49 total
Life sentence for arson causing bodily harm reduced to 12 years as injuries were not intentionally inflicted.
The 70-year-old appellant pleaded guilty to arson causing bodily harm after deliberately setting fires in a house where his four-year-old grandson was sleeping.
The child suffered horrendous and devastating burn injuries.
The trial judge sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment, characterizing the offence as one of 'stark horror' based primarily on the horrific consequences to the victim.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by placing undue emphasis on the consequences rather than the appellant's blameworthiness, as the appellant did not intentionally cause the injuries.
The court substituted a sentence of 12 years' imprisonment, reduced to 8 years after credit for pre-trial custody.
Appeal allowed and new trial ordered due to inadequate reasons by the summary conviction appeal judge.
The accused appealed his assault conviction to the summary conviction appeal court, which dismissed the appeal with brief, conclusory reasons.
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing the appeal judge's reasons were inadequate.
The Court of Appeal held that the failure to give adequate reasons constituted an error of law that deprived the accused of meaningful appellate review.
Upon reviewing the trial record, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence and subjected the accused's testimony to stricter scrutiny than the complainant's.
The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.
Crown sentence appeal dismissed; intermittent and conditional sentences upheld for cruelty to animals and mischief.
The respondent pleaded guilty to mischief to property and cruelty to animals after videotaping the torture and killing of a cat.
He was sentenced to 90 days intermittent on the cruelty charge and a consecutive 18-month conditional sentence for mischief.
The Crown appealed, seeking an additional 10 months of incarceration.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly focused on the cruelty to the cat, which carried a maximum penalty of six months, and that the total sentence adequately reflected the seriousness of the conduct.
Fresh DNA evidence excluding the accused and implicating an alternative suspect warrants a new trial.
The appellant appealed his second-degree murder conviction and applied to introduce fresh evidence, including new DNA test results and factual evidence regarding scabs on his hands.
The Court of Appeal applied the Palmer test and found that the fresh DNA evidence, which excluded the appellant and pointed to an alternative suspect, could reasonably be expected to have affected the result at trial.
The fresh factual evidence regarding the source of the appellant's hand injuries was also admitted.
The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.
Attempted murder conviction quashed due to jury charge errors regarding concoction and victim's violent disposition.
The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder arising from a shooting during a drug transaction.
He argued the gun discharged accidentally during a struggle initiated by the victim.
The Court of Appeal found two reversible errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury: improperly instructing the jury that a finding of deliberate fabrication by the appellant could be used as positive evidence of guilt without independent evidence of concoction, and failing to instruct the jury on the use of the victim's criminal record and disposition for violence.
Conditional sentence for chiropractor's sexual assaults of patients replaced with nine months' imprisonment.
The respondent, a licensed chiropractor, pleaded guilty to nine counts of sexual assault against his female patients over a ten-year period.
The trial judge imposed an eighteen-month conditional sentence.
The Crown appealed the sentence.
The Court of Appeal held that the conditional sentence failed to adequately reflect the principles of general deterrence and denunciation given the gravity of the offences and the gross breach of trust.
The appeal was allowed, and the conditional sentence was replaced with a nine-month term of imprisonment.
Conviction for uttering threats quashed and new trial ordered due to misdirection on intent.
The young offender appealed a conviction for uttering threats.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected himself on the issue of intent by accepting the Crown's submission that it was only necessary to prove the accused intentionally uttered the words.
The Court held that the trial judge had to be satisfied the appellant intended the words to be taken seriously or meant to cause fear or intimidate.
As there was a live issue regarding whether the words were spoken in jest, the appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.
New parole eligibility hearing ordered due to inflammatory and highly prejudicial remarks by Crown counsel.
The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under s. 745 of the Criminal Code after serving 15 years.
At the hearing, the jury refused to reduce the period.
The appellant appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the hearing was unfair due to inflammatory remarks by Crown counsel and errors in the judge's charge.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing, finding that Crown counsel's remarks, which discredited the s. 745 process and improperly referenced the death penalty and unrelated crimes, seriously compromised the fairness of the hearing.
The Court also held that victim impact statements may be admissible at a s. 745 hearing at the discretion of the presiding judge.
Private juror screening after plea breached presence rights and required a new trial.
Criminal appeal from conviction for conspiracy to obtain contributions for a governing political party through influence peddling.
The majority held that questioning prospective jurors in private after arraignment and plea, on grounds including possible partiality, formed part of the trial for purposes of s. 577(1) of the Criminal Code and violated the accused's right to be present.
The majority further held that this defect could not be cured by later challenges for cause or by the curative provisions dealing with jury irregularities, and that the process impermissibly intruded into the Code's exclusive scheme for determining juror impartiality.
A new trial was ordered, although the majority indicated agreement with the dissent's resolution of the remaining issues concerning the definition of “person”, the co-conspirators' hearsay exception, and good character instructions.