C. Michael Harpur

The accused was charged with multiple counts of breaching probation and prohibition orders, as well as four counts of luring under section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused engaged in sexually explicit communications with two fifteen-year-old girls via Facebook, with the purpose of facilitating sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching.

The accused claimed his communications were intended solely for friendship and self-gratification fantasy.

The court found the accused guilty of all charges, holding that the Crown need not prove an intention to ultimately commit the secondary offence, only that the communications were intended to facilitate or make easier the commission of such offences.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of breach of probation orders prohibiting internet access and communication with minors, and with luring a person under 16 years old.

The accused brought a Charter section 8 application to exclude evidence obtained from a seized smartphone on the grounds of unreasonable search and seizure.

The court considered four alleged breaches: observation of a password gesture in public, seizure and search of cellular phones from the residence without a specific warrant, the particularity of the warrant for the target smartphone, and whether the search was overly broad.

The court found one breach regarding the warrantless search of cellular phones seized from the residence but declined to exclude the evidence from the target smartphone under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with alcohol-impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration following a traffic stop on Highway 400.

The trial proceeded on the merits with a blended Charter voir dire.

The court found that police violated the accused's Charter section 10(b) right to counsel by failing to provide a Prosper warning when the accused indicated a change of mind regarding legal representation.

The Intoxilyzer readings were excluded as a result.

However, the court found the Crown proved impairment based on the accused's driving pattern and roadside observations, resulting in conviction on the impaired charge and acquittal on the over 80 charge.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal and judgment of acquittal issued by a Justice of the Peace on charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The defendant company operated a construction yard where an employee was fatally struck by a reversing dump truck.

The Crown established that the company violated regulatory requirements regarding signallers.

The court allowed the appeal in part and decided the outstanding issue of due diligence on the evidentiary record.

The court found that the company had established due diligence through its safety protocols, training, and monitoring procedures, despite the tragic accident.

The company was found not guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with excess alcohol after police discovered his vehicle stuck in the snow-filled side yard of his residential property.

The Crown relied on observations of impairment indicators and breath samples showing 210 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the police entry onto private property and the sufficiency of grounds for the breath demand.

The court found no Charter violations, dismissed the impaired charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment, but convicted on the over 80 charge based on the admissible breath readings.

The accused brought an application to stay criminal charges on the basis of alleged violations of his Charter rights (sections 7 and 12) arising from an incident at Central North Correctional Centre where he was pepper sprayed by correctional officers during a meal service.

The accused had been convicted of seven offences related to a home invasion and was awaiting sentencing.

The court dismissed the application for a stay, finding that a stay was not appropriate given the serious nature of the underlying offences and the accused's extensive criminal record.

The court also found that the evidence did not establish that excessive force was used by the correctional officers.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a construction company on charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from the death of an employee struck by a reversing dump truck.

The trial court had directed a verdict of acquittal on one count and dismissed the remaining three counts.

The central issue was whether the company failed to ensure that a competent signaller assisted the dump truck operator in accordance with the applicable regulations.

The appellate court found that the trial court erred in concluding that the Crown had not proven the absence of a required signaller, as the evidence established that the deceased was not exclusively performing signaller duties and was not in full view of the truck operator.

The court set aside the acquittals and remitted the due diligence defence for reconsideration.

The accused was charged with sexual exploitation and sexual assault of a minor (E.T.) between October 2013 and June 2014, and with sexual interference and sexual assault of another minor (M.P.) on or about April 18, 2015.

The Crown sought to amend the information to extend the timeframe for the E.T. charges back to April 2012.

The court permitted the amendment and, after hearing evidence from both complainants and their mother, found the accused guilty of sexual assault of both complainants.

The court rejected the defence argument that the accused was in a position of trust or authority over E.T., finding instead that she was capable of consenting but did not.

The court acquitted on the sexual exploitation charge regarding E.T. but convicted on the sexual assault charge.

The defendant applied for exclusion of breath sample evidence pursuant to Charter sections 8, 9, and 24(2), alleging that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to arrest her or demand breath samples under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with excessive blood alcohol concentration.

The court found that the officer had objectively reasonable grounds based on the totality of circumstances, including the defendant's operation of a vehicle without lights, delay in stopping, improper stopping position, apparent attempt to mask breath odor through smoking, failure to produce documents promptly, provision of irrelevant documents, odor of alcohol on breath, failure to recite the alphabet accurately, and alteration of her account regarding alcohol consumption.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with assaulting his young daughter, causing her bodily harm, and breaching a probation order.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on evidence that the child was uninjured when placed in her crib but bore significant bruising when arriving at hospital approximately three hours later.

The Crown argued the accused was the only person with opportunity to cause the injuries.

The defence argued the Crown had not proven guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The court found significant credibility issues with both the Crown's primary witness and the accused's testimony, and admitted hearsay evidence from the accused's older son suggesting the mother may have caused the injuries.

The court concluded that while the mother's involvement could not be eliminated as a possibility, and a remote possibility of self-injury existed, the Crown had not proven the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with three counts of criminal harassment against Lisa Aube, Brent Aube, and Claude Aube between April 16 and December 16, 2013.

The Crown alleged that the accused sent repeated written communications to various recipients falsely claiming that the Aubes had abducted two children and demanding DNA testing.

The Crown established that the accused sent the communications from computers at the Mississauga Central Library using a library card registered in his name.

The trial proceeded with an amicus curiae assisting the self-represented accused.

The court found all elements of criminal harassment established, including identity of the sender, repetitive communications, harassment of the complainants, knowledge or recklessness regarding the harassment, and reasonable fear for safety.

Charter applications challenging the conviction were dismissed.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The accused was charged with first degree murder in the death of an elderly woman.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish that the killing was planned and deliberate, while the defence argued the evidence supported only second degree murder.

The Crown's case relied primarily on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's statements to a neighbour approximately two hours before the killing that God had commanded him to kill a female customer in the retirement community.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial on the first degree murder charge, distinguishing the case from precedents where planning and deliberation could not be reasonably inferred from the evidence.

The Crown applied for a declaration of mistrial following the emergence of a not criminally responsible (NCR) defence after the accused had entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault pursuant to a plea bargain.

The Crown argued that the accused was attempting to resile from the plea agreement and that the judge's ordering of a mental health assessment, which led to the NCR opinion, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding no bias or apprehension of bias, and holding that the emergence of the NCR issue was a natural consequence of the mental health assessment ordered for sentencing purposes.

The court found that even if an NCR finding resulted, the Crown would not be prejudiced as the facts of the serious assault would remain before the court or Ontario Review Board.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a police response to a parking lot in Wasaga Beach.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings of 140 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence raised three issues: whether the detention following breath sampling was arbitrary, whether the accused's right to counsel was violated, and whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found the samples were taken as soon as practicable and that no violation of the right to counsel occurred.

However, the court found an arbitrary detention breach under section 9 of the Charter, as the police decision to detain was based solely on blood alcohol readings without considering other relevant circumstances.

Nevertheless, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was modest and made in good faith.

The accused was found guilty.

At a preliminary inquiry into a charge of first-degree murder, the Crown alleged that the accused intentionally shot his wife following marital discord and separation discussions.

The defence argued the shooting was accidental, occurring during a struggle over a firearm as the accused attempted suicide.

The court found sufficient evidence of intentional shooting based on the common sense inference from pointing and firing a loaded handgun at close range, forensic evidence regarding trigger force and muzzle proximity, circumstantial evidence of the victim's incapacity at the time of shooting, and evidence of animus.

The court also found some evidence of forcible confinement based on ante-mortem and peri-mortem injuries and the time gap between the victim's final text and the 911 call.

The accused was committed to trial for first-degree murder.

The appellant appealed his convictions for speeding (117 km/hr in an 80 km/hr zone) and failure to surrender his driver's licence.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty on both counts following a trial where the Crown called the investigating officer and the appellant testified on his own behalf.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the speeding conviction on the basis that the trial judge improperly restricted cross-examination regarding potential flaws in the radar unit as identified in the manufacturer's manual.

The appellant also challenged the failure to surrender licence conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting his evidence that he had eventually produced his licence.

The appeal court allowed the appeal on the speeding charge and dismissed the appeal on the licence charge.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The defence sought exclusion of Intoxilyzer readings under Charter section 24(2) based on alleged violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the accused was denied a reasonable opportunity to speak with her counsel of choice before providing breath samples, constituting a Charter section 10(b) breach.

The court rejected other Charter arguments regarding the timeliness of the approved screening device demand and the reasonableness of grounds for the Intoxilyzer demand.

However, applying the Grant test for section 24(2) exclusion, the court found that the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits, resulting in exclusion of the breath samples and dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, assault of a peace officer, and disarming a peace officer.

The charges arose from an incident at a housing complex where police officers observed the accused in a vehicle with a plastic bag.

The accused was arrested following a physical altercation with officers.

The trial court acquitted the accused of the drug possession charge, finding insufficient evidence that the cocaine found at the scene was ever in the accused's possession.

However, the court convicted the accused of assault and disarming a peace officer, finding that the officers were lawfully executing their duties and that the accused's resistance and attempt to take the officer's taser were established beyond reasonable doubt.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish that the accused possessed a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace contrary to s. 88 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and possession of a weapon.

The defence argued that the Crown had not adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the object possessed constituted a "weapon" as defined in the Criminal Code, or that it was possessed for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The court found that while the eyewitness evidence alone was insufficient, when combined with the accused's brother's police statement describing the accused pulling out, raising, and putting away a toy gun in a manner consistent with intimidation, there was sufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial on the weapon possession charge.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with excess blood alcohol following a complaint of erratic driving.

A civilian witness with police experience observed the accused's vehicle weaving across lanes at excessive speeds.

Police attended the accused's residence and observed signs of impairment.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing excess blood alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the arrest, detention, and search.

The court rejected all Charter arguments, finding the police conduct lawful and the evidence admissible.

The court convicted the accused on both charges based on the totality of evidence including the civilian witness observations, police observations of impairment indicators, and the breath sample results.