Nancy Jane Tourgis

The accused applied under s. 462.34(1) of the Criminal Code for access to funds seized by police as alleged proceeds of crime in order to pay legal fees while facing multiple serious criminal charges including kidnapping and murder.

The court applied the three‑part test requiring proof of an interest in the funds, the absence of other assets or means to fund legal expenses, and the absence of competing ownership claims.

While the Crown conceded the accused had an interest in the seized funds, the court found he failed to establish that he lacked other available assets.

Given extensive evidence of undisclosed or unaccounted assets and the applicant’s lack of credibility, the court was not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that no other means existed to fund counsel.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing libel actions against certain defendants, the court reconsidered the appropriate costs award.

The defendants argued that an early offer to settle should justify full or substantial indemnity costs after the plaintiffs refused the offer and ultimately lost on summary judgment.

The court held that the offer did not trigger Rule 49 cost consequences because it expired before the hearing, but it could still be considered under the court’s discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01.

The court found no reprehensible or unreasonable conduct warranting full or substantial indemnity costs but concluded the early offer should have prompted a careful reassessment of the claim.

The costs award was therefore increased from $25,000 to $35,000.

Costs decision following a lengthy will challenge trial.

Although the plaintiff ultimately proved the validity of the will and became executor and principal beneficiary, the court found the defendants had reasonable grounds to challenge the will due to numerous suspicious circumstances and the plaintiff’s own conduct.

Applying Rule 57.01 and the modern estates litigation approach, the court held that the usual “loser pays” principle may yield where there is a reasonable basis to question testamentary capacity or execution.

Given the suspicious circumstances and litigation conduct, it was appropriate for the estate to bear the litigation costs.

The court fixed costs for the plaintiff and defendants at specified amounts payable from the estate.

Following the dismissal of defendants’ summary judgment motions and related motions to set aside an Anton Piller order, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The defendants had argued the plaintiff’s action was barred by limitation periods under s. 18(5) of the Radiocommunication Act and the Ontario Limitations Act and sought dismissal on summary judgment.

The court held that the motions were unreasonable given the extensive factual disputes, credibility issues, and evidentiary record requiring trial under the “full appreciation test” articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch.

The defendants also unsuccessfully sought to challenge the Anton Piller order.

Costs were therefore awarded to the plaintiff on a substantial‑indemnity basis.

The plaintiff son sought to propound his father's last will, which left the bulk of the estate to him and only $1,000 to each of his five defendant sisters.

The sisters challenged the will on the grounds of lack of due execution, undue influence, and lack of testamentary capacity, pointing to suspicious circumstances including the son's involvement in arranging the will with an unknown lawyer.

The court found that while suspicious circumstances existed, the son successfully proved on a balance of probabilities that the father had testamentary capacity and knew and approved of the will's contents.

The court ordered that a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee with a will may issue.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his former litigation counsel for solicitor's negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellant alleged his counsel wrongly consented to default judgment and failed to respond to the bank's counsel, leading to a receivership over his farm properties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual conclusions—that the counsel acted diligently and was not negligent—were firmly anchored in the evidentiary record and free from palpable and overriding error.

The appeal regarding trial costs was also dismissed.

The defendants brought motions to set aside an Anton Piller order and to exclude evidence obtained under it, and also sought summary judgment dismissing the action on limitation grounds.

The action alleged an unauthorized SMATV scheme distributing encrypted satellite television programming to hundreds of tenants using residential subscriber accounts, contrary to the Radiocommunication Act, contract, and tort principles.

The court held that the plaintiff established a strong prima facie case and that the Anton Piller order was properly granted, finding no failure of full and frank disclosure.

The court also found that complex factual disputes, credibility issues, and allegations of fraudulent concealment prevented determination of limitation defences on summary judgment.

Both the motions to set aside the Anton Piller order and the motions for summary judgment were dismissed.

A municipal candidate appealed preliminary rulings concerning the scope of an appeal from a Compliance Audit Committee decision ordering a compliance audit under the Municipal Elections Act, 1996.

The appellant argued the appeal should proceed as a de novo hearing rather than a review based on the existing record and challenged the committee’s procedures and lack of reasons.

The court held that appeals are presumptively based on the record unless legislation clearly authorizes a new hearing, and the statute provided only for an appeal.

Issues relating to fresh evidence and the standard of review were properly deferred to the hearing of the main appeal.

The preliminary appeal was dismissed.

The respondent commenced an action alleging the appellants fraudulently obtained and illegally transmitted its satellite programming to apartment tenants.

The appellants moved to stay the action under s. 7(1) of the Arbitration Act, relying on an arbitration clause in the residential subscriber agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the stay, finding the appellants could not invoke the arbitration clause without acknowledging they were parties to it.

The Court also agreed that a partial stay under s. 7(5) was inappropriate as it would cause a multiplicity of proceedings, given that only a few of the 23 defendants were potentially bound by the agreement.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding he breached a non-competition provision in a Shareholders Agreement.

The appellant argued this finding was inconsistent with the trial judge's conclusion that he did not breach a fiduciary duty when he left his employment and took a specific client's business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding there was no inconsistency because the Shareholders Agreement required the appellant to relinquish his shares to avoid the non-competition provision, which he failed to do.

The plaintiffs appealed an order determining that Ontario lacked jurisdiction or was forum non conveniens for their claims of breach of contract and misrepresentation against their insurance brokers and insurers.

The claims arose from a lapsed umbrella liability policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the central core of the lawsuit concerned contracts and representations made in Quebec, and that the plaintiffs' presence in Ontario was insignificant.

The tenants appealed an eviction order and a jurisdictional ruling made by the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing before a differently constituted Board.

The Court found that meaningful appellate review was impossible due to a malfunction that resulted in missing transcripts for a full day of evidence, combined with the Board member's failure to provide adequate reasons for her decision.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay a $3.3 million equalization payment, retroactive child support, ongoing child support, and costs including a $150,000 premium.

The core issues involved whether a cottage owned by the husband's numbered company constituted a matrimonial home, the valuation of his business, and the appropriateness of the support and costs awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to pierce the corporate veil regarding the cottage and accepted the business valuation and support orders.

However, applying recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the $150,000 costs premium.

The respondent wife's cross-appeal seeking higher pre-judgment interest was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding the wrongful distribution of corporate assets to themselves, to the detriment of the respondent shareholder.

The appellants argued the judgment should be set aside because the trial judge had also conducted the pre-trial conference, contrary to Rule 50.04.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants had explicitly waived any objection to the trial judge presiding and suffered no prejudice.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's findings on the wrongful distribution of assets and the imposition of liability on the appellants under the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act.