Mark J. Sandler

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault, arguing that the summary conviction appeal court judge failed to provide adequate reasons and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and applied unequal scrutiny to the testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal court judge's reasons were adequate and permitted effective appellate review.

The Court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding the trial judge's assessment of credibility, the complainant's prior statements, and the use of confirmatory evidence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and leave to appeal the sentence was refused.

The appellant appealed her conviction for second degree murder and her thirteen-year parole ineligibility period for shooting and killing her former husband during a child custody dispute.

She argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the defence of provocation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the provocation defence because the appellant's actions were not sudden and she had time for her passion to cool.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in setting the parole ineligibility period.

The Attorney General of Ontario and the Ontario Provincial Police appealed a motions judge's order refusing to dissolve an injunction against Aboriginal protestors occupying a residential development, and requiring the Attorney General to take carriage of criminal contempt proceedings while reporting back to the court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

It held that the motions judge erred in refusing to dissolve the injunction after the Ontario government purchased the property and consented to the occupation.

The Court maintained the referral of the contempt matters to the Attorney General, but imposed strict conditions, finding that the motions judge's previous contempt process was fundamentally flawed for denying procedural fairness and improperly interfering with police and prosecutorial discretion.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to stay an order of a motion judge pending appeal.

The motion judge had refused to dissolve an injunction prohibiting protestors from occupying land, even though the land had been purchased by the Province of Ontario, until criminal contempt proceedings were disposed of.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the paragraph continuing the injunction, finding a serious issue as to its validity, irreparable harm to the public interest and land claim negotiations, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court declined to stay the paragraph referring the contempt matter to the Attorney General for carriage.

The applicant, a Canadian citizen, sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering him to the United States to face charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.

The applicant argued that the American jurisdictional claim was unfounded, that his surrender violated his section 6(1) Charter right to remain in Canada, and that he was denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister correctly applied the substantial connection test to determine that Canada would have jurisdiction in similar circumstances, reasonably weighed the factors favouring prosecution in the United States, and afforded the applicant adequate procedural fairness.

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to smuggle, sell, and possess alcohol, and possession of unlawfully imported spirits.

The Court of Appeal found significant errors in the trial judge's jury instructions.

The trial judge failed to adequately explain the defence's position, mischaracterized the defence's argument regarding the police investigation, and improperly suggested that police surveillance confirmed the evidence of unsavoury witnesses.

Additionally, the instructions on the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule (the Carter test) were confusing and deficient.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The 70-year-old appellant pleaded guilty to arson causing bodily harm after deliberately setting fires in a house where his four-year-old grandson was sleeping.

The child suffered horrendous and devastating burn injuries.

The trial judge sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment, characterizing the offence as one of 'stark horror' based primarily on the horrific consequences to the victim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by placing undue emphasis on the consequences rather than the appellant's blameworthiness, as the appellant did not intentionally cause the injuries.

The court substituted a sentence of 12 years' imprisonment, reduced to 8 years after credit for pre-trial custody.

The accused appealed his assault conviction to the summary conviction appeal court, which dismissed the appeal with brief, conclusory reasons.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing the appeal judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to give adequate reasons constituted an error of law that deprived the accused of meaningful appellate review.

Upon reviewing the trial record, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence and subjected the accused's testimony to stricter scrutiny than the complainant's.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent pleaded guilty to mischief to property and cruelty to animals after videotaping the torture and killing of a cat.

He was sentenced to 90 days intermittent on the cruelty charge and a consecutive 18-month conditional sentence for mischief.

The Crown appealed, seeking an additional 10 months of incarceration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly focused on the cruelty to the cat, which carried a maximum penalty of six months, and that the total sentence adequately reflected the seriousness of the conduct.

The appellant appealed his second-degree murder conviction and applied to introduce fresh evidence, including new DNA test results and factual evidence regarding scabs on his hands.

The Court of Appeal applied the Palmer test and found that the fresh DNA evidence, which excluded the appellant and pointed to an alternative suspect, could reasonably be expected to have affected the result at trial.

The fresh factual evidence regarding the source of the appellant's hand injuries was also admitted.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder arising from a shooting during a drug transaction.

He argued the gun discharged accidentally during a struggle initiated by the victim.

The Court of Appeal found two reversible errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury: improperly instructing the jury that a finding of deliberate fabrication by the appellant could be used as positive evidence of guilt without independent evidence of concoction, and failing to instruct the jury on the use of the victim's criminal record and disposition for violence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent, a licensed chiropractor, pleaded guilty to nine counts of sexual assault against his female patients over a ten-year period.

The trial judge imposed an eighteen-month conditional sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the conditional sentence failed to adequately reflect the principles of general deterrence and denunciation given the gravity of the offences and the gross breach of trust.

The appeal was allowed, and the conditional sentence was replaced with a nine-month term of imprisonment.

The young offender appealed a conviction for uttering threats.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected himself on the issue of intent by accepting the Crown's submission that it was only necessary to prove the accused intentionally uttered the words.

The Court held that the trial judge had to be satisfied the appellant intended the words to be taken seriously or meant to cause fear or intimidate.

As there was a live issue regarding whether the words were spoken in jest, the appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under s. 745 of the Criminal Code after serving 15 years.

At the hearing, the jury refused to reduce the period.

The appellant appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the hearing was unfair due to inflammatory remarks by Crown counsel and errors in the judge's charge.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing, finding that Crown counsel's remarks, which discredited the s. 745 process and improperly referenced the death penalty and unrelated crimes, seriously compromised the fairness of the hearing.

The Court also held that victim impact statements may be admissible at a s. 745 hearing at the discretion of the presiding judge.

Criminal appeal from conviction for conspiracy to obtain contributions for a governing political party through influence peddling.

The majority held that questioning prospective jurors in private after arraignment and plea, on grounds including possible partiality, formed part of the trial for purposes of s. 577(1) of the Criminal Code and violated the accused's right to be present.

The majority further held that this defect could not be cured by later challenges for cause or by the curative provisions dealing with jury irregularities, and that the process impermissibly intruded into the Code's exclusive scheme for determining juror impartiality.

A new trial was ordered, although the majority indicated agreement with the dissent's resolution of the remaining issues concerning the definition of “person”, the co-conspirators' hearsay exception, and good character instructions.