Michel Bastarache

The appellant commenced an action in rem against a cargo of coal and obtained a warrant to arrest the cargo to secure an arbitration proceeding for an alleged breach of a contract of affreightment.

The Federal Court of Appeal struck the claim and set aside the warrant based on binding precedent requiring a 'physical nexus' under s. 43(2) of the Federal Courts Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, rejecting the 'physical nexus' interpretation in favour of an 'identifiability' test, finding that the cargo was the subject of the action because it was designated in the contract alleged to be breached.

The appellant posted federal election results from Atlantic Canada on his website before polling stations had closed in other parts of the country, violating s. 329 of the Canada Elections Act.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it infringed his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the publication ban infringes freedom of expression, it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The majority found that the ban serves the pressing and substantial objective of ensuring informational equality among voters and maintaining public confidence in the electoral system, and that the salutary effects of the brief delay in publication outweigh its deleterious effects.

The accused was arrested for multiple robberies.

During police interrogation, he offered to confess in exchange for lenient treatment for his girlfriend, who was also arrested.

The police officer denied being able to make a deal but allowed the accused to visit his girlfriend after a partial confession.

The trial judge admitted the statements as voluntary, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding that the trial judge properly applied the contextual approach to voluntariness and correctly concluded that the inducements were not strong enough to overbear the accused's will.

The federal government amended the Canada Pension Plan to extend survivor benefits to same-sex partners, but limited eligibility to those whose partners died on or after January 1, 1998, and precluded payments for months before July 2000.

A class action challenged these temporal limits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the temporal limits infringed section 15(1) of the Charter and were not justified under section 1.

However, the Court denied fully retroactive relief, finding that the prior exclusion of same-sex partners was based on a reasonable understanding of the law before the Court's landmark decision in M. v. H., and that the government acted in good faith.

The Court also held that estates do not have standing to advance section 15(1) claims.

The appellants, foreign nationals and a permanent resident, were detained under security certificates issued pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

They challenged the constitutionality of the IRPA's certificate scheme, which allows for detention and deportation based on secret evidence not disclosed to the named person.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the procedure for determining the reasonableness of a certificate infringes section 7 of the Charter because it denies the named person the right to know the case to meet, and is not saved by section 1.

The Court also found that the lack of prompt review for the detention of foreign nationals infringes sections 9 and 10(c) of the Charter.

The Court struck down the offending provisions but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow Parliament to amend the law.

The appellant appealed a Court of Appeal decision that set aside a contempt order against the respondent.

The respondent had been found in contempt for failing to secure his support obligations with an irrevocable letter of credit and to post security for costs.

The Court of Appeal had held that the motions judge lacked jurisdiction under Rule 60.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure because the orders were for the 'payment of money'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting appellate judge that neither security order amounted to an order for the payment of money, and reinstated the contempt order.

The respondent was badly burned when he mistakenly poured hot water into the gasoline tank of an ice-resurfacing machine, causing an explosion.

He sued the manufacturer and distributor for negligent design.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the accident was caused by operator error and that the design was not a reasonably foreseeable cause of the confusion.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the trial judge erred in his foreseeability and causation analyses, specifically by not applying the 'material contribution' test.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, clarifying that the 'but for' test remains the primary test for causation in negligence, and the 'material contribution' test applies only in exceptional circumstances where it is impossible to prove causation using the 'but for' test.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

At trial, the Crown relied on the testimony of a witness whose memory of seeing the appellant near the crime scene was refreshed through hypnosis, as well as similar fact evidence from a former girlfriend.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that post-hypnosis evidence is presumptively inadmissible because it does not meet the reliability requirements for novel scientific evidence.

The Court also found that the similar fact evidence lacked sufficient probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect, and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of obstructing justice under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code for deliberately failing to gather evidence to lay an impaired driving charge against a fellow officer.

The appellant claimed he was exercising police discretion.

The trial judge rejected this explanation, finding the appellant acted out of favouritism.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while police possess discretion, it must be exercised honestly, transparently, and on valid grounds.

The trial judge's finding that the appellant acted with the specific intent to obstruct justice was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant hospital terminated the grievor's employment after a three-year absence due to illness, relying on an automatic termination clause in the collective agreement.

The union grieved the termination, arguing the employer failed in its duty to accommodate.

The arbitrator dismissed the grievance, finding the employer had accommodated the grievor beyond the collective agreement's requirements and that she remained totally disabled.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while a collective agreement cannot contract out of human rights legislation, a negotiated termination clause is a significant factor in assessing the employer's duty to accommodate and undue hardship.

The municipality issued a call for tenders for equipment and operators, specifying that all equipment must be 1980 or newer.

The successful bidder submitted a bid promising 1980 equipment, but the serial numbers provided corresponded to older equipment.

An unsuccessful bidder informed the municipality of this discrepancy before the contract was awarded, but the municipality did not investigate and awarded the contract to the successful bidder.

The unsuccessful bidder sued the municipality for breach of Contract A. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the successful bid was compliant on its face, the municipality had no duty to investigate the bid, and the municipality's obligations under Contract A ended once Contract B was formed.

The appellant, a bookstore catering to the gay and lesbian community, sought advance costs to fund litigation against Customs regarding the detention of four books and a systemic review of Customs' practices.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the case did not meet the strict requirements for an advance costs award established in Okanagan.

The Court found that the four books appeal was too narrow to constitute special circumstances of public importance, and the systemic review was an unnecessary expansion of the litigation.

Corporate taxpayers sought restitution of liquor user charges paid under legislation later held ultra vires as an unconstitutional indirect tax.

The Court held that recovery of ultra vires taxes is grounded in constitutional principles, not unjust enrichment, because the rule against taxation without legislative authority is a fundamental incident of democracy and the rule of law.

The Court rejected both any general Crown immunity from restitutionary claims and the passing-on defence in this context, and discarded protest and compulsion as a prerequisite for recovery against public authorities.

Recovery was limited by the six-year limitation period, compound interest was denied, and the appellants obtained restitution of charges paid on or after the limitation date with costs.

The appellants, members of the Tsartlip Indian Band, were convicted under provincial wildlife legislation for hunting at night with an illuminating device.

They appealed, arguing the legislation infringed their right to hunt under the North Saanich Treaty of 1852.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the treaty right to hunt includes the right to hunt at night with illumination.

The Court found that while the province can regulate safety, the absolute prohibition on night hunting was overbroad and constituted a prima facie infringement of the treaty right.

Consequently, the provincial law could not be incorporated under s. 88 of the Indian Act and was inapplicable to the appellants.

The appellant Indian band received federal funding under a Comprehensive Funding Arrangement (CFA), which was deposited into an off-reserve bank account.

The respondent creditor sought to garnish these funds to satisfy a consent judgment.

The band argued the funds were exempt from seizure under ss. 89 and 90(1)(b) of the Indian Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the funds were not physically situated on a reserve under s. 89, rejecting a notional situs test.

Furthermore, the Court held that the word 'agreement' in s. 90(1)(b) is limited to agreements that flesh out treaty obligations.

Because the band failed to prove the CFA funds were ancillary to a treaty, the funds were not deemed to be situated on a reserve and were subject to garnishment.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for theft, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the respondent had committed new fraud offences while awaiting sentencing.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the fresh evidence was inadmissible because the Crown failed to exercise due diligence in adducing it at the sentencing hearing.

The Court also discussed the admissibility of uncharged offences at sentencing, with the majority holding that such evidence must comply with the procedural safeguards in section 725 of the Criminal Code.

The respondents, members of the Maliseet and Mi'kmaq First Nations, were charged with unlawful possession or cutting of Crown timber under New Brunswick's Crown Lands and Forests Act.

They claimed an aboriginal right to harvest timber for personal use.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondents possess an aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses on Crown lands traditionally used for that purpose by their respective First Nations.

The Court clarified the Van der Peet test, holding that a practice undertaken for survival purposes can be considered integral to an aboriginal community's distinctive culture, and that the right to harvest wood for domestic uses has no commercial dimension.

The appellant sought to enforce a U.S. consent decree and contempt order against the respondent in Ontario for trademark infringement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the traditional common law rule should be changed to allow the enforcement of foreign non-monetary judgments in appropriate circumstances, the specific orders in this case were unenforceable.

The Court found the contempt order to be quasi-criminal in nature and the consent decree's extraterritorial application to be unclear, raising concerns about comity and the use of domestic judicial resources.

The Regroupement pour la commercialisation des produits de l'érable inc. is a non-profit corporation whose activities were paralyzed by internal conflicts.

The Fédération des producteurs acéricoles du Québec applied for its dissolution and the designation of a liquidator.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the suppletive scheme for the dissolution of legal persons set out in the Civil Code of Québec applies to a corporation constituted under Part III of the Companies Act when no specific legal scheme is applicable.

The Court upheld the dissolution and the attribution of the assets to the Fédération, but struck out the Court of Appeal's order relating to the payment of extra-judicial fees.