M. Gregory Ellies

The appellant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board, which found that a tenancy was provided as part of an employment compensation package and ended when the employment relationship ended.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's findings of fact were reasonable and within its jurisdiction, and that no error of law was demonstrated.

The court also declined to stay the eviction order, noting that an application for a stay requires proper materials addressing the test for injunctive relief.

The accused applied to exclude evidence following a fatal accident investigation, arguing Charter breaches under ss. 8, 9, and 10 after police obtained statements, roadside screening results, and subsequent breath samples.

Earlier reasons excluded the accused’s compelled roadside statements under s. 24(1) and ruled they could not justify the approved screening device demand.

The remaining issue concerned whether observations made by a breath technician while obtaining Intoxilyzer samples should also be excluded.

The court held the detention was not arbitrary and the arrest was justified by a failed roadside screening device.

However, because the Intoxilyzer process and resulting observations flowed solely from compelled statements, admitting the observations would indirectly permit use of compelled evidence and undermine the right against self‑incrimination.

The observations were therefore excluded under s. 24(1), or alternatively under the court’s common law discretion.

The Attorney General sought forfeiture of $10,000 seized from an individual during an arrest under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The court considered circumstantial evidence including the manner in which the cash was bundled, the circumstances of the seizure late at night, the respondent’s criminal record, and inconsistent explanations regarding the source and purpose of the funds.

Applying the balance of probabilities standard, the court found the respondent’s explanation of savings from employment not credible and insufficient to rebut the inference that the funds were connected to unlawful activity, particularly drug trafficking.

The court held the money constituted proceeds of unlawful activity, an instrument of unlawful activity, or both.

The application for forfeiture was granted.

Sentencing following convictions for multiple sexual offences against a minor in a familial relationship.

The offender sexually abused his common-law stepdaughter over a prolonged period between the ages of 10 and 18, escalating from touching to sexual intercourse.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the primary sentencing objectives in cases involving sexual abuse of children and rejected the defence request for a conditional sentence.

Aggravating factors included abuse of trust, the victim’s age, and the devastating impact on the victim and family.

A penitentiary sentence was imposed despite mitigating factors such as the offender’s lack of criminal record and advanced age.

Following separation, the applicant father sought sole custody of two young children while the respondent mother sought joint custody with primary residence to her.

Evidence included reports from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer recommending sole custody to the father and therapeutic access for the mother.

The court found joint custody unworkable due to serious communication issues and concerns about the mother’s parenting conduct, including involving the children in the litigation, disregarding professional advice, and problematic behaviour during supervised access.

Applying the best interests test under the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court granted the father sole custody and primary residence.

Access to the mother was restricted to therapeutic supervision, with limited monitored telephone contact and review of access after six months.

The parties separated in 2001 due to the respondent's alcoholism but maintained contact and engaged in numerous activities together between 2003 and 2009.

The applicant sought a valuation date of February 26, 2009, while the respondent argued for June 1, 2001.

The court applied the Molodowich factors and found that the parties had resumed cohabitation between 2003 and 2009, despite maintaining separate residences.

The court determined the valuation date for equalization of net family property to be February 26, 2009, as there was no reasonable prospect of the resumption of cohabitation after that date.

During a scheduled status hearing under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties filed a consent request to adjourn the hearing, marking at least the second such adjournment.

The court emphasized that Rule 48.14 functions as a limited form of case management designed to ensure timely resolution of disputes and proper allocation of judicial resources.

The judge noted that repeated consent adjournments undermine the oversight purpose of the rule.

Although the adjournment was granted, the court required the parties either to attend the next status hearing or comply with Rule 48.14(10) in advance.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death following a UTV accident.

In a pretrial motion, the accused sought to exclude statements made to police at the scene, arguing they were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and their admission would violate his right against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter.

The court found that the accused honestly and reasonably believed he was required by law to report the accident and answer the officer's questions.

The court excluded the statements for all purposes under s. 24(1) of the Charter, including as the basis for the approved screening device demand.

However, the court held that the officer's observations of the accused at the scene were not compelled and remained admissible.

The appellants, previously declared vexatious litigants, appealed the assessment of costs ordered following the dismissal of their application for leave to commence an action under the Road Access Act.

They failed to attend the assessment and had not filed objections under Rule 58.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before appealing.

The court held that although the appellants had not followed the proper procedure and had filed an inadequate record, the notice of appeal was filed within the seven-day period and the certificate of assessment had been issued immediately, preventing the objection process contemplated by the Rules.

Relying on Rule 2.01, the court dispensed with strict compliance with the Rules to permit the appellants an opportunity to participate in a new assessment.

The matter was remitted to the assessment officer to schedule a new assessment of costs.

The defendants moved for leave to require the plaintiff to attend further medical examinations and a further examination for discovery in a long‑running civil action set down for trial.

The parties resolved the medical examination issue, leaving only the request for further discovery.

The court held that leave to conduct additional discovery after an action is set down for trial requires proof of a substantial or unexpected change in circumstances.

While the passage of time and new expert reports did not meet that threshold, amendments to the statement of claim created uncertainty regarding the alleged cause of an aircraft engine failure.

The court granted limited leave for a further examination for discovery of up to one hour strictly concerning the amendments, applying proportionality principles under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following the defendant’s successful summary judgment motion in a commercial dispute, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought more than $164,000 in costs relying on a prior offer to settle, or alternatively $141,852.34 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court considered Rule 57.02 factors including the amount claimed, complexity of the proceedings, the plaintiff’s conduct in prolonging the litigation, and the requirement that costs be fair and reasonable.

Although the plaintiff’s conduct contributed to delay and the defendant’s offer to settle was relevant, the court found the hours claimed excessive and reduced the award.

Costs were fixed globally at $100,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence charges involving his common law spouse's daughter over a period extending from childhood into adulthood.

The court accepted parts of both the complainant's and the accused's evidence, rejected other portions, and found that sexual touching began when the complainant was a child and progressed to oral sex and later intercourse.

Applying the law of consent and vitiation by authority, the court held that the complainant's apparent participation in certain acts after reaching the age of consent was nevertheless invalid because of the accused's coercive exercise of parental authority and the pre-existing pattern of abuse.

However, the court found reasonable doubt on one later adult intercourse count where the complainant was no longer sufficiently under the accused's authority.

Convictions were entered on counts 4, 5, 6, 8 and 10, and counts 3 and 11 were dismissed.

Historical sexual offence prosecution arising from longstanding sexual contact between the accused and his common law stepdaughter beginning when the complainant was a child.

The court conducted a detailed credibility analysis, accepting parts of both witnesses' evidence and applying the W.D. framework.

It found that pre-1988 sexual touching, oral sex, and later sexual acts in 1988 and 1989 were proven, and that apparent participation after the age of consent was vitiated by the accused's coercive exercise of parental authority and prior grooming.

The court rejected one count because the charged provision had been repealed before the proved conduct and acquitted on a later count because the complainant, as an adult, was no longer shown to be under the accused's coercive authority.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges, including attempted murder, were laid in 2002 but the accused was not arrested until 2009 while residing in South Korea, resulting in approximately 11 years of delay before trial.

The court held that the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to bring the accused to trial despite knowing his whereabouts and having extradition options available.

Most of the delay was attributable to Crown inaction rather than inherent requirements or actions of the accused.

Given the exceptional delay and resulting prejudice to liberty, security, and fair trial interests, the court concluded that the accused’s s. 11(b) rights were violated.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for damages arising from the termination of a propane supply relationship and seeking judgment on a counterclaim for unpaid invoices.

The dispute centered on whether negotiations following the expiry of earlier agreements resulted in a binding contract and whether promissory estoppel or bad faith negotiations could support the plaintiff’s claim.

The court held that the plaintiff’s December 6, 2001 letter constituted a counter-offer that rejected the defendant’s earlier proposal, eliminating any ability to later accept it.

The court further found no evidence establishing promissory estoppel or any pleaded claim based on a duty of good faith in negotiations.

Summary judgment was appropriate in this document-driven case, the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed, and judgment was granted to the defendant on its counterclaim for unpaid gas supplied.

The applicant brought a motion seeking temporary child and spousal support notwithstanding a prior separation agreement.

The respondent sought dismissal of the request, arguing that the agreement governed the parties’ obligations and disputing ongoing child support obligations for adult children attending a performing arts college.

The court held that the validity or repudiation of the separation agreement could not be determined summarily and must be addressed at trial, including any potential review under the principles from Miglin v. Miglin.

On a temporary basis, the court ordered the respondent to resume spousal support payments consistent with the status quo and to continue contributing to child support and extraordinary educational expenses while the children completed their programs.

The order preserved existing arrangements pending trial.

The moving party sought to set aside a temporary spousal support order made in his absence, claiming he was out of the country when served.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to satisfactorily explain his delay in bringing the motion to set aside the order after returning to Canada.

The court ordered the matter to proceed to a settlement conference.

On a motion concerning interim custody, access, and child support, the father sought a temporary order reflecting recommendations made in an Office of the Children’s Lawyer investigation report and a reduction of ongoing child support.

The court held that while the factual evidence contained in an assessment report may be considered on an interim motion, the assessor’s recommendations should generally not be relied upon absent exceptional circumstances.

Applying that approach, the court declined to adopt the recommendations wholesale and instead fashioned an interim parenting arrangement maintaining the child’s primary residence with the mother while granting the father defined access, including summer and monthly school‑year parenting time.

The court also declined to reduce child support, imputing income to the father on the basis that he was not earning to his full potential.

The result was a temporary parenting and access regime with child support remaining unchanged.

The accused police officer was charged with assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon arising from injuries sustained by an individual during a G20 demonstration at Queen’s Park.

The Crown alleged the officer struck the individual with a shield and baton or used excessive force while moving him.

The court considered three theories of liability based on eyewitness testimony and video evidence.

The judge found significant reliability and credibility issues with the key identification witness and concluded the video evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused struck the individual or used excessive force.

The Crown failed to establish any theory of liability beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant brought a motion to change a prior custody order, alleging denial of access, interference with telephone contact, and failure by the custodial parent to address the child’s medical needs.

She also brought a contempt motion, while the respondent sought an order declaring the applicant a vexatious litigant.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish a material change in circumstances under the Children’s Law Reform Act and that the variation motion was effectively an attempt to relitigate or appeal the prior custody determination.

The contempt motion was also dismissed because the applicant herself had repeatedly failed to comply with the access terms of the order.

Although declining to impose the broadest restrictions under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court declared the applicant a vexatious litigant and prohibited her from commencing further proceedings relating to custody or access without leave of the court.