Monique J. Jilesen

The proposed intervenor filed a request to intervene in a human rights application alleging discrimination regarding the use of the Cleveland Indians team name and logo.

The proposed intervenor claimed to have knowledge of international human rights instruments and argued the Tribunal was violating his human rights by dealing with the application.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding the proposed intervenor had no special contribution to make and would not provide assistance that the respondents would not already provide.

The Applicants, under CCAA protection, brought a motion seeking an order to authorize and approve the Revised Fourth DIP Amendment.

The motion was opposed by the USW and GIP.

The court granted the motion, finding that the DIP solicitation process was competitive, robust, and fair, and that the Revised Fourth DIP Amendment was the best available proposal.

The amendment addressed previous concerns by providing a maturity date past the winter build period, a sufficient commitment amount, and minimal conditions on covenants.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Deputy Judge's order for pre-trial inspection of an iPhone in a products liability case.

The appellant alleged the iPhone overheated and caused severe burns to his arm.

The central issue was whether Deputy Judges of the Small Claims Court have jurisdiction to order pre-trial inspection of property.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that such jurisdiction exists under the Rules of the Small Claims Court where trial fairness and the interests of justice require it, and that the jurisdiction was properly exercised in this case.

Following an oppression action within CCAA proceedings, the court determined costs claims by Algoma and GIP.

The Essar Defendants agreed to pay $1.7 million in costs to the Monitor.

Algoma sought partial indemnity costs against the Essar Defendants, largely for extensive e-discovery disbursements.

The court rejected the argument that Algoma should be denied costs because it was aligned with the Monitor, finding Algoma's participation and document production were critical to the case.

The court awarded Algoma $1,138,809.19 in costs.

GIP's claim for costs against the Monitor was dismissed with no order as to costs, as the court found success between the Monitor and GIP was divided.

The applicants (Algoma) sought two declarations: (i) that amounts owing under a promissory note from Portco to Algoma had been set off against amounts Algoma owed to Portco under a Cargo Handling Agreement; and (ii) that Algoma's right to terminate related Port Agreements was not subject to Portco's payment of the GIP Loan, which was tied to the set-off amounts.

The court granted the first declaration, finding that equitable set-off applied given the close connection between the parties and transactions, and the manifest inequity of requiring Algoma to pay Portco while the parent company (EGFL) failed to pay the promissory note.

However, the court denied the second declaration, holding that it would contradict a prior oppression judgment and an assignment agreement which explicitly required the GIP Loan to be paid in full in cash before Algoma could terminate the Port Agreements.

This endorsement addresses a procedural dispute regarding the order of upcoming motions.

The Defendants brought a motion for contempt and other relief, alleging the Plaintiff violated a prior court order.

The Plaintiff, in turn, brought a motion to strike the Defendants' contempt motion, arguing it could not succeed and seeking to avoid being compelled to testify or submit an affidavit in defense of the contempt allegations.

The court agreed with the Plaintiff, ruling that the motion to strike should be heard first, as its success could significantly reduce the need for the Defendants' broader motion and protect the Plaintiff's right not to testify in contempt proceedings.

GIP Primus, L.P. and Brightwood Loan Services LLC ("GIP"), along with Portco, brought motions seeking orders for Essar Steel Algoma Inc. ("Algoma") to resume payments under a Cargo Handling Agreement, including arrears, and for a priority charge in the alternative.

The motions were based on section 11.01(a) of the CCAA, arguing that Portco provided critical services or licensed property.

The court dismissed the motions, reiterating previous findings that Portco did not provide services or a license, and that the arguments were previously decided.

The court also declined to grant a critical supplier charge under section 11.4 or the general discretion of section 11 of the CCAA, citing lack of application by the debtor, prior rulings, and potential breach of DIP loan terms and prejudice to other creditors.

The Holmes defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their fourth motion to set aside a Mareva injunction and ancillary orders.

The motion judge had dismissed the Mareva order challenge on grounds of waiver and res judicata.

The applicant argued for leave based on conflicting decisions and doubt regarding the order's correctness.

The court denied leave, finding no conflicting decision on principle and no serious debate about the order's correctness, emphasizing the unique circumstances and the history of repeated, unsuccessful motions.

Essar Capital Limited and USW Local 2251 brought motions within a Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceeding.

Essar Capital sought to re-open the Sale and Investment Solicitation Process (SISP) and compel the disclosure of information to Essar Global for a potential bid.

Local 2251 sought court advice on engaging in discussions with Ontario Steel Investments Ltd. regarding potential transactions.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no basis to interfere with the established SISP, noting Essar Global's prior failure to demonstrate financial capability and the lack of a formal bid from Ontario Steel.

The court emphasized the need to maintain the integrity of the court-ordered process and avoid delays detrimental to the restructuring.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on ancestry, colour, and ethnic origin regarding the use of the Cleveland baseball team's name and "Chief Wahoo" logo during games and broadcasts in Ontario.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer the application pending another proceeding.

The Tribunal determined that deferral was not appropriate because an injunction application had already been decided and a related federal human rights complaint raised jurisdictional issues that needed to be resolved first.

The Tribunal issued directions and a schedule for the parties to make submissions on the preliminary jurisdictional issues.

The applicant, an Indigenous person, sought an urgent interim and interlocutory injunction to restrain the broadcast and display of the Cleveland Indians' team name and 'Chief Wahoo' logo during the American League Championship Series in Toronto, pending human rights complaints.

The court found there was a serious issue to be tried regarding whether the name and logo constituted discrimination in the provision of a service.

However, the court dismissed the application because the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm, noting the delay in bringing the application, and found the balance of convenience favoured the respondents due to the material prejudice of last-minute broadcast and uniform changes.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Small Claims Court order requiring him to produce his allegedly defective iPhone 5 to the respondent for expert inspection.

The applicant argued the Deputy Judge lacked jurisdiction because the Small Claims Court Rules do not explicitly provide for pre-trial property inspection.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that Rule 1.03 permits the court to make orders by analogy to the Rules of Civil Procedure where the Small Claims Court Rules are inadequate.

The court found that ordering a pre-trial inspection was necessary to ensure fairness and a level playing field, given the applicant's intent to rely on expert evidence regarding the device.

This decision concerns the judicial approval of a class action settlement, legal fees for class counsel, and an honorarium for the representative plaintiff in a misclassification overtime class action against BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. The defendant agreed to pay $12 million for class member compensation and $500,000 for administration costs.

The court found the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, falling within a zone of reasonableness established by comparable U.S. settlements.

A 25% contingency fee for class counsel and a $10,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff were also approved.

The plaintiff railway company sought interlocutory injunctive relief after former employees joined a direct competitor and allegedly downloaded and circulated confidential commercial information, including customer lists and revenue data, to solicit the plaintiff’s clients.

The parties agreed to an injunction preserving confidential information and restricting its use, but disputed whether an independent court-appointed monitor should oversee compliance with the order.

The court found the defendants had initially fallen short in complying with an earlier undertaking but had taken substantial remedial steps, including forensic searches, employee discipline, and written directives prohibiting use of the information.

The court concluded that appointing a monitor with broad investigative and supervisory powers would be overly intrusive into the defendant corporation’s business operations.

The court held that the contempt power and the existing order sufficiently protected the plaintiff’s interests.

The plaintiff in a proposed class action regarding defective condominium bathtub valves brought a motion to set aside settlements reached between the defendants and several putative class members prior to certification.

The defendants had offered $500 and a valve replacement to unit owners who contacted them, in exchange for a release.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no breach of the Class Proceedings Act or Rules of Professional Conduct, and concluded that court intervention was not necessary to protect the putative class members' interests at this stage.

The plaintiff, a resident of Switzerland with no assets in Ontario, sought court approval for a third-party Litigation Funding Agreement (LFA) to pursue a complex commercial action against the defendants.

The defendants opposed the LFA, arguing it could allow the funder to recover more than 50 percent of the proceeds, and brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The court found that while third-party funding is not per se objectionable in commercial litigation, the specific terms of this LFA were unfair to the plaintiff and constituted champerty and maintenance.

The motion to approve the LFA was dismissed without prejudice, and the cross-motion for security for costs was deferred.

The moving defendants sought to vary a case management order requiring related actions to proceed together, to set aside a longstanding Mareva injunction, or alternatively to vary the injunction to permit asset sales and access to funds.

The court refused to sever the consolidated trial process and declined to vacate the Mareva order, finding the delay was not solely attributable to the plaintiff, the factual basis for the injunction had not materially changed, and the moving defendants had provided contradictory and incomplete financial disclosure.

Applying the established injunction and Mareva variation frameworks, the court held the moving defendants had not discharged their heavy burden for broad relief.

Limited variation was granted to allow supervised sale of properties and potential funding of a tax appeal, with any further living or legal expense relief made conditional on compliance and meaningful disclosure.

The moving parties sought an order restraining a private investigator from disclosing or assisting others in disclosing documents and information obtained through the discovery process in related civil litigation.

The investigator, who was not a party to the action, had obtained thousands of documents produced on discovery and had disseminated some of them to third parties, including media outlets, and moved the documents outside the jurisdiction.

The court considered the scope and purpose of the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and authorities recognizing that the rule protects discovery material from collateral use.

It held that the court has jurisdiction to restrain third parties who knowingly obtain and use discovery documents contrary to the rule.

Given the investigator’s deliberate conduct in soliciting and disseminating the documents and attempting to evade court authority, a restraining order was warranted.

Following certification of a class proceeding alleging unpaid overtime by investment advisors, the court determined the appropriate costs award arising from the certification motion.

The plaintiff sought $575,000 in partial indemnity costs while the defendant argued the award should not exceed $315,000.

The court outlined a structured methodology for certification-motion costs awards emphasizing transparency, historical averages, proportionality, and the Rule 57.01(1) factors.

After reducing the claim for excess fees and disbursements and considering historical cost award data and comparable cases, the court fixed costs at $290,000 all-inclusive payable by the defendant to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, a former investment advisor, sought to certify a class action against the defendant for unpaid overtime under the Employment Standards Act.

The defendant argued that investment advisors were exempt from overtime provisions due to their managerial character or because their compensation provided a greater benefit.

The court found that the plaintiff met all five prerequisites for certification under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including that the applicability of the exemptions could be determined as common issues.

The motion for certification was granted.