was open to the motions judge to decline to draw an adverse inference based on the record.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board, which found that a tenancy was provided as part of an employment compensation package and ended when the employment relationship ended.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's findings of fact were reasonable and within its jurisdiction, and that no error of law was demonstrated.

The court also declined to stay the eviction order, noting that an application for a stay requires proper materials addressing the test for injunctive relief.

The applicant, convicted of two counts of second degree murder and awaiting a further murder trial, sought a publication ban on evidence and credibility findings arising from an earlier application under s. 462.34 of the Criminal Code for access to seized funds to pay legal fees.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to grant a ban and applied the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test balancing freedom of expression against the accused’s right to a fair trial.

The court concluded that publication of the applicant’s admissions of criminal activity and the court’s adverse credibility findings posed a serious risk to the proper administration of justice in the upcoming jury trial.

A temporary ban was therefore necessary and proportionate.

The court ordered a time‑limited publication ban on the evidence, the fact of the application, and the earlier decision until completion of the pending murder trial.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on its action for a debt owed under a share purchase agreement and to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim.

The defendant alleged unwritten collateral agreements and illegal conduct by the plaintiff but provided no evidence to support these claims.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the defendant's allegations were bald and self-serving.

The court also found the defendant's counterclaim was statute-barred.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for $289,000, and the counterclaim was dismissed.