Matthew Morley

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol level contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused claimed he was in his parked car in a private lot behind his apartment building to smoke, having moved it only to access a Wi-Fi signal.

He fell asleep in the driver's seat with the engine running.

The court found that the accused occupied the driver's seat, triggering a rebuttable presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a).

The accused failed to rebut this presumption on a balance of probabilities.

The court also found that even absent the presumption, a real risk of danger existed given the circumstances.

The breath tests were taken approximately 1.5 hours after the alleged offence, raising concerns about compliance with the "as soon as practicable" requirement, but the court found the delay was reasonable in all the circumstances.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams.

He was found slumped over the steering wheel of a parked car with the engine running.

The accused conceded impairment but argued he lacked care or control because there was no realistic risk of danger.

The court acquitted the accused, finding that the vehicle was safely parked, the emergency brake was engaged, and there was no risk of accidental transmission engagement.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol count exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

Police found the defendant asleep in the driver's seat of his vehicle with the engine running.

The defence raised three issues: (1) whether a 30-minute delay in administering the roadside screening device breached Charter rights; (2) whether the defendant's right to counsel of choice was violated; and (3) whether the Crown proved a realistic danger that the vehicle could be put in motion.

The court found no Charter violations and determined that while the defendant rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a realistic risk of danger.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 following a police investigation.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings of 170 mgs obtained at a police station.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath evidence on three grounds: (1) the time of driving was not accurately recorded to satisfy the two-hour requirement; (2) the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable; and (3) the accused's right to counsel under the Charter was violated.

The court found no violations regarding the timing of the breath samples.

However, the court found that a police officer interrupted and curtailed the accused's consultation with duty counsel by making hurry-up gestures through a window, thereby violating s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis from R. v. Grant, the court excluded the breath evidence as the seriousness of the Charter breach and its impact on the accused's protected right outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant, detained under the Ontario Review Board for over 30 years, appealed the Board's disposition continuing his detention at St. Joseph's Healthcare.

He argued the Board erred in refusing an adjournment, relying on hearsay evidence, failing to address his sleep deprivation, and refusing a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the adjournment issue moot and no basis to interfere with the Board's substantive decisions, though it noted the Board erred in its approach to the adjournment request and urged it to address the sleep deprivation issue at the next review.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

On the sentence appeal, the parties agreed the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's criminal record.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the fitness of the sentence based on the actual record, which included 11 prior convictions for break and enter over 25 years.

The Court concluded the total sentence of 820 days was fit and dismissed the appeal.