Michael H. Tulloch

This is an appeal from a trial judge's decision to discharge a mortgage.

The appellant claimed a loan was secured by a mortgage on the respondent's home, which was later re-loaned but remained secured.

The trial judge, unable to determine witness credibility, relied on documentary evidence to find the mortgage had been repaid and effectively redeemed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the issue of redemption was properly before the court via counterclaim, that the appellant waived technical compliance by admitting repayment, and that the trial judge was entitled to rely on documentary evidence given credibility issues.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that the officer had subjective reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, finding it supported by evidence and objectively reasonable.

The allegation of negligent investigation was dismissed because the appellants failed to present expert evidence on the standard of care to rebut the police's evidence.

The court affirmed that summary judgment in favour of a defendant was appropriate in this case.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal concerning an award of punitive damages.

The motion judge had awarded $50,000 in punitive damages without providing any analysis or reasons for the award.

The appellate court found that this lack of analysis rendered the decision unreviewable, concluding that punitive damages are an exceptional remedy requiring proper justification.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the punitive damages award was set aside.

This is an appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Justice finding the appellant in contempt of various court orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, noting that the appellant was clearly in contempt and failed to purge it despite numerous opportunities.

The appeal was dismissed, and the contempt sentence was ordered to run concurrently with any related criminal sentence.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession and distribution of child pornography, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 7 and 10(b) were infringed regarding statements made to police.

The trial judge had found the statements admissible, concluding no detention occurred.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was psychologically detained when questioned at his home without being informed of his right to counsel, constituting a serious Charter breach.

The subsequent statement at the police station was also tainted.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the Court determined that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the willful disregard of Charter rights and the significant impact on the accused, despite the evidence's reliability.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of assault with a weapon, breaking and entering, robbery, and aggravated assault.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in law by assessing the evidence piecemeal rather than considering it holistically, thereby failing to appreciate how the cumulative evidence built the strength of the Crown's case.

While the appellate court found that the trial judge did commit an error of law in her approach to the evidence, the appeal was dismissed because the victim—a Crown witness who knew the respondent well—testified with certainty that the attacker was not the respondent.

This independent exculpatory evidence raised a reasonable doubt that could not be overcome by the trial judge's error.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a respondent charged with committing indictable offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist group under section 83.2 of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was the sole member of his own terrorist group.

The trial judge found the respondent not guilty of the section 83.2 offences but found him not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (schizophrenia) for the underlying predicate offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation that section 83.2 does not apply to a lone wolf terrorist acting as the sole member of a terrorist group, as the provision contemplates a bilateral relationship between the principal committing the offence and a separate terrorist group.

The court dismissed the appeal.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering continued detention of an NCR (not criminally responsible) accused at a forensic psychiatric hospital with community living privileges.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge as the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the detention order remained necessary and appropriate given the appellant's ongoing mental health and substance use issues, poor insight into her condition, vulnerability to relapse, and recent threatening behaviour.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments that the Board failed to consider relevant factors including her sobriety, age-related reduction in violence risk, negative effects of hospitalization, and commitment to treatment compliance.

The appellant, a condominium corporation, sought to appeal a motion judge's decision staying its action in favour of arbitration.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal on the basis that it was barred by section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion to quash, finding that the appeal was statutorily barred.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments that it was denied natural justice and that the pith and substance of its claim was an oppression remedy under the Condominium Act that could not be precluded by arbitration clauses.

The court found that the motion judge correctly applied the test for determining whether claims fell within the scope of arbitration clauses and that the arbitrator could determine its own jurisdiction.

Four co-accused appealed convictions arising from a large-scale police investigation into criminal gang activity in Toronto (Project Battery and Project Rx).

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The key issues involved: (1) material non-disclosure regarding the use of a Mobile Device Identifier (MDI); (2) warrantless police entries into common areas of condominium buildings; and (3) warrantless installation of hidden surveillance cameras in condominium hallways.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but found that the warrantless installation of hidden cameras violated section 8 rights.

However, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants' convictions were dismissed except for a one-year sentence reduction for one appellant due to the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding drug quantities.

The appellant appealed from a partial summary judgment order in which the respondents obtained declarations that the appellant was not entitled to commissions or any increased compensation for changes in his employment.

The appellant had been employed as Business Development Manager from May 2014 until his termination in January 2016.

The appellant objected to the partial summary judgment procedure and argued he had inadequate time to advance his case.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in granting partial summary judgment and rejecting the appellant's late attempt to raise the doctrine of quantum meruit on appeal.

An applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order to surrender him to the United States to face drug trafficking and conspiracy charges.

The applicant argued that surrender would be unjust or oppressive due to serious health conditions including schizophrenia, epilepsy, and prostate cancer, and that extradition would cause significant harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Minister's decision, finding that the Minister applied the correct legal test under section 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act, properly considered the overall effects of surrender including available medical care in the U.S., and was entitled to rely on information from U.S. authorities regarding treatment availability.

The appellants appealed from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of Justice granting the respondent's motion to amend her statement of claim in a Simplified Rules action.

The Court of Appeal found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as interlocutory orders fall within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order finalizing equalization payments and property division in a matrimonial case that followed the appellant's conviction for first-degree murder of his wife.

The motion judge ordered the appellant to pay the Estate $410,000 plus interest, with payment secured through a vesting order on property, vesting of bank account funds for child support, and transfer of 50% of the appellant's pension to the Estate.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: lack of procedural fairness, reliance on a settlement conference statement, unequal equalization payment, and failure to adjust child support.

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness, no error in relying on the sworn Net Family Property statement, and that the unequal division was discretionary and justified given the circumstances.

The appellant, a former inbound technical call centre agent employed for approximately six months, appealed a summary judgment decision that awarded her $4,846.92 in pay in lieu of notice and dismissed her remaining claims for damages totalling millions of dollars.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the order was a final order for a single payment not exceeding $50,000 exclusive of costs, which falls within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court rather than the Court of Appeal.

Homeowners appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing their motion for a declaration that the respondents breached a Minutes of Settlement and granting the respondents declaratory relief enforcing the Minutes of Settlement.

The motion judge found that the respondents had complied with the Minutes of Settlement based on evidence that the work had been completed, including HVAC work, plumbing obligations, and permit closures.

The appellants advanced numerous grounds of appeal, all of which were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his common-law wife from a single stab wound.

He appealed his conviction on four grounds: failure to answer a jury question regarding mental state for murder; admission of bad character evidence; admission of a 911 call; and misdirection on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly admitted the evidence and gave appropriate jury instructions.

The first ground was abandoned after fresh evidence established the jury question was answered timely.

The remaining grounds were rejected as the trial judge properly balanced probative value against prejudicial effect and provided adequate cautionary instructions to the jury.

A teenage plaintiff was catastrophically injured when she deliberately jumped from a moving school bus on the last day of Grade 8 as part of an informal tradition among graduating students.

The bus operator had received prior reports of students jumping from buses but failed to report these incidents to the school as required by its own handbook.

A jury found the defendant 75 per cent liable and the plaintiff 25 per cent contributorily negligent, awarding substantial damages.

The defendant appealed on grounds of improper jury charge regarding causation and contributory negligence, erroneous removal of the mitigation issue from the jury, and failure to deduct statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the jury verdict on causation and contributory negligence, found the trial judge erred in removing mitigation from the jury but determined no miscarriage of justice resulted, and remitted the statutory accident benefits deduction issue to the Superior Court for determination.

A provincially incorporated contractor providing construction services to federally regulated telecommunications companies sought to challenge a provincial labour relations board's certification of its construction technicians as a provincially regulated bargaining unit.

The contractor argued that its construction technicians performed work vital, essential, or integral to federal undertakings and should therefore be subject to federal labour jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal reversed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the presumption of provincial jurisdiction over labour relations was not displaced.

The court found that the federal undertaking (Rogers) was not dependent on the contractor's construction technicians, and that the proper focus in derivative jurisdiction analysis is whether the federal undertaking is dependent on the particular employees in question, not whether the work performed is generally important to the federal undertaking.

The appellant mother appealed the decision of the Ontario Superior Court, which had upheld a motion judge's order making three young children Crown wards (now called extended society care) without access to the mother under the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal judge applied the wrong legislation (CFSA instead of CYFSA) and the wrong summary judgment principles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, confirming the extended society care order but granting the mother access to the children.

The court found that the motion judge's factual findings regarding the mother's inability to adequately care for the children were sound, but the denial of access was based on improper judicial notice and unsupported assumptions about adoption prospects.

The nature and extent of access were remanded to the Ontario Court of Justice.