Marie-Andrée Vermette

The applicant law firm sought to enforce an arbitral costs award of $130,485 against its former clients following an arbitration assessing legal accounts.

The respondent clients brought a cross-application to set aside the award under s. 46(1)3 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, or alternatively for leave to appeal under s. 45(1).

The court dismissed the cross-application, finding the arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine costs and that the alleged errors regarding the departure from the normal costs paradigm were questions of mixed fact and law, not extricable questions of law.

The court granted the application to enforce the costs award.

The applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following a successful application to gain vacant possession of a property.

The respondents failed to deliver costs submissions.

The court found that substantial indemnity costs were warranted due to the respondents' reprehensible conduct, which included ignoring court orders, using stalling tactics, and attempting to file improper and vexatious evidence at the last minute.

The court awarded the applicant $50,000 in all-inclusive substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming she was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic and mood stabilizing medications for a schizoaffective condition.

The appellant, supported by amicus curiae, argued the initial capacity assessment was inadequate and that she was denied procedural fairness.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's conclusion that the appellant could not recognize she was affected by manifestations of a mental condition and was therefore unable to appreciate the consequences of treatment decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion to dismiss the self-represented defendant's counterclaim and crossclaim, arguing they were derivative claims belonging to a dissolved corporation.

The defendant brought a cross-motion seeking production of banking records and a court order to revive the dissolved corporation.

The court dismissed the cross-motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to order the corporate revival and that the requested banking records either did not exist or belonged to third parties.

The court granted the bank's motion to dismiss the counterclaims and crossclaim, applying the rule in Foss v. Harbottle to conclude the defendant could not personally sue for wrongs allegedly committed against the corporation, save for a claim for an accounting.

The applicant mortgagor paid the principal and all interest payable under a commercial mortgage two weeks before the maturity date.

The respondent mortgagee demanded a prepayment charge of one month's interest, which the mortgagor paid under protest to obtain a discharge.

The mortgagor applied for a declaration that the charge was improper and for repayment.

The mortgagee cross-applied, arguing it was entitled to three months' interest and that the parties had reached a settlement.

The court found no settlement was reached and held that the prepayment clause was not triggered because the mortgagor paid all interest due up to the maturity date.

The court ordered the mortgagee to repay the improperly charged fees.

Following a judgment in the applicant's favour, the parties could not agree on costs.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs of $75,163.75, arguing the respondent raised unproven allegations of forgery and fraud.

The court found the respondent's conduct did not rise to the egregious level required for substantial indemnity costs, noting the respondent attacked the integrity of non-parties rather than the applicant.

The court awarded the applicant costs of $50,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant landlord sought damages for unpaid rent and utilities from the respondent tenants who had vacated the property.

The respondents, who did not appear at the hearing, made a last-minute request for an adjournment, which the court denied due to their repeated failure to comply with court orders and retain counsel.

The court found that the lease had not been renewed and that the respondents were overholding tenants.

The court ordered the respondents to pay $122,500 in unpaid rent and $1,324.60 in unpaid utilities, plus prejudgment interest.

The applicant sought to enforce an assignment agreement for a pre-construction condominium unit in downtown Toronto.

The respondent seller claimed she never accepted the final counteroffer and that the agreement contained fundamental mistakes.

The court found the respondent's evidence lacked credibility and that a binding contract was formed.

The court rectified minor mathematical errors in the agreement and ordered specific performance, finding the property was unique to the applicant's family needs and damages would be inadequate in a rising real estate market.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against a corporate defendant and its principal for defaulting on a small business loan and personal guarantee.

The defendants argued they did not receive independent legal advice and that the COVID-19 pandemic frustrated the contract, as their restaurant was forced to close.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no requirement for independent legal advice and holding that the pandemic did not render the repayment obligations radically different from what was originally agreed.

Following reasons for judgment in two related applications regarding a commercial lease, the successful parties, The Tire Pit Inc. and Michael Goldlist, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the conduct of the unsuccessful parties did not rise to the egregious level required for substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, ordering Augend and Charles Bulmer jointly and severally to pay $36,000 to The Tire Pit Inc., and Augend to pay $31,000 to Michael Goldlist.

The plaintiff franchisor brought a motion for summary judgment against the corporate franchisee and its personal guarantor for unpaid royalties and advertising fees.

The corporate defendant had been voluntarily dissolved and the individual defendant had transferred his shares without the plaintiff's consent.

The defendants did not appear at the motion.

The court validated service on the corporate defendant, found no genuine issue for trial regarding the breach of the franchise agreement and guarantee, and granted summary judgment for the unpaid fees plus interest at the contractual rate of 24%.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought costs exceeding full indemnity, while the defendants argued for costs in the cause or a reduced amount due to the plaintiff's delay.

The court found that the defendants did not act in bad faith or unreasonably in bringing the motion, noting that the delay was largely attributable to the plaintiff's counsel.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $25,735.54.

Augend, the new owner of a commercial property, brought an application seeking a declaration that the lease with the tenant, Tire Pit, had expired and seeking vacant possession.

Tire Pit brought a companion application seeking a declaration that it had validly exercised its option to extend the lease for another five years.

The court found that Tire Pit had personally delivered written notice of its intention to extend the lease to the former landlord at his home, more than six months before the lease expired.

Although the lease prescribed notice by registered mail or courier, the court applied the principle that actual notice by a no less advantageous method is valid where the lease does not strictly exclude other methods.

The court declared the lease validly extended and dismissed Augend's application.

The plaintiff sued his former employer and three individual managers for wrongful dismissal, moral damages, punitive damages, and intentional infliction of mental suffering, alleging workplace harassment and reprisal.

The defendants brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the claims against the individual defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the claims against the individual defendants were factually intertwined with the claims against the corporate employer and were not readily separable.

The court concluded that granting partial summary judgment would create a material risk of inconsistent findings and would not be a proportionate or cost-effective way to resolve the litigation.

The defendant Atrium brought a motion to amend its Statement of Defence and Crossclaim and to withdraw admissions made during pre-trial conferences regarding causation and the condition of the stairs where the plaintiff slipped and fell.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for judgment based on those admissions.

The court found that Atrium had made clear, binding admissions that the condition of the stairs caused the fall and that there was a breach of the standard of care.

Applying the three-part test for withdrawing admissions under Rule 51.05, the court denied Atrium's request because it failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the withdrawal.

The plaintiff's cross-motion for judgment under Rule 51.06(2) was also dismissed because the core issue of which defendant was the 'occupier' remained undetermined.

The applicant sought to set aside part of an arbitration award concerning a parking unit owner's access to condominium common elements.

The court held that, although the access dispute was properly before the arbitrator, the arbitrator went beyond contractual interpretation and effectively corrected or amended errors and inconsistencies in the declaration.

Because amendments or corrections to a condominium declaration fall within the Superior Court's jurisdiction under s. 109 of the Condominium Act, the arbitrator decided a matter outside the scope of the arbitration agreement for the purposes of s. 46(1)3 of the Arbitration Act.

The access-related portion of the award was set aside and costs were awarded to the applicant.

The plaintiff vendor and defendant purchaser entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

On the scheduled closing date, the purchaser advised she could not close due to lack of financing.

The vendor sent a letter stating this was an anticipatory breach and, unless they heard otherwise by end of day, would declare the agreement null and void and forfeit the deposit.

The purchaser's daughter confirmed the lack of financing.

The vendor subsequently resold the property at a loss and sued for damages.

The court found the vendor clearly and unequivocally accepted the anticipatory breach through its letter and subsequent conduct, entitling it to forfeiture of the deposit and damages for the resale loss.

The plaintiff sued the tenants and the landlord of a residential property after slipping and falling on an allegedly icy porch.

The tenant defendants brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim and the landlord's crossclaim against them, arguing the landlord was solely responsible for snow and ice maintenance under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The plaintiff did not participate in the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was not an appropriate case for partial summary judgment as the plaintiff's allegations went beyond ice and snow, and the moving parties failed to discharge their evidentiary burden to show there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendant taxi dispatch company brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action against it.

The plaintiff, who claimed $1.6 million in damages for various torts allegedly committed by a taxi driver, did not participate in the motion.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendant's uncontradicted evidence showed no dispatch call was made to the taxicab in question on the date of the alleged incident, thereby establishing no genuine issue for trial.