Marie-Andrée Vermette

Following a successful motion by the plaintiff for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The plaintiff sought $10,750.00 on a partial indemnity scale, while the defendant argued for a lower amount, citing procedural irregularities.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs in the all-inclusive amount of $9,000.00 on a partial indemnity basis, applying a small reduction for a jurisdictional mix-up and delegation issues.

The plaintiff successfully moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant landlord from re-entering the leased premises.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The plaintiff sought costs payable immediately, arguing the defendant's conduct forced the urgent motion.

The defendant argued costs should be in the cause.

The court held that because the merits of the case would be decided shortly at an upcoming application, and most of the evidence on the motion related to the merits, the costs of the motion should be reserved to the judge hearing the application.

The applicant landlords sought an order terminating the respondents' tenancy, evicting them, and awarding $47,300 in unpaid rent.

Because the rent arrears exceeded the Landlord and Tenant Board's monetary jurisdiction, the landlords brought the application in the Superior Court of Justice pursuant to section 207(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The tenants requested an adjournment and argued the application should be dismissed under section 83(3) of the Act, alleging outstanding repairs and retaliatory motives.

The court denied the adjournment and granted the application, finding no evidence to support the tenants' allegations and noting their repeated failure to pay rent or provide evidence of payment.

The defendant, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario (HMQ), brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statements of claim in two actions arising from a fire that destroyed a school.

The plaintiffs alleged that the Office of the Fire Marshal (OFM) was negligent in failing to ensure a proper fire watch was in place after the initial fire was extinguished, leading to a rekindling that caused extensive damage.

The court found that the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 does not impose a duty on the OFM to post a fire watch or suppress fires, as those duties belong to municipal fire departments.

The court struck the negligence and nuisance claims against HMQ but granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to properly allege a duty of care based on specific interactions or assumption of control, provided the alleged duty does not exceed the OFM's statutory powers.

The defendants sought costs following their largely successful motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The self-represented plaintiff also sought costs, arguing divided success.

The court found the defendants were entirely justified in bringing the motion and were entitled to costs.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs in the all-inclusive amount of $12,500, finding the amount fair, reasonable, and consistent with the parties' expectations.

The parties, two brothers who jointly own a cement delivery business through separate corporations, reached a settlement in their oppression applications involving a shotgun buy-sell agreement.

A dispute arose regarding the payment of legal fees incurred by one brother (DN) from the business's revenues, which had been the historical practice.

The other brother (GN) refused to transfer funds to pay a $364,346.96 legal invoice, arguing the fees were unreasonable and disproportionate to his own.

The court found that GN's refusal breached the status quo agreed upon in the settlement and ordered GN to transfer the funds.

The court also dismissed GN's request to refer the legal accounts for assessment, finding he lacked standing under section 9 of the Solicitors Act.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her incapacity to consent to a community treatment plan and upholding a community treatment order.

The appellant, who has a history of bipolar disorder, argued the Board applied the wrong legal test for capacity and that the treatment plan was overbroad regarding mobility and marijuana use.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the test from Starson v. Swayze and made no palpable and overriding error in its factual findings or its interpretation of the treatment plan.

The defendant appealed an Associate Judge's order dismissing its motion for security for costs against the foreign plaintiff.

The plaintiff, a Washington State corporation, sued for unpaid commissions and damages for breach of contract.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Associate Judge applied the correct legal test from Yaiguaje by holistically considering the justness of the order, and made no palpable and overriding errors of fact in relying on the plaintiff's principal's undertaking to make personal funds available.

The applicant sought an order directing the release of funds held in trust following the settlement of two professional negligence actions against KPMG.

The parties disputed the interpretation of an Assignment Agreement and a Mutual Release regarding the distribution of the settlement funds and the return of monies paid into court as security for costs.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, finding that the Release did not bar the application, the respondent was not entitled to reimbursement of litigation expenses in the absence of a costs award, and the security for costs funds were not 'net amounts recovered' from the litigation.

The court ordered the funds distributed according to its interpretation of the agreements, apportioning the remaining settlement funds equally between the two actions.

The plaintiff tenant entered into an agreement of purchase and sale with the defendant landlord to buy the residential property she was leasing.

A dispute arose on closing regarding a $190,000 credit in a schedule to the agreement.

The transaction failed to close, and the plaintiff sued for specific performance, bringing a motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation (CPL).

The court granted the motion, finding the plaintiff established a triable claim to an interest in land because the property was her home and therefore unique, and the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff.

The plaintiff brought an action for wrongful dismissal, human rights damages, and intentional infliction of mental suffering against his employer and its principal, as well as against a related corporation, claiming they were common employers.

The related corporation brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the action against it.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that this was not one of the rare cases where partial summary judgment is appropriate, as the claims against the moving party were factually intertwined with the claims against the other defendants, creating a material risk of inconsistent findings.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay, failure to attend examinations for discovery, failure to appoint a new lawyer, and failure to pay a previous costs award.

The action, arising from a 2009 motor vehicle accident, had been stalled due to the self-represented plaintiff's refusal to attend in-person discoveries, citing medical reasons supported only by an outdated doctor's letter.

The court declined to dismiss the action immediately, finding the medical evidence insufficient to justify written discoveries but opting to give the plaintiff a final opportunity to attend an in-person examination.

The motion to dismiss for delay was adjourned until after the discovery, and the other requests for dismissal were denied.

On an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision, the court upheld the Board’s finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to a community treatment plan under s. 4(1) of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The court also upheld the Board’s conclusion that certain plan terms were not impermissibly vague or overbroad and that the statutory deterioration criterion under the Mental Health Act was met.

However, the court held that the Board erred in law in finding that the physician had complied with the consultation requirement in s. 33.1(4)(d) of the Mental Health Act, because a written referral to a community agency without any response or agreement before issuance of the order did not amount to consultation.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part and the community treatment order was set aside, with no costs.

The parties were unable to agree on costs following a motion where the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their statement of claim to increase damages and ordered the defendant to answer undertakings, but the balance of the motion was dismissed.

The court found that the defendant was the overall successful party as the plaintiffs were unsuccessful on the most contentious issues.

Taking into account the divided success and the late stage at which the motion was brought, the court awarded the defendant costs of $8,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

Following the dismissal of the defendant's motion to strike a Notice of Examination, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $84,621.20, arguing the defendant's conduct was reprehensible.

The defendant argued for partial indemnity costs of no more than $30,000.

The court found the defendant's conduct did not warrant elevated costs and awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs in the all-inclusive amount of $45,000.

Following a successful motion by the defendant Nelson to permanently stay the action and crossclaim against him, the parties could not agree on costs.

Nelson sought costs for both the stay motion and a moot summary judgment motion brought by the co-defendant Halton.

The court declined to award costs for the moot summary judgment motion.

However, the court awarded Nelson his costs for the successful stay motion on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting Halton's argument that Nelson's criminal conduct should preclude a costs award.

Halton was ordered to pay Nelson $19,000 in costs.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application for dependant support, the successful respondent sought costs against the applicant and a portion against the applicant's counsel personally.

The court applied the two-part test under Rule 57.07(1) and declined to order costs against counsel personally, finding it was not a clear case despite concerning conduct.

The court also declined to award substantial indemnity costs, but awarded the respondent $100,000 in partial indemnity costs against the applicant.

The applicant and her mother signed an agreement of purchase and sale for a property.

The applicant's uncle claimed a one-third interest in the property based on an alleged oral agreement.

The applicant brought an application seeking a declaration that the uncle had no interest, and seeking various orders against her mother regarding the closing of the transaction.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the uncle had no interest in the property, as the alleged oral agreement was not proven and the doctrine of part performance did not apply to overcome the Statute of Frauds.

However, the court dismissed the claims against the mother, finding no legal basis under the Vendors and Purchasers Act to grant the requested relief, which did not relate to title objections.

The plaintiff tenant sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant landlord from exercising a right of re-entry over leased commercial premises.

A dispute had arisen regarding the share of realty taxes payable by the plaintiff, and the defendant had issued a notice of default and attempted to re-enter the premises.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried regarding contractual interpretation, irreparable harm to the plaintiff's business and reputation if locked out, and a balance of convenience favouring the plaintiff.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was granted.

The plaintiff, Dik Lee, had multiple costs awards totalling $29,000 ordered against him.

He attempted to pay by cheques made out to all defendants, which could not be cashed.

The defendants sought directions from the Case Management Judge regarding the payment of a specific $4,000 costs order.

The plaintiff argued he had complied and that paying to the defendants' law firm in trust or a single defendant would be unlawful.

The court, relying on Rule 59.06(2)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found the plaintiff's position disingenuous and that he was not complying with the spirit of the orders.

The court directed the plaintiff to pay the $4,000 costs order by issuing a cheque to "Filion Wakely Thorup Angeletti LLP, In Trust" to ensure the order could be carried into operation.

The court declined to award further costs for the submissions on this issue.