M. Gregory Ellies

This sentencing decision concerns Corey Fulford, found guilty of sexually assaulting a 10-year-old victim.

The Crown sought a 12-month carceral sentence, while the defence proposed a 3-6 month conditional sentence.

The court, considering the offender's developmental delay, lack of prior record, remorse, and the lower end of the physical conduct spectrum for the offence, determined that a conditional sentence was appropriate despite the gravity of child sexual assault.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence followed by 18 months of probation, along with mandatory Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, a 10-year firearm prohibition, and a 5-year order prohibiting contact with persons under 16.

The accused, Cody Lenard, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under ss. 11(b) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his aggravated assault charge to trial.

The total delay was 38.5 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court attributed 5.5 months of delay to the defence's unnecessary adjournments.

However, the court rejected the Crown's argument that a 6.7-month period, during which the accused was out of province, constituted defence delay or an exceptional circumstance, finding the Crown failed to prove the accused's knowledge of the charge or police diligence in obtaining a Canada-wide warrant.

With only the 5.5 months of defence delay deducted, the net delay remained 33 months, still exceeding the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay was granted.

Two personal injury actions, arising from a 2014 collision, were commenced in North Bay.

The court, concerned about judicial resource shortages and the impact of R. v. Jordan timelines on civil matters, initiated discussions about transferring the actions to Ottawa, where the accident occurred.

The plaintiffs consented to the transfer, but the defendant opposed, arguing that a formal motion was required and that the transfer would be unfair given a prior decision to strike a jury notice to expedite the trial in North Bay.

The court, exercising its discretion under Rule 2.03 to dispense with the formal motion requirement, ordered the transfer, emphasizing that the interest of justice, particularly judicial availability in Ottawa, outweighed the defendant's objections to ensure the timely disposition of these long-standing cases.

The accused, J.F.R.G., was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a complainant under 16.

The court found significant material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony across police statements, preliminary inquiry, and trial, coupled with a confrontational demeanor during cross-examination.

The accused, who testified, was found to be candid and compelling in his denial of the allegations.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on both counts.

The applicant moved for a parenting time order, a refraining order against the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) regarding driver's license suspension, and a retroactive variation of child support.

The motion was opposed by the respondent and FRO.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no authority to remove FRO, that the applicant failed to meet procedural conditions for a refraining order (e.g., filing a sworn financial statement, bringing a proper Motion to Change), and failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances or "clean hands" for the support variation.

The parenting time request was dismissed without prejudice, allowing the applicant to provide further evidence of required counselling.

The accused, M.C.D., faced 13 charges, including assault and sexual assault, involving his former spouse and two children.

Three charges were withdrawn by the Crown.

The court acquitted the accused of the remaining charges, finding significant issues with the credibility and reliability of the Crown's witnesses (the former spouse and children).

The judge noted numerous inconsistencies, embellishments, improbabilities, and evidence of collusion in their testimonies, which created a reasonable doubt regarding the accused's guilt.

This decision addresses whether a previous costs award of $34,800, ordered against the Applicant for breaches of parenting orders, could be characterized as support for enforcement purposes under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996.

The Respondent argued that the costs related to child support issues in an underlying, outstanding motion to change, and that the broad discretion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules permitted such characterization, asserting that Clark v. Clark was overruled by Bouchard v. Sgovio.

The court dismissed the Respondent's request, holding that for costs to be enforceable as support, support must have been claimed and adjudicated in the specific proceeding where the costs were awarded, not merely in a related, outstanding motion.

The court affirmed that Rule 1(8) does not allow for characterizing costs in a manner inconsistent with the substance of the proceeding in which they were awarded, and that Bouchard did not overrule Clark on this point.

The applicant, previously declared a vexatious litigant, sought leave to continue or commence new proceedings against the Attorney General of Ontario and Soo Greyhounds Inc. under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court reviewed the applicant's arguments, including claims that a prior "counter-application" was a nullity, that the Registrar erred in refusing filings, and that the 2014 vexatious litigant order was no longer necessary or did not apply.

The court found no merit to the applicant's arguments and determined the application for leave was an abuse of process, citing the lack of reasonable grounds, failure to pay previous costs, persistent unsuccessful motions, excessive factum length, and attempts to re-litigate settled issues.

Leave was denied.

This decision concerns the assessment of costs following a successful trial where the plaintiff, Steele Industrial Supplies Inc., proved that the defendant, Sharon Elliott, had stolen $204,670.

Steele sought partial indemnity costs of $72,177.58.

The defendants argued for a lower award, contending that the plaintiff's initial evidentiary shortcomings and expanded expert scope unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding.

The court, applying the principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, found the proceeding complex and the costs sought by the plaintiff to be fair and reasonable, especially considering the defendants' significantly lower settlement offer.

The court dismissed the defendants' arguments regarding the plaintiff's conduct and ordered the defendants to pay the full amount of costs sought.

This decision addresses costs arising from a multi-part summary judgment motion.

The Township, as the moving party in the original summary judgment motion, sought partial indemnity costs of $69,638.46.

The plaintiffs opposed and sought their own partial indemnity costs of $28,392.61.

The court found that the Township had misrepresented the dispositive nature of the initial summary judgment motion.

While the Township succeeded in dismissing the public road and common road claims (Parts 1 and 2), the misfeasance claim and access road claim survived (Part 3).

The court awarded the Township $33,000.00 in all-inclusive partial indemnity costs for Part 1 of the motion, finding that the public road claim was the focal point.

For Parts 2 and 3, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs, acknowledging the plaintiffs' poor pleading but also the Township's overstatement of the motion's scope.

The accused was charged with multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences following the execution of a search warrant at a basement apartment.

The police found the accused attempting to escape through a bedroom window, outside of which they located a jacket containing a loaded handgun.

Inside the bedroom, police found fentanyl, cocaine, cash, digital scales, and cell phones.

The court found the circumstantial evidence, including text messages, photos, and the accused's exclusive occupation of the bedroom, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in possession of the loaded handgun and possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused was convicted on all counts.

The appellant, William Peters, appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's alleged misapprehension of evidence regarding the reliability and credibility of a key civilian witness.

The appellant argued that inconsistencies in the witness's testimony, including details about the vehicle, her property ownership, her level of impairment, and animosity towards the appellant, rendered the verdict unreasonable.

The court found these alleged inconsistencies to be minor or irrelevant, concluding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the witness's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming that any misapprehension of evidence must demonstrably influence the trial judge's reasoning process to warrant setting aside a judgment.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The trial judge had dismissed the charges, finding the complainant's evidence to have "frailties" and accepting the respondent's denial and evidence of mobility issues.

The Crown argued two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred by permitting reputation evidence regarding the complainant's veracity, and second, that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, particularly regarding a photograph and the respondent's admission of possible accidental touching.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of reputation evidence given the lack of objection and the trial judge's non-reliance on it, and concluding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate and clearly explained the basis for the acquittal.

Corey Fulford was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 10-year-old complainant.

The trial involved conflicting testimony from the complainant and the accused, who has a learning disability.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault, concluding that the "cuddling" on the bed, which occurred after a kiss and while the accused was aroused, constituted a sexual assault, as the relationship was not familial.

The accused was acquitted of sexual interference, as the alleged hand touching was not found to be for a sexual purpose.

The accused, Michael Malabre, applied for a mistrial during his jury trial for drug trafficking and proceeds of crime.

The application was based on a police officer's testimony that the accused refused to identify himself at the time of arrest, which the defence argued was inadmissible and highly prejudicial, infringing on the right to silence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a prompt and clear mid-trial instruction to the jury, combined with defence counsel's cross-examination, effectively cured any potential prejudice.

The court emphasized that a mistrial is a remedy of last resort and that the instruction removed the impugned evidence from the jury's consideration.

This decision concerns a blended voir dire where the Crown sought to admit a statement made by the accused to police, and the accused sought to exclude it due to an alleged breach of his Charter right to counsel.

The court found the statement was given voluntarily and admissible under the confessions rule.

While an eight-to-nine-minute delay by police in contacting duty counsel constituted an unreasonable breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right, the court determined that the breach was not serious and had minimal impact.

Consequently, admitting the statement would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

This decision addresses costs following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' Small Claims Court action for damages related to deteriorating deck beams, which was dismissed due to an expired limitation period and failure to establish liability and damages.

The defendants sought enhanced costs based on an unaccepted offer to settle.

The court, bound by Divisional Court and Court of Appeal precedent, affirmed that enhanced cost provisions (r. 14.07(2) and r. 49.10(2)) do not apply when a plaintiff's claim is wholly dismissed.

However, the court exercised its discretion under s. 29 of the Courts of Justice Act to penalize unreasonable behaviour.

Manitoulin Cedar Products, which made a reasonable offer to settle, was awarded elevated costs ($9,573.00), while Whittington Engineering Ltd. and IWS Wood Products Inc., who made no financial offer and showed unwillingness to settle, were awarded only the statutory maximum 15% of the claim amount plus disbursements ($5,323.00).

The applicant daycare sought judicial review of a Ministry of Education Director's decision refusing to approve its proposed supervisor.

The Director had previously revoked the supervisor's approval following an inspection.

When the daycare reapplied, the Director refused approval based on new, undisclosed concerns regarding absenteeism and past complaints that had not been raised as issues previously.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding the Director breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide notice of the case the applicant had to meet.

The matter was remitted to a different director for a fresh decision.

Following a successful application for judicial review that set aside a Children's Aid Society decision due to procedural unfairness, the Society sought directions on whether it was required to conduct a fresh investigation.

The Divisional Court clarified that the Society is not obliged to commence a new investigation, but if it chooses to do so, it should be conducted by another agency with appropriate procedural safeguards.

The accused, facing charges including possession of a loaded handgun and fentanyl for trafficking, brought an application for disclosure of occurrence reports related to two residences and three individuals (Cassandra Puskas, Sean Collins, and Tyrone Lothian).

The Crown opposed the request, arguing it was a fishing expedition, untimely, or required a different disclosure application type.

The court largely granted the accused's disclosure application, finding the information relevant for potential witness credibility or an alternate suspect defence, and that it fell under the Crown's first-party disclosure obligations as "obviously relevant" information.