Marie-Andrée Vermette

The offender was found guilty by a jury of human trafficking, receiving a material benefit from human trafficking, and related offences.

The Crown sought a seven-year custodial sentence, while the offender sought a conditional sentence, relying on his youth, minor record, and 5.5 years of restrictive bail conditions.

The court found that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the need for denunciation and deterrence.

After weighing the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors, including the restrictive bail conditions and harsh pre-sentence custody, the court imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment, less 36 days credit for pre-sentence custody.

The offender was convicted of break and enter and armed robbery after a home invasion targeting a sex worker.

The Crown sought a sentence of 8 years and a Long-Term Offender (LTO) designation.

The court sentenced the offender to 7 years' imprisonment, granting 6.5 years of enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, leaving 6 months to serve.

The court found the offender met the criteria for an LTO designation due to a substantial risk of violent reoffending and a reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community, imposing a 7-year long-term supervision order.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial involving former intimate partners, the court assessed allegations of sexual assault, property damage, attempted murder, and assault causing bodily harm.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as internally inconsistent and largely unbelievable, and accepted the complainant's evidence on the January and April 2019 incidents, subject to minor peripheral reservations.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused sexually assaulted the complainant, wilfully damaged her phone, and stabbed her in the breast causing bodily harm.

However, applying the specific-intent requirements for attempted murder and the stabbing factors drawn from the jurisprudence, the court held that the limited force of the single flesh wound left a reasonable doubt about an intent to kill.

The court also found no evidentiary foundation for a defence of advanced intoxication.

The accused was convicted by jury of sexual assault.

At sentencing, the court found that the victim lost consciousness and lacked capacity to consent to sexual activity, and that the accused was reckless about whether the victim was consenting.

The court imposed a 32-month penitentiary sentence, rejecting both the Crown's request for 3.5 years and the defence's request for a conditional sentence.

The court found highly mitigating factors including the accused's status as a first-time offender, genuine remorse expressed within 24 hours of the offence, meaningful engagement in counselling and rehabilitation, strong pro-social support, and low risk of recidivism.

The court declined to impose a Sex Offender Information Registration Act order, finding that the accused had established that such an order would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The applicant brought a motion under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The applicant and co-accused were charged with human trafficking, receiving material benefit from human trafficking, receiving material benefit from sexual services, procuring, advertising sexual services, and theft.

The trial was initially scheduled for October 7, 2024, but was adjourned at the co-accused's request due to personal circumstances.

The rescheduled trial was set for September 29, 2025.

The court found that the net delay was 41 months and 28 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling by 11 months and 28 days.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The court applied an individualized approach to delay attribution and found that the co-accused did not proceed as a collective.

The Crown could have ameliorated the delay through severance but failed to do so.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was ordered.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no breach of sections 8 and 9, but found a breach of section 10(b) regarding the failure to inform the accused of his right to counsel.

However, the court concluded that the evidence was not obtained in a manner causally connected to the Charter breach and therefore section 24(2) did not apply.

The court found the accused guilty of the offence based on evidence establishing possession of a large quantity of cocaine (approximately 731.77 grams including packaging) that was ingested and surgically removed, with expert evidence establishing the quantity was inconsistent with personal use and consistent with trafficking.

The applicant, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence, alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The police arrested the applicant after a foot pursuit following a 911 call about a person with a gun matching his description.

The court found no breaches of ss. 7, 8, or 9, concluding the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for possession of a firearm and that the use of force was justified.

The court found breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) due to a delay in informing the applicant of the reasons for his arrest for a firearm and failing to hold off questioning before facilitating his right to counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the application.

The court granted the applicant’s Charter application, finding that the police used their Highway Traffic Act powers as a pretext to stop the applicant’s vehicle to investigate a possible drug transaction, resulting in arbitrary detention contrary to section 9.

The subsequent search and seizure of drugs and a firearm were not justified under the plain view doctrine and violated section 8.

The applicant’s right to counsel under section 10(b) was also breached due to an unreasonable delay in facilitating access to duty counsel.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2), concluding that admitting it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a successful summary judgment motion by the plaintiff, Esther Gerstel Inc., against the defendant, Denise Michelle Scott, in a mortgage enforcement proceeding.

The court considers the contractual right to full indemnity costs under the mortgage, the conduct of the parties, and the principle of proportionality.

The court ultimately awards the plaintiff full indemnity costs in the reduced amount of $15,500.00, finding no special circumstances to depart from the contractual terms and noting the defendant’s partial success regarding renewal fees.

The decision addresses an application by Rutal Alott Hankey for a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his case to trial.

The court applies the framework from R. v. Jordan, analyzing periods of delay attributable to the defence, the Crown, and systemic factors, as well as the impact of exceptional circumstances.

The court finds that the net delay exceeds the 30-month ceiling even after accounting for exceptional circumstances, and grants a stay of proceedings.

The decision addresses an application by Deren Akyeam-Pong to exclude evidence seized during a search of a Toronto hotel room, arguing that the search warrants were issued without sufficient grounds and that his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter were breached.

The court reviews the adequacy of the Information to Obtain (ITO), the role of confidential informant privilege, and the sufficiency of judicial summaries of redacted material.

The court finds that the ITO, as supplemented by a judicial summary, provided sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the issuance of the warrants.

The application is dismissed.

The plaintiff, Esther Gerstel Inc. (EGI), brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, Denise Michelle Scott, for payment of amounts due under a mortgage and for possession of the mortgaged property.

The only issue was the amount owing, as the defendant acknowledged some amount was due.

The court found this was an appropriate case for summary judgment, holding that the principal and interest claimed by EGI were established, but that two renewal fees were not.

The court ordered payment of the principal and interest, but not the disputed renewal fees, and granted EGI possession of the property, with a 45-day period for the defendant to pay before enforcement.

The accused, Mark Andre Davis, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a 13-year-old complainant, his tennis student, relating to an incident in his car after a tennis practice.

The complainant and the accused gave conflicting accounts of the incident.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the complainant’s evidence and was left in reasonable doubt by the accused’s version.

Mr. Davis was acquitted of all charges.

The Crown and the accused brought pre-trial applications in a child pornography case.

The Crown sought to admit the accused's statement to police, which the court found was made voluntarily.

The accused sought to exclude evidence under the Charter, arguing that the police's use of the Child Protection System (CPS) to obtain his IP address from a peer-to-peer network violated section 8, that the search of his devices exceeded the warrant's scope, and that his 58-minute detention during the search violated section 9.

The court held that the use of CPS did not engage section 8 as there was no state action and no reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address shared on a public peer-to-peer network.

While the court found the accused's detention was arbitrary and breached section 9, it declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2), noting the lack of causal connection to the evidence and the seriousness of the offences.

C.N.B. was sentenced after being found guilty of multiple counts of assault, assault with a weapon, invitation to sexual touching, sexual interference, and sexual assault against his minor daughter.

The court considered aggravating factors including abuse of trust, prolonged and repeated abuse, use of weapons, and significant victim impact.

Mitigating factors were limited due to C.N.B.'s lack of full remorse.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court imposed a global sentence of six years imprisonment.

Ancillary orders, including DNA, weapons prohibition, non-communication, and Sex Offender Registry registration, were also issued.

The Crown applied for orders permitting the complainant in a human trafficking and sexual services case to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) and in the presence of a support person, pursuant to sections 486.2(2) and 486.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent opposed the CCTV request but consented to a support person in the courtroom.

The court granted both applications, finding that the use of CCTV and a support person would facilitate the complainant's ability to provide a full and candid account, considering factors such as the complainant's fear of the respondent, the nature of the offences, and the relationship between the parties.

The court rejected arguments regarding the right to face one's accuser and potential moral prejudice to the jury.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a judgment where the action was granted in part, the counterclaim dismissed, and the third-party claim dismissed.

The Plaintiff and Third Party sought costs on a partial indemnity basis up to February 2, 2023, and substantial indemnity thereafter, relying on an offer to settle.

The Defendants failed to submit costs arguments.

The court found the Plaintiff and Third Party were successful and entitled to costs.

Despite potential technical non-compliance with Rule 49.10, the offer to settle's terms were more favourable than the judgment, justifying substantial indemnity from the offer date under Rule 49.13.

The court reduced the quantum sought due to high junior lawyer rates and duplication, ultimately awarding an all-inclusive amount of $115,000.00.

The Plaintiff, Barbara Wilds, sought substantial indemnity costs after partially succeeding in a wrongful dismissal action against 1959612 Ontario Inc. o/a Gibson Building Supplies, where she was awarded damages for wrongful dismissal and punitive damages.

The Defendant argued costs should be limited as the recovery was within Small Claims Court jurisdiction and success was divided.

The court found the action should have been commenced in Small Claims Court and limited the costs award to the maximum recoverable there ($5,250.00 plus disbursements), further reducing it by 25% due to divided success.

The Plaintiff's Rule 49 offer to settle was found not to trigger costs consequences as the judgment was not more favourable.

The Defendant was ordered to pay $6,000.00 in all-inclusive costs.

The applicant, R.Y.D., brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded legal defence, arguing he lacked the financial means and that counsel was essential for a fair trial.

The Crown opposed, asserting incomplete financial disclosure and that counsel was not essential.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to provide complete, accurate, and credible evidence of his financial circumstances, thus not satisfying his onus to prove he lacked the means to employ counsel.

This decision addresses a costs motion following the successful summary judgment dismissal of an action.

The Defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing their offer to settle and the Plaintiff's conduct warranted it.

The Plaintiff argued for a lower partial indemnity amount, citing excessive time and hourly rates in the Defendants' bill of costs.

The court found that Rule 49.10 was not triggered because the Plaintiff obtained no judgment.

It also determined that the Plaintiff's conduct, while unsuccessful, did not rise to the level required for substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, reducing the quantum sought due to an excessive law clerk rate and potential duplication of effort, fixing the all-inclusive amount at $22,000.00.