M. Gregory Ellies

The applicant, a registered nurse working as a security guard, applied for judicial review of the College of Nurses' refusal to remove his employment address from the public register.

The Registrar had requested documentation to support his claim that publication endangered his safety, which the applicant failed to provide before bringing the application.

The Divisional Court quashed the application as premature, applying the principle against fragmenting administrative proceedings, and directed the applicant to submit the required documentation to the Registrar to create a full record.

This is Part 3 of a summary judgment motion brought by the Township of Coleman.

The court determined which remaining allegations from the plaintiffs' claims (misfeasance in public office and access road) would proceed to trial, following previous partial summary judgments.

The court dismissed the allegation of negligent transfer of Parcel 12907 in 1975, finding it was not properly pleaded as evidence of intent for misfeasance or estoppel.

However, it allowed other allegations to proceed, including failure to follow precedents, coercion, bad faith, misleading investments, failure to identify the end of the road, and failure to create/maintain accurate records, as these were properly pleaded and had some evidentiary value.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a child support order for the parties' adult son, who had finished playing junior hockey and was starting university.

The respondent father argued the son was not a child of the marriage during the summer before university and that his spousal support payments were sufficient.

The court found the son remained a child of the marriage and ordered the father to pay full Guidelines support for the summer months and one-third of that amount for the school months to help maintain a home for the son.

The claim for section 7 expenses was dismissed without prejudice due to insufficient financial information about the son's income and expenses.

The respondent sought a temporary parenting time order accommodating his two-week on/two-week off work schedule and an order for child support.

The applicant opposed, citing her primary caregiver role, the "7-day rule" for young children, and disagreements over healthcare.

The court dismissed the applicant's objections, finding them insufficient.

The court granted the respondent's request for parenting time, with a minor adjustment for the applicant, and ordered child support as per the Guidelines.

The parties were also ordered to communicate via a specific application.

The applicant, a Roman Catholic priest, sought judicial review of a Children's Aid Society decision 'coding' him as a risk of sexual and emotional harm to children following allegations from female students regarding discussions during confession.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness and that the decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the CAS breached mandatory procedural requirements set out in the Ontario Child Protection Standards by making the verification decision before examining the scene, immediately after interviewing the applicant, and without a proper verification conference.

The decision was set aside and a fresh investigation by a different CAS was ordered.

The plaintiff employer sued its former bookkeeper and her husband's estate for damages resulting from employee theft.

The bookkeeper had previously pleaded guilty to fraud and paid $100,000 in restitution, but the employer claimed the stolen amount was much higher.

Following a summary judgment motion, a trial of the issue was ordered to determine the exact amount stolen and the extent of the husband's unjust enrichment.

Relying on forensic accounting evidence and estimating the loss despite destroyed records, the court found the bookkeeper stole $204,670.

The claim for unjust enrichment against the husband's estate was dismissed due to insufficient evidence to quantify the enrichment.

Judgment was granted for the remaining $104,670.

Ryan Abraham pleaded guilty to charges including manslaughter, robbery, threatening death, and firearms offences.

The Crown and defence agreed on a 14-year prison sentence but disputed the amount of "Duncan" credit for harsh presentence custody conditions.

The court, considering aggravating factors (victim impact, repeated firearms prohibitions, prior robbery conviction) and mitigating factors (guilty pleas, remorse, willingness to resolve charges, delays), determined a fit sentence.

The primary issue was the qualitative assessment of presentence custody conditions for the "Duncan" credit, with the court ultimately granting 12 months of Duncan credit, leading to a remaining sentence of just over six years after applying both Duncan and Summers credits.

Stephanie Slack pleaded guilty to trafficking fentanyl.

The Crown sought a provincial custodial sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence based on the defendant's significant rehabilitation.

The court, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for fentanyl trafficking but also considering rehabilitation, determined that a conditional sentence of two years less one day, followed by two years probation, was appropriate.

The judge found that a conditional sentence, with sufficiently punitive conditions, could achieve the sentencing objectives without hindering the defendant's progress in recovery and employment, even if exceptional circumstances were not strictly required.

The defendant, Mr. Edwards, applied for leave to cross-examine affiants and challenged a search warrant under s. 8 of the Charter, arguing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched residence.

The court considered factors for establishing a privacy interest, including presence, control, ownership, historical use, and ability to regulate access.

While the defendant relied on the Crown's theory, the court found that the objective evidentiary basis did not support a reasonable expectation of privacy, concluding that the defendant was merely a temporary house guest.

Consequently, Mr. Edwards lacked standing to challenge the warrant, and his application was dismissed.

The respondent, L.R., brought a motion to admit fresh evidence at trial and to suspend the applicant, P.G.'s, parenting time, following P.G.'s breach of a consent order by removing a child from L.R.'s care.

The court granted the motion to admit fresh evidence, applying the four-part test from R. v. Palmer.

Despite finding P.G. in breach of the order, the court declined to suspend P.G.'s parenting time, reasoning that there was no immediate threat to the child's well-being, the summer parenting schedule would soon commence, and a final decision on parenting time was imminent at trial.

The court ordered P.G. to return the child to L.R.'s care by a specific date and for parenting time to resume according to the existing summer schedule, emphasizing parental encouragement for parenting time.

This was a temporary order pending final trial submissions.

The respondent, Domenico Niro, brought a renewed motion to vary monthly child support for the parties' son and for reimbursement of post-secondary education expenses.

The court varied the monthly child support retroactively as sought by the respondent.

However, the court found that the respondent had significantly underestimated the son's post-secondary expenses and had under-contributed to them.

The court determined the reasonable post-secondary expenses and the proportionate contributions of both parents and the child, leading to a recalculation of the reimbursement owed to the respondent by the applicant.

The applicant was ordered to repay a reduced amount, including a previous order for moving expenses.

The appellants appealed a certification order for a class action arising from an infection control lapse at an endoscopy clinic.

The plaintiff sought compensation for the enhanced risk of infection and the psychological trauma of receiving a public health notification, despite testing negative for any blood-borne diseases.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the certification order, finding that a claim for damages based solely on an increased risk of harm, without actual injury, is not a legally viable cause of action.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a settlement agreement reached at a pretrial conference, moving for judgment under Rule 49.09(a).

The court granted leave to bring the motion and found that a valid settlement agreement had been reached.

However, the court exercised its discretion under Rule 49.09(a) to refuse enforcement of the settlement, finding that it would lead to a clear injustice due to the recent discovery of serious structural deficiencies in the defendants' home, which were unknown at the time of the purported settlement.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision that precluded them from suing the respondent for personal injuries sustained by the applicant at her workplace.

The Tribunal found that both the applicant's employer and the respondent were Schedule 1 employers under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, and that the applicant was injured in the course of her employment while returning from a smoke break.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision was reasonable, well-reasoned, and consistent with the evidence, the law, and Board policies.

This endorsement addresses a request to seal supplemental affidavits filed in support of a settlement approval.

While the settlement was approved, the court largely denied the request to seal the affidavits, emphasizing the foundational principle of transparency and the open court principle.

The judge found no basis to seal information regarding the merits of the plaintiffs' case post-settlement approval or the terms of counsel's retainer, citing section 137 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The affidavits were ordered to remain sealed for 60 days, with a requirement for a formal application, served on all parties and the media, to extend the sealing order.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating his tenancy for substantially interfering with the reasonable enjoyment of another tenant.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness regarding the service of N5 notices and disputed the LTB's factual findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness as the appellant had the notices well before the hearing, and holding that disagreements with factual findings do not constitute errors of law.

The Court also noted that the appeal was not moot despite the complainant tenant having passed away after the hearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal regarding the interest payable on compensation for expropriated land.

The appellant argued that interest should run from an earlier date based on a redevelopment use and at a higher rate of 12% due to delay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Tribunal's factual findings that the productive use of the land was as a rental building and ceased only upon formal expropriation.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's discretionary refusal to award a higher interest rate, as it had not been pleaded, and declined to consider a new claim for compound interest.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision declaring its commercial lease properly terminated and directing a writ of possession.

The tenant argued the landlord's notice of termination was deficient under s. 19(2) of the Commercial Tenancies Act and that the landlord failed to provide 30 days' notice of re-entry.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that under s. 18(1) of the Act, the landlord had the right to re-enter without formal demand because the tenant had been in arrears of rent for more than 15 days.

The court also upheld findings that the tenant's failure to pay deposits under the related Agreement of Purchase and Sale constituted a material breach.

The appellant sought to appeal an order dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The Divisional Court held that an order dismissing a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory, not final, and therefore requires leave to appeal under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court declined to grant leave, finding no conflicting decisions or good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant was seriously injured when a dog knocked her down at an off-leash park.

She sued the dog owner, who failed to defend the action.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's motion for default judgment, finding the dog merely 'ran into' her, which did not constitute an 'attack' under the Dog Owner's Liability Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in law by requiring proof of the dog's intent to injure, failing to consider the deemed admissions in the statement of claim, capping non-pecuniary damages for dog injuries, and improperly deducting private disability insurance benefits from the lost income claim.

The matter was remitted for a new default judgment hearing.