Court File Numbers
CR-24-20000387-0000
CR-24-20000605-0000
Date
April 4, 2025
Court
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Style of Cause
Between:
His Majesty the King
– and –
Deren Akyeam-Pong
Appearances:
Ryan Wilson, for the Crown
Craig Zeeh, for the accused, Deren Akyeam-Pong
Heard: February 27 and March 21, 2025
Reasons for Judgment on Application Pursuant to Sections 8, 9 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Sylvia C. Vermette
Introduction
[1] Mr. Deren Akyeam-Pong is charged with several offences that include possession of a controlled substance and possession of a loaded firearm.
[2] Mr. Akyeam-Pong has brought an application for an order under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) excluding the evidence seized from the Hilton Hotel in Toronto on January 9, 2022, during the execution of search warrants. Mr. Akyeam-Pong’s position is that the police breached his rights under section 8 of the Charter because the Information to Obtain (“ITO”) lacked sufficient grounds to support the allegations that the targets were in possession of a firearm or that a firearm would be found in the places searched. Mr. Akyeam-Pong also alleges a breach of section 9 of the Charter because the grounds for his arrest rest solely on the search warrant.[^1]
[3] The form of the ITO provided to Mr. Akyeam-Pong was substantially redacted to protect a confidential source. The Crown concedes that the form of the ITO provided to Mr. Akyeam-Pong does not justify the issuance of the search warrants. Thus, in response to Mr. Akyeam-Pong’s challenge to the legality of the search, the Crown brought an application pursuant to step 6 of the procedure established in R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421 at 1461 (“Garofoli”), to have this Court consider the excised materials in the ITO as necessary to support the authorization.
[4] After considering the matter, I allow the Crown’s application pursuant to step 6 of the procedure established in Garofoli, and I conclude that the search warrants could have issued based on the ITO. Accordingly, Mr. Akyeam-Pong’s application is dismissed.
A. Background
[5] The following is a summary of the relevant facts based on the evidence before me.
1. The ITO and Search Warrants
[6] The search warrants in issue were obtained based on the ITO of Detective Constable (“DC”) Fardell dated January 8, 2022. In the ITO, DC Fardell stated that there were reasonable grounds to believe that certain things were located in three hotel rooms (1210, 2204 and 2712) and three vehicles at the Hilton Hotel in downtown Toronto, including the following items: firearms, ammunition, magazines, firearms parts and paraphernalia (including cleaning tools, holsters and speed loaders), firearms documents (including licences, registrations, authorizations and permits), and other documents in relation to firearms.
[7] The listed items were being sought as evidence in respect of the alleged offence of unlawful possession of a firearm by Hamdan Mahmoud, Mason Hood and Deren Akyeam-Pong on January 8, 2022, contrary to section 92 of the Criminal Code.
[8] Justice of the Peace Felix Mora issued the search warrants. The warrants authorized the police to conduct the search between 11:30 p.m. on January 8, 2022 and 11:59 p.m. on January 10, 2022.
[9] The ITO states that the Gun and Gang Task Force initiated an investigation of Messrs. Mahmoud, Hood and Akyeam-Pong in the month of January 2022. It also states that information was received from a confidential human source in relation to Messrs. Mahmoud and Akyeam-Pong. Relying on the information provided, DC Fardell believed that Messrs. Mahmoud, Hood and Akyeam-Pong were in possession of illegal firearms. The ITO notes that Messrs. Mahmoud, Hood and Akyeam-Pong are not licenced to possess a firearm.
[10] The ITO sets out investigative steps taken by the police on January 8, 2022, including contacting and receiving information from the Hamilton Police Service and attending at the Hilton Hotel. The Hilton Hotel’s security advised the police that, among other things:
- Room 2712 was rented under the name of Sura Mahmoud and had three vehicles associated to it. The room was rented on January 5, 2022 at 7:14 a.m. The police believed that Sura Mahmoud was Hamdan Mahmoud’s sister.
- Rooms 1210 and 2204 were rented under the name of Mason Hood. One room was rented on January 6, 2022 at 4:40 a.m. and the second room was rented on January 7, 2022 at 4:29 a.m.
- All three rooms extended their stay until January 9, 2022.
- Mason Hood and Deren Akyeam-Pong came to the front desk to extend rooms 1210 and 2204.
[11] The ITO summarizes surveillance conducted by the police at the Hilton Hotel on January 8, 2022. Among other things, the surveillance team observed Messrs. Hood and Akyeam-Pong attending the main desk at the hotel where they met two unknown males, and then returning into the hotel. Messrs. Hood and Akyeam-Pong were also seen exiting the hotel and leaving the area in a vehicle with the two unknown males.
[12] The ITO also summarizes the database checks conducted by DC Fardell on January 8, 2022, on Messrs. Mahmoud, Hood and Akyeam-Pong. Among other things, it is stated that Mr. Akyeam-Pong had outstanding charges (not deemed to be relevant to the investigation) and a lengthy criminal record, including one conviction for unauthorized possession of a firearm in a motor vehicle in April 2021.
[13] Appendix D to the ITO includes the information provided on a confidential basis by the confidential informer (“CI”). The CI is a carded confidential source with the Toronto Police Service. The ITO states that the CI is embedded within the criminal world and has the ability to make first-hand observations not available to the police.
[14] Appendix D is heavily redacted. The section dealing with the track record and reliability of the CI (described as CI#01 in the ITO) is almost entirely redacted. The section entitled “Compelling Nature of the Information Provided by CI#01” includes the following:
Source of Knowledge
The information provided by CI#01 is from firsthand knowledge based on observations made personally and from second hand knowledge obtained from being part of the same criminal subculture.
Degree of Detail
The information provided by CI#01 is detailed in nature outlining the offence, a detailed description of the firearms involved, identification of the person(s) of interest and the location currently occupied by the persons of interest.
Subject Matter
The information provided by CI#01 indicates that MAHMOUD, AKYYEAM-PONG [sic] and other associates are in the possession of a firearms [sic].
Relationship of the CI to Person(s) of Interest
CI#01 is heavily involved in the criminal subculture. [Redacted – Gender/sex] has knowledge of firearms, drug trafficking and other criminal offences by being involved in the criminal subculture. [Redacted – Gender/sex] has the ability to make observations due to [Redacted – Gender/sex] role in the criminal world. [Redacted – Gender/sex] has a relationship with the persons of interest as a result of being in this same criminal culture.
[15] The section entitled “The Information Provided by CI#01” also contains substantial redactions. The parts that are not redacted include the following information, among others:
- A “crew” that comes from the Hamilton area did the robbery at Rock City Jewelers in Toronto.
- The “Hamilton Crew” is flashy and armed with numerous handguns.
- The CI is unsure of how many people are in the Hamilton Crew, but the CI identified Messrs. Mahmoud and Akyeam-Pong as being part of the Hamilton Crew.
- The group is currently at the Hilton Hotel. The information in the following two paragraphs is redacted, except for the words “firearms” and “more firearms”.
[16] The section entitled “Corroboration of Information from CI#01” does not contain redactions. It provides as follows:
Corroborating Evidence was Obtained in Relation to the Information Provided by the Confidential Informer
The identities provided by CI#01 have been confirmed and they are currently believed to be staying at the Hilton Hotel Toronto at 145 Richmond Street West as stated by CH#01 [sic]. “Ritchie” was provided as a nickname for MAHMOUD and “D-Nine” is listed as the nickname for AKYEAM-PONG. Both these names are listed on CPIC[^2] as alias for MAHMOUD and AKYEAM-PONG.
Corroboration of the Content of the Confidential Informer Information Related to Criminality and/or Other Details Provided
Police are unlikely to corroborate the details of the Criminality when the offence at hand involves firearms possession. It is unlikely that police will make observations of a firearm prior to the execution of a search warrant unless under limited circumstances.
Whether or not the Information from the Confidential Informer, in Part or as a Whole, is Consistent with, or Contradicts, Other Available Information Including Police Experience and any Other Confidential Informer Information
CI#01 provided the location of the persons of interest which has been in part corroborated by on scene police investigation and surveillance.
2. Execution of the Search Warrant at Room 2204
[17] On January 9, 2022, at 6:26 a.m., the Toronto Police’s Emergency Task Force executed the search warrant at room 2204 at the Hilton Hotel. They made no prior announcement before breaking down the front door and entering into the room. Mr. Akyeam-Pong and a woman were in the room. They were both arrested. From room 2204, police officers seized a loaded Glock 23 handgun with eight rounds of .40 caliber ammunition, and various quantities of four different drugs.
B. Discussion
1. Redactions Made to the ITO by the Crown
[18] As part of the Garofoli procedure, I reviewed the redactions made to the ITO and the reasons for the redactions provided by the Crown, which are based on confidential informant privilege.
[19] Confidential informant privilege is a near absolute class privilege. Given that the innocence at stake exception was not raised in this case, the privilege acts as a complete bar to disclosing any information that might tend to identify an informer. This includes any information that might implicitly reveal the informer’s identity. See R. v. A.B., 2024 ONCA 111 at para. 34 (“A.B.”).
[20] A heavy burden is placed upon the court, police and Crown to protect confidential informant privilege. It is essential that this task be approached with a keen understanding that even seemingly innocuous information may reveal an informant’s identity when it is disclosed to an accused. Given that the persons who have to make calls about disclosure do not know what the accused and others already know, the law requires that those disclosure decisions err on the side of caution, assuming that even the disclosure of seemingly bland information can result in a narrowing of the pool. See A.B. at para. 38 and R. v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524 at para. 82 (“Reid”).
[21] I conducted my review of the redactions in light of the principles set out above. I concluded that the quasi-totality of the redactions were appropriate and required in order to protect confidential informant privilege. However, I found that there were three instances where the text that had been redacted should be disclosed in full or in part. The Crown did not object to the proposed additional disclosure and the relevant text was subsequently included in my judicial summary.
2. Judicial Summary
[22] In Garofoli, the Supreme Court stated that the court should only accede to the Crown’s request under step 6 – i.e., to have the judge consider so much of the excised material as is necessary to support the authorization – if satisfied that the accused is sufficiently aware of the nature of the excised material to challenge it in argument or by evidence. A judicial summary of the excised material should be provided if it will fulfil that function. See Garofoli at 1461.
[23] A judicial summary, by its very nature, is general and not detailed. Its predominant characteristics are conciseness and brevity. The summary need only make the accused aware of the nature of the redacted material, not its substance and details. However, the judicial summary, combined with the redacted ITO, must be sufficient to ensure that the accused is in a position to exercise their right to make full answer and defence and mount a challenge to the redacted material, by argument or evidence. In assessing the summary’s sufficiency, the judge must take into account the fact that the accused: (a) has received disclosure, (b) can, with leave, cross-examine the affiant, and (c) can lead evidence on the application. See Reid at paras. 88, 90 and R. v. Crevier, 2015 ONCA 619 at para. 43 (“Crevier”).
[24] In preparing the judicial summary (or reviewing the Crown’s proposed summary), the judge must be satisfied that the summary includes as much information as is possible to allow the accused to mount both a facial and a sub-facial attack on the ITO while nonetheless ensuring that informer privilege is maintained. The summary must provide the accused with a meaningful basis upon which to challenge whether the affiant made full and frank disclosure regarding the reliability of the informer, and sufficient information to evaluate whether the preconditions for issuing the warrant were met, including whether the information was compelling and corroborated and whether the informer was credible. However, it must be kept in mind that the summary will never be a complete substitute for full disclosure given the need to protect informer privilege. See Crevier at paras. 83-84, Reid at para. 90 and R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 at 1168 (“Debot”).
[25] In this case, the Crown prepared a proposed judicial summary of the redacted portions of the ITO for the defence before the hearing of the application. Upon review, I made a number of changes to the judicial summary prepared by the Crown. The Crown did not object to the changes that I made.
[26] The purpose of my changes was to ensure accuracy. Some of the summaries proposed by the Crown contained inferences and/or argument. I agree with Justice Nakatsuru’s comments in R. v. Thelwell, 2018 ONSC 394 at para. 40 that a judicial summary should not go beyond what is contained in the original text, and that matters of inference-drawing – even if they may strike one as obvious – should be left out of the summary.
[27] After providing a revised judicial summary to defence counsel, I heard submissions regarding the contents of the summary. Following the submissions, I made minor changes to the judicial summary that was provided to defence counsel, and a final judicial summary was marked as an exhibit.
[28] In Crevier, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that what will be contained in a judicial summary will vary from case to case. However, the Court of Appeal stated that the judge should consider whether the judicial summary ought to indicate that the redacted materials include the following types of information, to the extent that they are relevant and will not risk revealing the identity of the confidential informer (see Crevier at para. 84). I discuss below the factors set out in the non-prescriptive and non-exhaustive list provided by the Court of Appeal:
- The source of the informer’s information (first-hand, hearsay and, if hearsay, the source of that hearsay): The source of the informer’s knowledge is described in an unredacted paragraph of the ITO (paragraph 14 of the ITO, reproduced in paragraph 14 above). The judicial summary indicates when the information provided is clearly hearsay/second-hand and identifies the number of sources of the hearsay.
- The informer’s relationship with/to the accused and how they first came into contact: The nature of the CI’s relationship with the accused is described in a paragraph of the ITO that is not redacted, except for information regarding the gender/sex of the CI (paragraph 18 of the ITO, reproduced in paragraph 14 above).
- The length of time the informer has known the accused and the frequency of contact between them: This information was not disclosed in the ITO, as indicated by the Crown in its application materials.
- Whether the informer has previously provided information to police: This point is included in the judicial summary.
- Whether previous information provided (if any) has led to arrests, seizures, or convictions: This information (or lack thereof) is summarized in the judicial summary.
- Whether the past information provided by the informer has ever been proven unreliable or false: As indicated by the Crown in its application materials, there is no mention in the ITO of the CI ever providing information that has been proven unreliable or false.
- Whether the informer has a criminal record and, if yes, whether the unredacted ITO includes details of the convictions or charges or whether a copy of the criminal record was appended: This point is included in the judicial summary.
- Whether the informer has convictions for offences of dishonesty or against the administration of justice: See point above.
- The informer’s motivation for speaking to police, including whether consideration was sought or arranged: This point is included in the judicial summary and is also addressed in unredacted parts of the ITO (paragraphs 8-9 of the ITO).
- Whether the informer was instructed on the penalties for giving false information: This point is addressed in an unredacted paragraph of the ITO (paragraph 10 of the ITO).
- Whether descriptions provided by the informer match the accused or the target location: This point is included in the judicial summary and in unredacted portions of the ITO.
- The degree of detail of the information that the informer provided to police: This point is generally included in the judicial summary and can be assessed by reading the judicial summary in conjunction with the unredacted parts of the ITO and the length of the redactions. This point is also addressed in an unredacted paragraph of the ITO (paragraph 15 of the ITO, reproduced in paragraph 14 above).
- The recency or timing of the information that the informer provided to police: This point is included in the judicial summary.
- Any discrepancies between the information of one informer and another: Not applicable.
- Any aspects of the informer’s information that are contradicted by police investigation or otherwise detract from its credibility: As indicated by the Crown in its application materials, there is no mention in the ITO of any contradictions. This point is also addressed in unredacted paragraphs of the ITO (paragraphs 20-22 of the ITO, reproduced in paragraph 16 above).
- Any errors or inaccuracies that exist in the ITO, and their nature (e.g. typographical errors): As indicated by the Crown in its application materials, no errors or inaccuracies have been identified in the ITO.
[29] Taking the foregoing into account, I conclude that, after receiving the final version of the judicial summary, Mr. Akyeam-Pong was sufficiently aware of the nature of the excised material to challenge it in argument or by evidence. In my view, Mr. Akyeam-Pong was in a position to highlight areas of omissions, attack the steps (or lack thereof) taken to corroborate the information received from the informer, and make arguments in the alternative and on general principles of informer reliability. See Crevier at para. 77. In fact, defence counsel made a number of arguments of this nature. I note that Mr. Akyeam-Pong did not seek to cross-examine the author of the ITO and/or to adduce evidence.
[30] Having found that Mr. Akyeam-Pong was sufficiently aware of the nature of the redacted information, I now turn to the assessment of the adequacy of the ITO with the help of that information. In determining the weight to be given to the redacted information, I have to take into account the fact that Mr. Akyeam-Pong could not see the information and directly challenge it. See Crevier at para. 86.
3. Section 8 Analysis – Whether the Search Warrant Could Have Issued
i. General Principles
[31] A warrant is presumed to be valid. As a result, the onus of demonstrating that it was not validly issued falls on the party who challenges it. See R. v. Brown, 2021 ONCA 119 at para. 33 (“Brown”).
[32] When reviewing a warrant, the question is not whether the reviewing justice would have issued the warrant, but whether the issuing justice could have done so. The test is whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued. The reviewing court is to consider whether there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit the issuing justice to find reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed and that evidence of that offence would be found at the specified time and place. See R. v. Kalonji, 2022 ONCA 415 at para. 19 (“Kalonji”) and R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 at para. 40.
[33] Where the ITO is based primarily on the information obtained from a CI, the issuing justice must make three inquiries: (1) whether the information about the crime was compelling; (2) whether the source of the information was credible; and (3) whether the information was corroborated by the police before applying for a search warrant. These are not watertight inquiries. Weaknesses in one of the factors may be compensated by the strength of others. The totality of the circumstances must be considered in order to meet the standard of reasonable probability. See Debot at 1168 and Brown at para. 32.
[34] In applying the test of whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued, the reviewing judge is required to adopt a common-sense and holistic approach, and take into account that authorizing justices may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence in the ITO. Thus, reasonable inferences can be relied upon in the absence of direct evidence. See Kalonji at para. 25, R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60 at para. 16 and R. v. Herta, 2018 ONCA 85 at para. 20 (“Herta”).
[35] The “reasonable grounds to believe” standard does not require proof on the balance of probabilities. This standard is one of credibly-based probability. Credibly-based probability exceeds suspicion, but falls short of a balance of probabilities. The authorizing justice has to make their decision about whether to issue the warrant from the evidence included in the ITO as a whole, approaching the assessment on a common-sense, practical and non-technical basis. See R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72 at paras. 81-82 and Herta at para. 20.
ii. Analysis
[36] In my view, there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence in the ITO to permit the issuing justice to find reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed and that evidence of that offence would be found at the specified time and places.
[37] The three inquiries (i.e., the Debot factors) that must be made where the ITO is based primarily on the information obtained from a CI, which are discussed below, support this conclusion.
[38] Whether the information about the crime was compelling. While information that takes the form of bald conclusory statements or rumour or gossip is not compelling, an informer’s personal, detailed and recent observations may be considered compelling. See R. v. Ifesimeshone, 2024 ONCA 834 at para. 25.
[39] As stated in paragraph 15 of the unredacted ITO (reproduced in paragraph 14 above), the information provided by the CI is detailed in nature, includes a detailed description of the firearms involved, and identifies persons of interest and the location currently occupied by the persons of interest.
[40] Based on the context and wording of the ITO, the information provided by the CI regarding the alleged offence (i.e., the unlawful possession of firearms at the Hilton Hotel) appears to be based on first-hand knowledge. However, I note that it is not always 100% clear in the ITO whether the information provided by the CI was based on first-hand knowledge or not, especially the information of other alleged criminality. This is a weakness of the ITO. While I do not give any weight to the information in the redacted ITO that is clearly hearsay/second-hand, it is my view that this information is mostly peripheral in nature.
[41] Whether the CI was credible. The following information is included in the ITO: (a) the CI’s track record in providing reliable information to the police (including the fact that contraband was seized after the police used the information provided by the CI in prior investigations); (b) the CI’s motivation for providing the information; and (c) whether the CI had a criminal record and outstanding charges. Further, the ITO states that the CI is a carded confidential source with the Toronto Police Service. See Brown at paras. 44, 50.
[42] Whether the information was corroborated by the police before applying for the search warrants. The police were able to corroborate some of the information provided by the CI, including the following:
- The identities provided by the CI were confirmed by the police.
- The nicknames provided by the CI with respect to Mr. Mahmoud (“Ritchie”) and Mr. Akyeam-Pong (“D-9”) are listed on CPIC as aliases for Messrs. Mahmoud and Akyeam-Pong.
- The CI advised the police that Messrs. Mahmoud and Akyeam-Pong were part of the Hamilton Crew. The Hamilton Police Service corroborated that Mr. Akyeam-Pong was a known associate of Mr. Mahmoud.
- The CI advised the police that the Hamilton Crew was from the Hamilton area. The police were able to confirm that Mr. Akyeam-Pong has convictions involving the Hamilton Police Service and that he has a cancelled driver’s licence with an address in Hamilton. Further, Mr. Mahmoud’s listed address in the Versadex system is in Hamilton.
- The CI advised the police that Mr. Akyeam-Pong was part of the Hamilton Crew and that the Hamilton Crew was currently at the Hilton Hotel in downtown Toronto. Mr. Akyeam-Pong’s presence at the Hilton Hotel was confirmed by the police.
- The CI advised the police that the members of the Hamilton Crew were driving a black Honda. The police were able to confirm that a black Honda Civic was associated with the room at the Hilton Hotel rented under the name of Sura Mahmoud, who is believed to be the sister of Hamdan Mahmoud, one of the persons identified by the CI as a member of the Hamilton Crew.
- More generally, Mr. Akyeam-Pong’s involvement in the criminal subculture was corroborated by the fact that Mr. Akyeam-Pong had outstanding charges and a lengthy criminal record, including a criminal conviction for unauthorized possession of a firearm in a motor vehicle in April 2021 and three weapons prohibitions.
[43] Mr. Akyeam-Pong is critical of the type of information that was corroborated and argues that most of the information could be publicly known or available through social media. However, all corroborative information, even of neutral facts, must be taken together and not be viewed in isolation. Corroboration of details provided by the CI, even if not of the criminal activity, cannot be disregarded if it substantiates the reliability of a source’s information. See Ifesimeshone at paras. 30, 32. Further, the police are not obliged to confirm the very criminality alleged by the CI. See Brown at para. 55, R. v. Rocha, 2012 ONCA 707 at paras. 71-72, and R. v. Caissey, 2007 ABCA 380 at paras. 23, 25; aff’d 2008 SCC 65. Finally, I note that the type and level of corroboration in this case exceeds the corroboration that was present in many other cases. See, e.g., Brown at paras. 52-55.
[44] Mr. Akyeam-Pong points out that the CI’s information that the Hamilton Crew did the robbery at Rock City Jewelers in Toronto is not corroborated in any way, not even the existence of a robbery at that location. I agree with the defence that it is odd that the ITO does not contain any information about any steps taken by the police to attempt to corroborate the information related to this alleged robbery. While this is a weakness of the ITO, it is my view that it is not a significant one given that information that is more central to the alleged offence – e.g., Mr. Akyeam-Pong being at the Hilton Hotel – was corroborated.
[45] When considering the totality of the circumstances, the answers to the three inquiries as a whole and the fact that weaknesses in one of the factors may be compensated by the strength of others, I am satisfied that, on the basis of the evidence before him, the issuing justice could reasonably view the CI as credible and the information provided by the CI as compelling and sufficiently corroborated. Thus, I am satisfied that the information provided by the CI, as corroborated and supplemented by the police, constituted sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit the issuing justice to find reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed and that evidence of that offence would be found at the Hilton Hotel.
[46] Mr. Akyeam-Pong argues that the information in the ITO does not provide reasonable grounds to believe that the targets of the investigation were in possession of a firearm at the Hilton Hotel, and that there is no direct or circumstantial evidence that links the firearm to the searched location.
[47] I do not accept this argument. While I cannot provide detailed reasons without disclosing redacted information, I find that the information provided by the CI was compelling with respect to the targets of the investigation being in possession of firearms at the Hilton Hotel. I also note that direct evidence is not necessarily required, and that reasonable inferences may be relied upon in the absence of direct evidence. See Ifesimeshone at para. 35. Thus, I am satisfied that the ITO set out facts sufficient to allow the issuing judge to have the necessary grounds to believe that evidence of unlawful possession of firearms would be found at the specified locations at the Hilton Hotel.
[48] Given my conclusion that Mr. Akyeam-Pong’s rights under section 8 of the Charter have not been breached, I also conclude that his rights under section 9 of the Charter have not been breached.
C. Conclusion
[49] The Crown’s application pursuant to step 6 of the procedure established in Garofoli is allowed, and Mr. Akyeam-Pong’s application is dismissed.
Sylvia C. Vermette
Released: April 4, 2025
[^1]: Mr. Akyeam-Pong also alleged in his Notice of Application that the use of a “no knock” dynamic entry by the police breached his rights under section 8 of the Charter, but this ground was abandoned on the second day of the hearing.
[^2]: The Canadian Police Information Centre.

