Michel Z. Charbonneau

The accused was charged under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act with genocide and crimes against humanity for allegedly participating in the 1994 Rwandan genocide by intentionally killing Tutsis during attacks in the Kibuye region.

Numerous witnesses described massacres at Mugonero hospital and subsequent attacks in Gitwe, Murambi, and Bisesero.

The Crown relied on both direct eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence that the accused joined groups of attackers.

The court found serious credibility issues in several key Crown witnesses, including evidence that some allegations had been fabricated or exaggerated after investigators revealed the accused as the target of an investigation.

Given inconsistencies, unreliable identifications, and lack of corroboration, the court held the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused participated in the killings or materially assisted the attacks.

The moving party brought a motion in a family law proceeding seeking to add a closely held corporation as a respondent, amend the pleadings, ratify service on the corporation, and obtain related procedural relief.

The responding party opposed the addition of the corporation, arguing the corporate shares were excluded property under the Family Law Act and that the corporation had no legal interest in the litigation.

The court held that the alleged excluded property status had not yet been proven and that the corporation could be substantially affected by the final judgment.

The court therefore granted the motion to add the corporation and to amend the pleadings, ratified service, and refused the responding party’s request to adjourn and proceed with a child support motion due to delays and failure to provide financial disclosure.

Child protection proceedings in which a children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment declaring several children in need of protection and seeking their return to the mother under a supervision order.

The evidence demonstrated extensive past concerns including exposure to domestic violence, substance abuse, neglect of medical and hygiene needs, and inappropriate discipline.

The mother consented to a finding of protection and supervision, while another responding party opposed the motion and requested a trial or placement of one child in his care.

The court held that the evidence overwhelmingly established the children were in need of protection and that no genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

Applying the statutory requirement to consider the least disruptive measures, the court ordered the children returned to the mother under supervision.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal on charges of impaired driving and refusal to provide a breath sample.

The appeal court held that the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard when assessing whether the police officer had reasonable grounds to demand a roadside screening test, requiring proof of probable impairment rather than a reasonable suspicion that alcohol was present in the accused’s body.

The court also found legal errors in the trial judge’s failure to provide reasons for excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and in dismissing the impaired driving charge without permitting Crown submissions.

Given that the trial judge had already made final determinations on key issues, the matter could not be meaningfully remitted to complete the trial.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 19.08(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff in a breach of contract action.

The court considered whether the motion was brought without delay, whether the default was reasonably explained, and whether the defendant demonstrated a triable defence.

The defendant asserted he was unaware of the Superior Court action after being served with multiple documents and believed only a Small Claims Court action had been commenced.

The court accepted this explanation and found a potential defence regarding whether the contract permitted recovery of damages for loss of profits beyond specified contractual damages.

The default judgment was set aside and the defendant was permitted to defend, subject to reimbursing the plaintiff for costs thrown away in obtaining the judgment.

Both parties brought competing motions to change the child support provisions of a 2001 divorce order.

The applicant sought increased and retroactive child support based on the respondent’s increased income and requested contribution toward special expenses including orthodontics and competitive soccer.

The respondent sought termination or reduction of support due to unemployment.

The court found material changes in circumstances, attributed income reflecting severance and employment insurance, and varied support prospectively from the date of effective notice rather than the earlier period sought.

The court also determined that competitive soccer constituted a s.7 special expense and ordered a limited contribution.

The responding party in a family law proceeding brought a motion to change seeking to eliminate child and spousal support arrears arising from a separation agreement filed with the court.

The self-represented party allegedly failed to file a response affidavit, and submissions proceeded on the assumption that no responding evidence existed.

Upon reviewing the court file, the judge determined that the responding party had in fact filed a response in the underlying motion to change and that the motion before the court was a continuation of that proceeding.

Because the judge had previously presided over a settlement conference and because the hearing had proceeded on a mistaken factual premise regarding the evidence, the judge recused himself and directed that the motion be heard by another judge.

Following the dismissal of a motion brought by the plaintiff, the court determined the issue of costs.

Applying the general principle that costs follow the event, the court held that the defendants were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the defendants’ request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the motion was not unreasonable and there was no evidence of bad faith.

Considering the complexity and importance of the issues raised, the court fixed partial indemnity costs payable by the plaintiff to each defendant.

The Family Responsibility Office sought enforcement of child support arrears against the respondent pursuant to prior consent orders governing periodic child support and extraordinary expenses.

The respondent disputed the arrears calculation, alleging that certain extraordinary expenses were improperly included, that payments previously made under protest were not credited, and that certain accounting charges were erroneous.

The court interpreted the prior variation order as having established a “clean slate” fixing arrears as of specified dates, thereby incorporating all credits and charges up to that time.

The court accepted the enforcement calculation and determined the respondent remained in arrears.

The respondent was ordered to pay the arrears by a specified date, failing which enforcement by committal could be sought.

The accused was charged with possession of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered 85.6 kilograms in the rear compartment of a pickup truck during a highway stop.

The defence sought exclusion of the evidence under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, arguing the vehicle stop and subsequent search were unconstitutional.

The court found the officer’s explanation for the stop not credible and determined the stop was a pretext unrelated to road safety, amounting to arbitrary detention.

The warrantless search of the vehicle flowed directly from that unlawful detention and constituted an unreasonable search.

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the cannabis evidence and acquitted the accused.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking an order compelling the Crown to produce a structured “livre de procès” setting out all material facts supporting each alleged criminal act and identifying the witnesses tied to those facts.

The accused argued that the exceptional measure was necessary due to the alleged complexity of the prosecution and relied on the court’s case‑management powers under the Fair and Efficient Criminal Trials Act.

The court rejected the request, finding that the case itself was not unusually complex and that the Act applies to mega‑trials involving numerous accused and counts.

The court further held it could not restrict the Crown’s discretion to call admissible evidence where full disclosure had already been provided.

The motion was dismissed, although the Crown was ordered to provide a final witness list prior to trial.

The accused brought a motion seeking a declaration that evidence placing him within a broad geographic region during the alleged offence period should not be treated as an alibi defence requiring advance notice to the Crown.

The accused argued the indictment was too vague as to time and location to permit a specific alibi disclosure obligation.

The court held that the disclosure provided by the Crown gave sufficient detail for the accused to understand the allegations and determine whether an alibi existed for particular incidents.

The court also held that there is no freestanding right to an alibi defence and that issues regarding late disclosure must be assessed contextually when the evidence is presented.

The motion was dismissed.

Homeowners commenced an action for damages alleging breach of a construction contract relating to the lifting of a house and installation of a new basement foundation.

The contractor counterclaimed for unpaid amounts relating to the contract and additional work performed as “extras”.

The court held the homeowners acted as builder‑owners responsible for overall project compliance with the Building Code and rejected claims that the contractor guaranteed the structural viability of the project.

While minor breaches of workmanship were found, including damage caused during lowering of the house and incomplete debris removal, the claimed damages were largely excessive.

After accounting for contractual credits and valid charges for additional work, the contractor succeeded on the counterclaim with judgment granted in a set‑off amount.