Marek Zygmunt Tufman

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to an alleged infringement of his s. 11(b) right to a speedy trial.

The total delay from the information to the anticipated trial conclusion was 1,120 days.

The court deducted 349 days for defence-caused delay and 140 days for COVID-19 related exceptional circumstances.

The resulting net delay of 631 days (20.74 months) exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court matters.

The Crown failed to demonstrate sufficient mitigation efforts for the post-COVID reopening delay.

Consequently, the court granted a stay of proceedings.

The plaintiff successfully defended summary judgment motions brought by multiple defendants across several actions.

While costs were resolved with most defendants, the plaintiff sought costs against the defendants Helden and 131 Ontario for their involvement in the dismissed motions in the s. 38 BIA Action and the Copyright Action.

The court declined to award costs for the Copyright Action due to the defendants' limited involvement.

For the s. 38 BIA Action, the court found the defendants were passive participants who 'tagged along' with the primary moving parties.

The court apportioned 25% of the plaintiff's costs for that motion to these defendants, fixing the amount at $9,500 on a partial indemnity scale.

The applicant mother sought sole decision-making, primary residence, and permission to relocate to Poland with the parties' 22-month-old child.

The mother, a Polish citizen without permanent status in Canada, faced potential deportation and relied on the respondent father financially during their relationship.

The court found a history of family violence by the father and determined the mother was the primary caregiver.

Concluding that the mother's lack of immigration status created instability, the court granted the relocation to Poland, awarding her sole decision-making and primary residence.

The court also imputed an annual income of $75,000 to the father and ordered retroactive and ongoing child support, along with a $10,000 lump sum for spousal support.

The plaintiff, a contractor, sued the defendant homeowner for unpaid contracting fees of $35,729.63 for building a log home.

The defendant counterclaimed against the contractor and the log home kit supplier for $124,203.30, alleging breach of contract due to delays and construction deficiencies.

The court found that the defendant homeowner, who acted as his own general contractor, was responsible for the delays and had wrongfully repudiated the contract by locking the contractor out of the site.

The court granted the plaintiff's claim for the unpaid balance and dismissed the defendant's counterclaim.

This appeal concerned the dismissal of a motion to set aside a default judgment against the appellant, Fida Kasi, related to a breached agreement for the purchase and sale of a residential property.

The appellant argued that the respondent, LIV Communities, was not the correct contracting party or property owner and thus could not have sustained damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's decision that LIV Communities and Landmart Homes were the same entity and that the appellant understood they were dealing with LIV Communities.

The plaintiff commenced four separate actions arising out of the bankruptcy and subsequent death of a lawyer.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the actions, primarily arguing they were barred by the applicable limitation periods.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the Bankruptcy Trustee Action and the Client Assigned Claims Action (with one minor exception), finding they were commenced after the expiry of the two-year limitation period and there was no genuine issue for trial regarding discoverability.

However, the court denied summary judgment for the s. 38 BIA Action and the Copyright Action, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the injuries and whether the copyrighted materials were used during the relevant period.

The buyer (defendant/plaintiff by counterclaim) sought specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property.

The seller (plaintiff/defendant by counterclaim) argued the agreement was null and void because the buyer failed to waive a home inspection condition before the deadline.

The court found that the seller's real estate agent made misrepresentations to the buyer regarding the seller's availability to sign an amending agreement and his agreement to a price abatement.

These misrepresentations breached the duty of honest contractual performance and caused the buyer to delay delivering the waiver.

As a result, the seller could not rely on the expiry of the condition period.

The court granted specific performance to the buyer.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

A motions judge struck her affidavit containing evidence not before the HRTO and subsequently dismissed her motion to adduce further evidence as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.

The applicant brought a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside those decisions.

The panel dismissed the motion, finding it was brought out of time and that the motions judge made no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in applying the general rule against admitting new evidence on judicial review.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend her statement of claim, which the defendant partially opposed.

The court granted leave to amend the statement of claim, allowing most proposed changes to provide context for existing claims, but disallowed irrelevant or inflammatory passages, including details related to Human Rights Tribunal proceedings and characterizations of the defendant.

The action was ordered to proceed under Simplified Procedure.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs thrown away to the defendant, but no costs were awarded for the motion itself.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision that partially dismissed his claims of discrimination in the hiring process for a law firm associate position.

The HRTO had found age discrimination, racial discrimination, and reprisal by the respondents, but dismissed other allegations.

On judicial review, the applicant argued the HRTO Vice-Chair breached procedural fairness, misapprehended evidence, and committed errors of law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the HRTO's process was fair, free of bias, and its conclusions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The moving party brought a motion to strike an affidavit filed by the responding party on an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

The responding party sought to introduce documents not in the tribunal's record, claiming in her affidavit that she had served them prior to the tribunal hearing.

The court found the affidavit to be demonstrably false, as several attached documents did not exist at the time of the hearing.

The motion was granted, the affidavit was struck, and costs were awarded to the moving party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $4,500 on a substantial indemnity scale.

The applicant sought an adjournment of a combined Settlement Conference/Trial Management Conference because a business valuation was not completed.

The court noted that the applicant had ample time to retain a valuator but failed to do so until shortly before the conference.

The adjournment was granted, but the court awarded costs of $470 to the respondent due to the applicant's failure to be ready to proceed.

This appeal concerned the capacity of Paul Tanti to enter into a marriage with Sharon Joseph.

Raymond Tanti, Paul's son, appealed the trial judge's decision that the marriage was valid, arguing his father lacked the requisite capacity.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's findings, holding that the correct legal test for marriage capacity was applied, which requires understanding the nature of the marriage contract and its duties.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, including the discounting of non-contemporaneous expert opinions and the reliance on direct lay witness testimony.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the validity of the marriage.

The applicant sought judicial review of three Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions finding him a related employer to his defunct company, binding him to current collective agreements, and imposing a fine for breach.

The applicant had operated a unionized masonry company until a 2007 car accident left him unable to work, leading to personal bankruptcy and the company's dissolution.

Ten years later, he resumed work as a sole proprietor.

The Divisional Court quashed the OLRB decisions, finding it unreasonable that the Board failed to consider whether a related employer declaration served a valid labour relations purpose given the decade-long hiatus and the applicant's circumstances.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) and interim injunctive relief to compel the defendants to sign a severance application and to enjoin them from interfering with a Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) proceeding.

The defendant Sedona Place Co-Ownership Inc. sought an order directing the proceeding to arbitration.

The court granted the CPL, finding a triable issue involving an interest in land and that damages were not an adequate remedy.

The court also granted the mandatory injunction compelling the severance consent, noting the defendants' breach of the option agreement and the potential for irreparable harm to the plaintiffs' development.

A prohibitory injunction preventing interference with the LPAT hearing was also granted based on the defendants' past conduct and potential irreparable harm.

The action was stayed to allow the parties to proceed to arbitration on agreed terms, with residual court jurisdiction.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The appellant mother appealed a finding of contempt and the subsequent penalty imposed for her failure to comply with a final order regarding the respondent father's access to their children.

The motion judge found multiple, wilful breaches of the order, relying heavily on text messages where the appellant explicitly denied the court's authority over her parenting decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the contempt finding or the penalty, which included fines for failing to attend a cooperative parenting program.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's motion to adduce fresh evidence, noting it either could have been produced earlier or did not displace the motion judge's findings.

This application concerned claims of oppression and declaratory relief brought by 37 townhouse unit owners against their condominium corporation.

The applicants alleged unfair treatment by a high-rise dominated Board of Directors, specifically regarding charges for interlock paving/steps, retroactive water charges, maintenance/landscaping/snow removal, and amenities, as well as inadequate notice practices.

The court found that the Corporation was responsible for the costs of interlock repairs and retroactive water charges due to lack of proper notice and inconsistent application of the Declaration.

It also declared the Corporation responsible for landscaping and snow removal for townhouse verandas and steps.

While the charge for amenities was deemed valid, the court urged regularization by bylaw and emphasized the need for proper notice delivery methods.

The court found the Board's management to be poor and unprofessional but ultimately concluded that their actions, while close to oppression, did not meet the legal threshold for an oppression remedy.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to register a certificate of pending litigation against a matrimonial home transferred by the defendant to his wife prior to a loan agreement.

The plaintiff alleged the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat creditors.

Applying the Grefford test, the court found the plaintiff established a high probability of recovering judgment on the loan, but failed to introduce sufficient evidence that the transfer was made with intent to defeat creditors, especially given the defendant's uncontroverted explanation that the transfer was for remortgaging purposes following a bankruptcy.

The balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the entitlement to deposits in a real estate transaction.

The application judge had determined that the respondents were prima facie entitled to the deposits based on the written contracts.

The appellants argued the application should have been converted to an action and raised claims for relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the application was properly authorized under the Rules of Civil Procedure, that there were no material facts in dispute, and that the deposits were true deposits with no evidence of disproportionality or unconscionability.