Marek Zygmunt Tufman

The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged an agreement to purchase shares through funds advanced in 2004 and 2005, and relied on subsequent promises of repayment and share substitution, including a 2010 recorded conversation, to argue acknowledgement of indebtedness and promissory estoppel.

Applying the summary judgment framework, the court held the limitation defence, the start date of any limitation period, and the availability of promissory estoppel were factually intertwined with the merits.

A trial was required for a fair and just determination.

Dispute over a workplace lottery pool after a free play ticket generated from a ticket purchased before one participant joined the group later won $1,000,000.

The court found the plaintiff had contributed to the June 25, 2010 ticket and was entitled to a one-fifth share of the winnings.

The later-joining participant's argument that the pool was a partnership under the Partnerships Act was rejected because the group was not carrying on a business with a view to profit.

Her counterclaim was dismissed, the plaintiff obtained judgment against the four co-participants for $40,000 each, and all five proper participants were granted judgment for $200,000 against her.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it could not go behind findings made in earlier proceedings and agreeing with the motion judge that the appellants' claims had no potential merit.

The appeal was dismissed with substantial indemnity costs awarded to the respondents.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike an action commenced by a corporate religious entity seeking declarations regarding the removal of a bishop and a church council member from ecclesiastical positions.

The court considered whether the corporate plaintiff had private law standing to seek declaratory relief concerning religious appointments and governance within the church.

It held that the corporation’s objects did not give it a legal interest in determining who held ecclesiastical offices or church administrative roles.

Because the dispute concerned the personal rights of individuals within a religious organization rather than the corporation’s legal rights or property interests, the corporation lacked standing.

The statement of claim was struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellants' solicitor was removed from the record, and the individual behind the appellant corporation failed to appear for the hearing despite being aware of the date.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs of $8,641 to the respondent.

Following a family law motion addressing disclosure, child support, interim disbursements, and the sale of a jointly owned property, the court determined costs.

The responding party on the underlying motion had been largely successful and had made reasonable offers to settle under the Family Law Rules.

The court found that the opposing party’s resistance to disclosure and last‑minute concessions increased the costs of the litigation, although the conduct did not amount to bad faith.

While the successful party sought full recovery costs exceeding $76,000, the court held that such an amount would be disproportionate to the issues.

Costs were fixed at $35,000 payable from the opposing party’s share of the sale proceeds of the property or before trial.

The respondent father obtained an Ontario divorce order after the parties’ separation and ongoing international custody dispute involving their child, who had been retained in Poland by the mother.

The mother moved to set aside the divorce order on the basis that it was granted before the expiry of the 60‑day period to file an answer under the Family Law Rules.

The court acknowledged the procedural irregularity but held that the moving party remained in contempt of prior Ontario orders requiring the return of the child and production of medical records.

The court found it would be an abuse of process to allow the motion while the contempt continued and where the practical effect would facilitate further defiance of the Ontario custody order.

The motion was stayed pending the mother purging her contempt and the matter was referred for possible international judicial communication with Polish courts.

The moving party mother brought a motion for temporary child support, section 7 expenses, and interim disbursements to obtain an expert income report.

The responding party father, who is self-employed, persistently failed to provide adequate financial disclosure and claimed an income of approximately $28,000, despite having expenses of over $53,000.

The court imputed the father's income at $53,076 based on his stated expenses and ordered him to pay table child support and 70% of the child's post-secondary expenses.

The court also ordered the father to pay $15,000 in interim disbursements to allow the mother to retain an expert to determine his true income.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order under appeal, and directed a new trial on the terms set out in the filed consent order.

The endorsement contains no substantive merits analysis.

The defendants brought a motion challenging the continuation of an injunction that had been granted on an ex parte basis prohibiting them from soliciting or doing business with the plaintiff company's customers.

The court considered whether the plaintiffs satisfied their duty of full and frank disclosure required on ex parte motions under Rule 39.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found material non‑disclosure, including failure to disclose that the parties had previously merged their businesses and operated together for approximately two years, failure to explain material terms of an employment agreement containing restrictive covenants that had expired, and failure to disclose key details contained in an attached witness statement.

The court held that merely attaching exhibits without highlighting their material contents in the affidavit did not satisfy the disclosure obligation.

Because the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts, the injunction previously granted was dissolved.

The court addressed costs following a motion to set aside a purported ex parte default judgment that bore a forged judicial signature.

The court found that the plaintiffs had fabricated the judgment by copying and pasting the judge’s signature and had circulated the fake order to opposing parties and regulatory bodies as if it were a valid court judgment.

The court concluded that the conduct constituted a fraudulent and scurrilous attack on the administration of justice and amounted to reprehensible, scandalous, and outrageous behaviour.

Applying the principles governing full indemnity costs, the court held that the defendants were entitled to full indemnity costs as a form of chastisement and deterrence.

The plaintiffs were also barred from taking further steps in the proceeding until the costs were paid in full.

Following the dismissal of a bank’s summary judgment motion in an action alleging breach of trust and negligence, the plaintiffs and a co-defendant sought costs.

The court considered Rule 49 settlement offers but found they did not promote compromise, as they effectively required the moving party to abandon its motion.

Although the bank succeeded on the legal issue that no trust existed, a negligence issue remained requiring trial.

Given the bank’s unsuccessful motion and the limited value of the underlying claim, the court found the motion unnecessary and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the plaintiffs and $15,000 to the co-defendant.

The defendant bank brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of claims alleging it negligently released $50,000 held in a bank account that had been ordered by a court as security for child support obligations.

After the death of the account holder, the Canada Revenue Agency issued a Requirement to Pay for tax debts and the bank remitted the funds.

The plaintiffs argued the funds should have been paid to satisfy child support arrears, and that the bank had been aware of efforts by the estate trustee and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to arrange payment of those arrears.

The court held that significant factual issues remained, including whether the arrears should have been paid before the Requirement to Pay and whether the bank’s conduct created liability through negligence or estoppel.

Applying the summary judgment principles articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, the court concluded that the evidence could not be fully appreciated without a trial.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking their amended statement of claim, which sought relief under the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act for lasting improvements made to a property they believed they owned.

The appellants also argued the motion judge erred by hearing the motion in an anteroom rather than open court, by effectively redrafting their pleadings, and by exhibiting a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in striking the statutory claim, as it was based on different legal grounds than the previously struck constructive trust claim.

The majority held that hearing the motion in chambers did not violate the open court principle, as no one was excluded and counsel did not object.

The appellant, a judgment creditor of the plaintiff, appealed a Master's order that maintained writs of seizure and sale registered by a competing creditor (the defendant) after a default judgment against the plaintiff was set aside.

The Master held that the appellant lacked standing under Rule 37.14(1)(a) because she was only indirectly affected by the order, and alternatively, that maintaining the writs was a just term under Rule 19.08(1).

The Divisional Court found no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the Master's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding Rule 20 and Rule 21.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the arguments and noting that the proposed fresh evidence conflicted with the appellant's own evidence.

The scope of the surviving unjust enrichment and constructive trust claim remains to be determined in ongoing litigation.

Costs were awarded to the respondent and the appellants' former counsel.

The appellants brought a motion to restore their appeal to the hearing list after failing to strictly comply with a consent order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the failure was minimal, explained, and caused no real prejudice to the respondent.

No costs were ordered.

The appellant nurse appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Nurses of Ontario, which found she committed professional misconduct by financially exploiting a vulnerable psychiatric patient.

The appellant had failed to attend the disciplinary hearing, claiming late disclosure of documents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that by choosing not to attend the hearing, the appellant waived her right to raise procedural fairness and evidentiary objections.

The court also upheld the penalty, which included revocation of her certificate of registration, a $15,000 fine, and costs, as reasonable given the serious abuse of the nurse-patient relationship.

The appellants appealed an order regarding their right to renew a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that not being in default was a condition precedent to the privilege to renew.

As the mortgage was and remained in default, the appellants could not renew it.

Following the release of the judgment in two related appeals, the respondents submitted written submissions on costs.

The appellant elected not to file responding submissions.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the respondents for the leave application, the application to introduce fresh evidence, and both appeals, fixing the total amount at $50,000 all inclusive.