M. Gregory Ellies

The self-represented applicant brought a motion to change a 2003 family law order and a motion to change venue.

The court dismissed the venue motion because the alleged concerns related to judges who regularly sat in Sault Ste.

Marie and no apprehension of bias was alleged against the motion judge.

The court held that the motion to change the order was barred by res judicata because an earlier motion involving the same parties, issue, and evidence had already been dismissed.

The court further observed that, even absent res judicata, the supporting affidavits were outdated and largely bald allegations.

Costs were not fixed in the decision, with further written submissions invited.

The applicant, previously subject to an order prohibiting her from commencing proceedings without leave, brought a family law application that did not seek only rescission of the vexatious litigant order and was not shown to have been served on the Attorney General.

The court held that the Family Law Rules did not adequately address proceedings under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, requiring reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Applying Rule 2.1.03, the court treated the responding party's letter and motion without notice as a written request to dismiss the unauthorized proceeding.

The application was dismissed and removed from the hearing list, with costs submissions invited.

The respondent, Sharon Fair, brought a motion in writing to amend the Divisional Court's earlier written reasons, alleging clerical errors.

The applicant school board opposed the motion.

The court noted that the applicant had already obtained leave to appeal the judgment to the Court of Appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that even if it had jurisdiction to amend its reasons, it would be unseemly to do so while an appeal was pending, and that justice would be better served by leaving the determination of any errors to the Court of Appeal.

A self-represented parent who had previously been declared a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act sought emergency leave to bring a motion without notice for temporary custody and access-related relief.

The motion alleged denial of access under an existing custody order and a dispute regarding holiday access scheduling.

The court held that, under s. 140(4) of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving party was required to demonstrate that the proposed proceeding was not an abuse of process and that reasonable grounds existed.

The evidence provided was incomplete and failed to establish that the opposing parent had acted improperly or that the motion had reasonable grounds.

Leave to bring the motion was therefore denied.

The appellant father brought a motion for a stay pending appeal of an Ontario Court of Justice order that transferred the children’s primary residence from him to the mother.

The court reviewed the applicable framework for stays of custody orders under s. 74 of the Children’s Law Reform Act and considered jurisprudence addressing the RJR‑MacDonald test and its modification in family law contexts.

The court found the appeal raised a serious issue, particularly regarding whether the trial judge misapprehended evidence about an ex parte custody order and improperly discounted the status quo.

Given the young ages of the children and the risk of instability if they were moved pending the appeal, the court concluded that their best interests favoured maintaining the current arrangement.

A stay of the trial judge’s custody order was granted pending the appeal.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of two Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions finding it discriminated against an employee by failing to accommodate her disability and ordering her reinstatement with damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decisions on liability and remedy were reasonable and amply supported by the evidence.

The Court also rejected the applicant's arguments regarding procedural fairness and reasonable apprehension of bias.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application for judicial review, the court received written costs submissions from the respondent Ministry.

The applicant did not provide submissions.

The court found the Ministry's requested costs to be fair and reasonable, awarding partial indemnity costs in the amount of $6,275.

Following earlier family law proceedings, the applicant sought costs on a full indemnity basis alleging the respondent failed to provide proper financial disclosure despite a prior court order.

The court considered Rule 24(10) of the Family Law Rules, which requires costs to be addressed promptly after each procedural step.

Relying on appellate authority, the court held that it could not award costs for earlier case conferences where no costs orders had been made at the time.

After removing those amounts and other fees previously ruled non-compensable, the court reduced the claimed amount and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

They argued there was no evidence that the victim was killed while being forcibly confined or regarding the role each applicant played in the killing.

They also argued they were denied natural justice because the preliminary inquiry judge relied on post-offence conduct and specific medical evidence without giving them an opportunity to make submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants were permitted to address the evidence and were not denied natural justice.

The court further held that even if there was a breach, the applicants suffered no prejudice because a committal was inevitable based on the pre-offence and post-offence circumstantial evidence, which was sufficient to permit a jury to infer a common intention and that each applicant played a substantial and integral role in the killing.

Following a prior decision granting summary judgment to one defendant insurer and refusing the plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The successful defendant sought costs jointly and severally against the plaintiffs and the co‑defendant insurance broker.

The court determined the appropriate quantum using standard partial indemnity rates and rejected arguments that delay in bringing the summary judgment motion should reduce the award.

Applying the principles governing Bullock and Sanderson orders and the factors articulated in Moore v. Wienecke, the court concluded that a Sanderson order was fair because the broker cross‑claimed against the successful defendant and the plaintiffs reasonably joined both defendants due to uncertainty regarding responsibility for inadequate insurance coverage.

The broker was ordered to pay the successful defendant’s costs.

In a personal injury action, the defendants inadvertently disclosed a litigation‑privileged witness statement to the plaintiff’s counsel during documentary discovery.

Despite the document being listed in Schedule B of the affidavit of documents as privileged, plaintiff’s counsel reviewed and relied upon it during discovery and in litigation materials, and refused to return it for an extended period after the error was identified.

The court applied the framework from Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition Corp. to determine whether counsel should be removed following the breach of privilege.

The court held that the privileged nature of the document remained intact, prejudice was presumed and not rebutted, and the plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct in reviewing and using the document aggravated the breach.

The plaintiff’s motion for leave to seek production of witness statement summaries after setting the matter down for trial was denied, and the plaintiff’s law firm was removed as counsel of record.

Following dismissal of the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the court addressed the quantum of costs payable to the successful plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought over $35,000 in partial indemnity fees plus disbursements.

The court held that time spent by newly retained counsel familiarizing himself with the file should not be included in the costs award and that the motion involved a discrete issue and a relatively simple record.

The court declined to impose sanctions for disclosure of an expired settlement offer but ordered the plaintiff’s written submissions sealed.

Partial indemnity costs of $10,000 plus disbursements were awarded.

The respondent, having been successful in the appeal, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, citing criticisms of the appellant's counsel.

The Divisional Court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding that counsel's failure to remit a notice of hearing was minimally inconvenient and that punishing a party for their counsel's inaccurate time estimate was inappropriate.

Costs were awarded to the respondent fixed at 60% of actual costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The plaintiffs moved for leave under Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend their statement of claim to allege that the insurer failed to properly assess and adjust their business interruption loss following a fire.

The insurer opposed the amendment, arguing it constituted a new cause of action outside the one‑year contractual limitation period and brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

The court held that the proposed amendment introduced a new factual basis for liability—post‑loss adjustment of the claim—distinct from the existing allegation that the defendants failed to place adequate insurance coverage prior to the loss.

As the limitation period had expired, the amendment was barred.

With no viable claim remaining against the insurer, summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim and the broker’s crossclaim was granted.

The defendant franchisor appealed a motion judge's refusal to transfer the venue of a franchise dispute from Hamilton to Kitchener.

The defendant argued the motion judge erred by not requiring the plaintiffs' chosen venue to have a rational connection to the claim, relying on the Siemens decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, clarifying that motions to change venue require a holistic application of the factors in Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found no error in the motion judge's balancing of the factors and affirmed that a plaintiff's choice of venue, even if lacking a strong rational connection, may be upheld if the defendant fails to demonstrate that a transfer is desirable in the interests of justice.

The applicant, a suppression firefighter, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed his age discrimination complaint regarding mandatory retirement at age 60.

The Tribunal had dismissed the complaint under Rule 19A, finding no reasonable prospect of success based on a previous test case (Espey) that upheld the mandatory retirement provision as a bona fide occupational requirement.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable, as the applicant failed to provide evidence demonstrating that the result in his case would differ from the established precedent.

The defendant insurer moved for summary judgment dismissing an action for long-term disability benefits on the basis that it was commenced outside the applicable limitation period.

The court held the insurer failed to validly contract out of the two-year limitation period in the Limitations Act, 2002 because the limitation provisions in the policy booklet and contract were ambiguous and did not clearly describe the shortened limitation period.

The court further held that the statutory limitation period began to run only when the insured was advised that her final appeal of the benefits denial had failed.

As the action was commenced within two years of that date, the claim was timely.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and a declaration issued confirming the action was commenced within the limitation period.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision certifying a union as the exclusive bargaining agent for a construction industry bargaining unit.

The core issue was whether two employees performed construction industry work on the application date.

The Divisional Court found the Board's conclusion that disconnecting a pump for off-site repair constituted construction work 'at the site' to be unreasonable.

However, the Court upheld the Board's finding that replacing a thermal sensor constituted repair work, as it was a reasonable, fact-driven conclusion owed deference.

Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant applied for a school purposes bus licence.

The Ministry of Transportation deferred the decision until the applicant's outstanding criminal charges were resolved.

The applicant sought judicial review to overturn the deferral or compel a decision.

The Divisional Court found the application was not premature but held that the Minister's decision to defer was reasonable given the safety concerns arising from the outstanding charges, which included possession of a switchblade and possession of controlled drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her daughter a Crown ward without access.

She argued the motion judge erred in denying her an adjournment to retain new counsel and present additional evidence, and in granting the order on the record before him.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence regarding a new parenting assessment but found it did not raise a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court concluded the motion judge made no errors in denying the adjournment or in finding that Crown wardship without access was in the child's best interests.

The appeal was dismissed.