Nancy Jane Tourgis

The plaintiffs in a conditionally certified class action sought court approval for new Class Counsel, a precondition for certification.

The defendant withdrew its decertification motion and consented to the appointment.

The court appointed Flaherty McCarthy LLP and Mack Lawyers as Class Counsel, rendering the action unconditionally certified.

This case involves three appeals arising from matrimonial proceedings.

The Court of Appeal addressed the validity of a stay of execution obtained by a third-party creditor (the husband's father) against the matrimonial home, the striking of the husband's pleadings for non-compliance with court orders, and the interpretation of a domestic contract concerning the wife's interest in the matrimonial home and equalization payments.

The court found that the stay of execution was justified under the Courts of Justice Act, despite not meeting the Family Law Act criteria, as the creditor's objective was to defeat the wife's claims.

The decision to strike the husband's pleadings was upheld due to his wilful non-compliance and history of defaults.

The trial judge's interpretation of the domestic contract, granting the wife a one-half interest in the matrimonial home, and the valuation of the husband's debt to his father at zero for equalization purposes were affirmed.

However, the costs award from the lower court was varied to credit the husband for interim payments already made.

An insurer appealed a decision finding that an insured's adult daughter was covered under a homeowner's insurance policy after she was injured falling from a porch.

The daughter had lived with her mother for over 60 years, paid rent, and performed household chores.

The policy excluded coverage for persons residing in the household except residence employees.

The application judge found the daughter was not a residence employee but was covered as a tenant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that once a person is established as a member of the household, they cannot be covered as a tenant under the exclusion clause, regardless of whether they pay rent.

The appellant developer appealed two summary judgments ordering the return of deposits paid for commercial and residential condominium units in a development.

The respondents had sought to rescind the purchase agreements based on material changes to the development disclosed in revised disclosure statements.

After the developer's financial difficulties led to receivership, the receiver conveyed the units to a third party, making performance impossible.

The motion judge found the agreements were terminated through no fault of the purchasers and ordered return of deposits with interest.

The appellate court upheld both judgments, finding the purchasers had not breached the agreements and were entitled to relief under the contractual termination provisions.

This costs endorsement followed multiple motions concerning the administration of the Estate of Peter Trezzi.

The court applied the modern approach to costs in estate litigation, considering public policy factors and the general civil litigation costs regime.

Costs were determined for four main matters: ownership of 18 Boyle Drive, extension of the applicant's Family Law Act rights, corporate assets, and share ownership of Across Canada Construction Ltd. The court also addressed costs for an adjournment motion, production orders, and consent orders.

The decision allocated costs between parties and the Estate, often finding that the Estate should bear costs due to issues arising from the deceased's actions or ambiguities in the will.

In a conditionally certified class action concerning rescinded agreements to purchase hotel units and the refund of deposits, the Representative Plaintiffs brought a motion for an order requiring the Defendant to disclose the amount in dollars represented by insurance policies and/or deposits held by its real estate lawyers.

The Plaintiffs argued this information was necessary to retain new Class Counsel, as the Defendant was insolvent.

The Defendant refused, claiming solicitor-client or litigation privilege.

The court granted the motion, finding that the requested information (copies of agreements of purchase and sale and confirmation of deposit amounts) constituted raw data, not privileged information, and should have been disclosed under sections 5(3) and 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, to ensure the fair and expeditious determination of the class proceeding.

The respondent appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to compel the moving party to answer discovery questions regarding a pattern of commercially unreasonable conduct.

The respondent had pleaded that the moving party's conduct toward his company was part of a broader pattern of conduct toward multiple borrowers.

The motion judge held the questions were not relevant because the respondent failed to demonstrate sufficient similarities.

The Court of Appeal held the order was interlocutory and the appeal was brought to the wrong court, as appeals of interlocutory orders lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the moving party.

This costs endorsement addresses the plaintiff's request for costs thrown away following the adjournment of a trial due to the defendants' late disclosure of material documents.

The plaintiff sought full indemnity costs of $16,709.88.

The defendants argued for nominal costs.

The court determined that the defendants' failure to disclose warranted a sanction and awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixing the amount at $5,000.00, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, to be paid by the defendants to the plaintiff.

Various defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, which alleged civil conspiracy, defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and unjust enrichment.

The court struck the claims for defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and unjust enrichment against all applicants.

The civil conspiracy claim against one individual defendant (Moez Kassam) was struck, but the conspiracy claims against the remaining Anson Corporate Defendants, Adam Spears, Sunny Puri, ClaritySpring Inc., Nathan Anderson, Richard Molyneux, and Darryl Levitt were allowed to proceed.

The court also clarified that 'whistleblower' complaints to the Ontario Securities Commission are subject to absolute privilege and do not constitute the commencement of legal proceedings for the tort of abuse of process.

The applicant wife and respondent husband separated after an 11-year marriage.

The husband's pleadings were struck for non-compliance with disclosure orders.

The court imputed an income of $100,000 to the husband for support purposes, finding him intentionally underemployed and noting the significant financial support he received from his wealthy father.

The court ordered prospective child and spousal support but denied retroactive support due to unexplained delay.

The court interpreted the parties' domestic contract as entitling the wife to one-half of the equity in the matrimonial home, which the husband had purchased solely in his name.

Furthermore, the court stayed a writ of execution obtained by the husband's father against the husband, finding it was an improper attempt to encumber the matrimonial home and defeat the wife's claims.

The plaintiffs, Henry Jung and Long Ocean Holding Ltd., brought two motions for summary judgment seeking the return of deposits plus interest for commercial and residential units in the former Trump Tower.

The defendant, Talon International Inc., counterclaimed for forfeiture of the deposits, alleging breach of contract.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that the agreements of purchase and sale were terminated through no fault of the purchasers due to Talon's receivership and subsequent sale of the units to a third party.

The court also found Talon's statements of adjustments to be aggressive and overreaching, and that the plaintiffs' actions for specific performance were not a breach of contract.

The applicant, Nicole Peerenboom, brought a motion to strike the pleadings of Robert Peerenboom due to his persistent non-compliance with court orders regarding interim costs, disbursements, and financial disclosure.

She also sought to strike Harold Peerenboom's pleadings for late filing and new claims.

The court found Robert's non-compliance wilful and struck his pleadings, allowing for reinstatement upon full compliance.

Harold's pleadings were struck only to the extent they raised new claims.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action on behalf of purchasers of hotel condominium units in the Trump International Hotel and Tower Toronto who sought rescission of their purchase agreements and the return of their deposits due to alleged misrepresentations.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed causes of action for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, and that the identifiable class, common issues, and preferable procedure criteria were met.

However, the court found a conflict of interest with the proposed class counsel, who also represented plaintiffs in individual actions.

The court conditionally certified the class action, giving the plaintiff 60 days to retain new class counsel, and consolidated a related action.

The appellant husband appealed an interlocutory order requiring him to pay $150,000 in interim costs and disbursements to the respondent wife in a complex matrimonial property dispute.

The appellant argued the motions judge erred in applying the four-part test for interim costs, specifically regarding the merit of the wife's claim, her inability to fund the litigation, and his ability to pay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error that would affect the outcome, as there was ample evidence to support the motions judge's findings on all branches of the test.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a motion brought by the moving parties (Singh et al.) seeking consolidation of multiple actions, payment of outstanding costs orders against Talon International Inc. (Talon), and security for costs against Talon.

The court had previously dismissed the consolidation request, ordered Talon to pay existing costs or have its defence struck, and granted security for costs in one action.

In this costs decision, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to Val Levitan and the Trump parties, who successfully opposed the consolidation motion.

Costs were denied to Alex Shnaider, who was represented by the same counsel as Talon, and Talon itself did not seek costs.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs to Levitan, finding the settlement offer did not trigger such an award.

The moving parties sought to consolidate 19 actions related to hotel condominium units in the Trump Tower, compel payment of outstanding costs orders against Talon International Inc. (Talon), and obtain security for costs against Talon.

The court dismissed the motion for consolidation, finding it unlikely to streamline proceedings and primarily a tactical move to enforce costs.

However, the court ordered Talon to pay existing costs awards in two specific actions within ten days, failing which its defence and counterclaim in those actions would be struck.

Security for costs was granted against Talon only in the Shah/Patel action, where Talon was the plaintiff and had insufficient assets, but denied in other actions where Talon's counterclaims were deemed defenses.

The plaintiff, the former manager of the defendant investment fund, sued for fees and damages following the termination of its management agreement.

The defendant fund counterclaimed, alleging the manager was terminated for cause due to material breaches of the standard of care, particularly regarding its handling of the fund's liquidity crisis and its recommendation to enter into a high-interest loan rather than suspending redemptions.

The court found that the manager materially breached the standard of care, justifying the termination.

However, the fund's counterclaim for damages was dismissed as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The manager was awarded certain unpaid fees accrued prior to termination.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to remove Friedman Law Professional Corporation (FLPC) as lawyers of record for the defendants due to an alleged conflict of interest.

FLPC had previously represented the plaintiff Keith Alexander in a family law application involving complex family and business disputes.

The court found that the prior retainer was sufficiently related to the current defamation action, which involved allegations of abuse and extortion related to the same family disputes.

The court concluded that FLPC likely acquired relevant confidential information during the prior retainer and ordered FLPC removed as counsel of record to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs' affiants to answer undertakings and refusals from their cross-examinations.

The primary issue was whether the plaintiffs waived solicitor-client privilege over their counsel's file regarding a business sale by placing their state of mind and legal advice in issue in their pleadings and affidavits.

The court found that the plaintiffs had waived privilege and ordered the production of the entire file and answers to related questions.

However, the court upheld refusals relating to the Assignment of Guarantees, legal accounts, and questions of law or relevance.

The motion was granted in part.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add a corporate plaintiff, Northeast Engineering & Development Ltd., and new causes of action for intentional interference with economic relations and breach of fiduciary duty.

The defendants opposed, arguing prejudice, abuse of process, and that the proposed claims were untenable.

The court granted leave, finding the proposed claims raised triable issues, the amendments complied with pleading rules, and the addition of the corporate plaintiff did not constitute undue prejudice or abuse of process, especially given the claims arose from the same facts and could have been brought in a separate action.