M. Gregory Ellies

This is the second part of a summary judgment motion brought by the Township of Coleman seeking to dismiss remaining claims by the Chitaroni plaintiffs.

The court previously ruled that a disputed road ("Road A") was not a public road.

In this part, the Township sought to dismiss claims for damages based on public misfeasance/malfeasance and declarations that Road A was an access or common road.

The court dismissed the Township's motion regarding the misfeasance claim and the access road claim, allowing them to proceed to trial.

However, the claim that Road A was a common road was dismissed.

The court also provided directions for the plaintiffs to particularize certain allegations for trial.

The tenants sought judicial review of a Landlord and Tenant Board decision to order a de novo hearing of their eviction applications.

The original LTB member had already conducted a consolidated hearing and determined that the landlord breached s. 83(3)(d) of the Residential Tenancies Act by treating tenant union members differently during rent arrears negotiations.

The only remaining issue was identifying which specific tenants had made repayment proposals.

Before making this final factual determination, the member resigned.

The LTB subsequently ordered a de novo hearing without consulting the parties.

The Divisional Court held that ordering a de novo hearing in these circumstances, where the substantive legal issues had already been comprehensively decided, was a denial of procedural fairness.

The application for judicial review was granted, the original decision was reinstated, and the matter was remitted to the LTB solely to determine which tenants made repayment proposals.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal an arbitration award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the fixed amount of $3,300.

The self-represented defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Conway J. dated December 7, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding plaintiff in the amount of $5,000.

The appellant, the Municipality of Chatham Kent, brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Aston J. dated November 14, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order of Conway J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were awarded as the responding parties failed to file a costs outline.

The applicant sought a temporary parenting time order, specifically that the respondent's parenting time be only in accordance with the children's wishes.

The court had previously ordered specific parenting times, which the children refused.

The children's counsel argued the court erred by prioritizing "maximum contact" over the children's well-being and showed predisposition.

The court rejected these arguments, affirming the statutory presumption of continuing parental contact, but expressed concern about the children's anxiety and the mother's potential influence.

Reluctantly, the court ordered no further parenting time for the moment, emphasizing it was temporary and without prejudice, and encouraged exploration of reunification therapy.

The applicant brought a motion for an adjournment.

The Divisional Court granted the adjournment request and imposed a timetable agreed upon by the parties.

Due to the inordinate delay in the case and the reasons for it, the court declined to award costs to any party.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assessment Review Board dismissing her application for property tax relief based on sickness or extreme poverty under s. 323 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The applicant sought relief for the 2015 and 2017 taxation years, as well as a refund for all years from 2011 to the present.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board correctly limited its jurisdiction to the years applied for and reasonably concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate an inability to pay, as the taxes had already been paid by her lawyers.

The court also rejected arguments of procedural unfairness and failure to accommodate.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision but failed to pay rent or rental arrears since October 2022, despite an undertaking to bring arrears up to date.

The tenant claimed inability to pay due to a slip and fall on the landlord's property.

The Divisional Court found no reasonable excuse for the failure to pay rent and dismissed the appeal as abandoned, awarding $5,000 in costs to the respondent landlord.

The Barge Respondents (Temagami Barge Limited and Dashiel Lowery Delarosbel) brought a motion to transfer an application from Toronto to North Bay.

The applicant, Corporation of the Municipality of Temagami, opposed this transfer, advocating for Haileybury due to significantly shorter hearing delays.

The court, applying Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissed the motion to transfer to North Bay.

Instead, the court ordered the application to be transferred to Haileybury, finding it more geographically appropriate for the community and witnesses, and crucial for securing the just, most expeditious, and least expensive determination of the proceeding by avoiding further delay.

Costs were awarded to the Municipality of Temagami.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, sought a ruling on whether various records in their possession met the definition of "record" under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code, thereby subjecting them to the record screening regime.

The court analyzed different categories of records, including family photos, video footage, emails, social media messages, and family law documents.

The court found that most records did not meet the definition, as they lacked intimate personal information or a reasonable expectation of privacy.

However, two family law documents (Form 13 Financial Statement and Form 17C Settlement Conference Brief) were deemed subject to the regime due to their confidential nature and protected status under the Family Law Rules.

This endorsement addresses a proposed consent order for a class action settlement between the plaintiff and the Sault Area Hospital.

The court convened a teleconference to ensure the order allowed for consideration of written objections from class members.

The order mandates the hospital to provide class member information, followed by notice distribution and a 30-day period for objections.

The court found the proposed settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, weighing the claim's nature, litigation risks and costs, class size, and potential recoveries, with reference to *Jones v. Tsige*.

The order is to take effect 90 days after being made, unless a written objection necessitates a settlement hearing.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure of its intention to dismiss five related proceedings commenced by the plaintiff in 2005 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff failed to respond to the notice.

The court found the pleadings to be incomprehensible, repetitive, and abusive, naming dozens of defendants with no material facts against some.

The court dismissed all five actions for being an abuse of process and for excessive delay.

The father brought a motion for a temporary parenting time order after the children, aged 11 and 13, refused to visit him due to his unpredictable outbursts and anger management issues.

The court considered the children's wishes and fears, finding them reasonable.

To ensure the children's emotional and psychological safety, the court suspended the previous parenting regime and ordered a gradual, monitored reintroduction through brief visits in public places, along with mandatory anger management counselling for the father and continued therapy for the children.

In a pre-trial application in a sexual offence prosecution involving allegations by the accused's biological daughter, the Crown sought leave to adduce similar fact evidence from two other complainants alleging prior intrafamilial sexual abuse.

Applying the similar fact evidence framework, the court held there was no air of reality to alleged collusion or contamination among the witnesses.

The court found the proposed evidence had insufficient probative value on mens rea, context, and rebuttal of fabrication, but was highly probative on actus reus because of the unusual and aberrant nature of the alleged conduct and the significant similarities among the allegations.

The probative value on that issue outweighed the substantial prejudicial effect, and the evidence was admitted.

The applicant moved for a temporary order for spousal support following the breakdown of a 30-year traditional marriage.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing the applicant suffered no economic disadvantage and failed to mitigate expenses by selling the matrimonial home.

The court found the applicant entitled to support on a non-compensatory and compensatory basis under the Family Law Act.

The court ordered the respondent to pay temporary spousal support at the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines range ($2,568 per month) until the matrimonial home is sold, after which support will reduce to the mid-range amount ($2,297 per month).

The young person appeared before the Superior Court of Justice for a detention review under section 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court raised the issue of its jurisdiction to conduct the review under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court held that because the young person had not elected to be tried in the Superior Court, the court was not deemed a youth justice court and therefore lacked jurisdiction.

The matter was transferred to the Ontario Court of Justice.

The applicant moved for an order requiring the respondent to pay his proportionate share of their adult son's section 7 expenses, including computer, chiropractic, gym, and personal trainer costs related to his hockey career and online education.

The respondent argued the son was an adult and the expenses were unnecessary.

The court found the son remained a child of the marriage under the Divorce Act as he was unable to withdraw from his parents' charge while pursuing a reasonable career in the OHL during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court ordered the respondent to pay his proportionate share of $3,127.34.

The respondent father brought a motion to change seeking a contribution from the applicant mother for section 7 expenses relating to their son's university moving costs and their daughter's hockey equipment, as well as a variation of ongoing child support for the son who was attending university away from home.

The court ordered the mother to pay her proportionate share of the son's moving expenses, finding she had unreasonably withheld consent, but dismissed the claim for hockey expenses as they were not extraordinary.

The motion to vary ongoing child support was dismissed with leave to renew due to insufficient evidence regarding the son's post-secondary expenses and ability to contribute.