Marc A. Garson

The plaintiff brought an action for damages against his former partner, several police officers, and the police services board for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and Charter breaches arising from two arrests related to a property dispute.

The court found that two officers lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the plaintiff for break and enter and breach of recognizance, respectively, and failed to conduct adequate investigations.

The court held the two officers and the police services board liable for negligent investigation and false arrest, awarding $40,192 in damages.

The claims for malicious prosecution and the claims against the former partner and other officers were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault following an altercation outside a pub where he repeatedly struck the complainant.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to properly consider self-defence and consent, and imposed an unfit sentence including a DNA order.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, rejecting the availability of self-defence or consent on the facts, and upholding the sentence as fit and within the acceptable range.

The Crown brought an application to qualify Detective Constable Charlie Rau as an expert witness on possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis marihuana, including production, valuation, and trafficking.

The defendant opposed, challenging the officer's methodology and expertise.

The court applied the two-step Mohan test, focusing on reliability and proper qualification.

It found the officer qualified based on extensive experience and training, rejecting the strict application of Daubert factors for non-scientific expert evidence.

The court admitted the expert evidence but imposed specific limitations on its scope, particularly regarding medical users, edibles, and extracts.

This action involved a subrogated claim by a landlord's insurer against its tenant for fire damage.

The matter came before the court as a special case to determine if the plaintiff landlord was precluded from proceeding with the subrogated action due to the terms of the lease.

The court analyzed the lease provisions, particularly the landlord's covenant to insure and the tenant's contribution to premiums, in light of established Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on subrogation rights against tenants.

The court found that the lease did not contain clear, express, and unambiguous language to contract out of the general rule barring subrogation, despite clauses referring to the tenant's liability for negligence.

The special case question was answered in the affirmative, barring the subrogated claim and leading to the dismissal of the action.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, sought a reduction in his 25-year parole ineligibility period under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code.

The court, acting as a screening judge, applied the "substantial likelihood of success" test, considering the applicant's character, conduct during incarceration, the nature of the offence, and victim information.

While acknowledging significant rehabilitation efforts and positive changes, the court found these were insufficient to outweigh the extreme violence of the murder, the applicant's ongoing substance abuse issues, extensive institutional misconduct, and evolving, inconsistent accounts of the crime.

The application was dismissed, but the applicant was permitted to reapply after five years.

This corrigendum amends a previous decision regarding the proposal of Innovative Coating Systems Inc. The original decision did not approve the proposal but granted leave for the debtor to file an amended proposal within ten days, specifically removing a deemed release clause.

It also adds a sentence concerning the trustee's costs.

The debtor brought an application for court approval of its proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Two secured creditors opposed the proposal because it contained a clause releasing the debtor's principal from his personal guarantees.

The court refused to approve the proposal, finding that the release of the guarantor was not necessary for the restructuring and did not benefit the general body of creditors.

The court also found that the proposal lacked good faith as the release clause was not prominently disclosed.

The plaintiffs sought partial-summary judgment for rescission of a franchise agreement and damages under the Arthur Wishart Act, alleging fundamental disclosure deficiencies, specifically the non-disclosure of earnings projections.

The defendants argued proper disclosure, timeliness issues, and issue estoppel.

The court, utilizing enhanced summary judgment powers, found that the non-disclosure of earnings projections constituted a material and fundamental omission, tantamount to no disclosure under AWA s. 6(2), thereby triggering the plaintiffs' right to rescission.

The court dismissed the defendants' arguments regarding timeliness, issue estoppel, and other alleged deficiencies, and granted the plaintiffs' motion for rescission and damages.

The defendant, Mizanur Rahman, was charged with possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purposes of trafficking.

Police surveillance observed the defendant in a vehicle making short stops consistent with drug transactions.

A subsequent arrest and vehicle search yielded drugs and drug paraphernalia.

The defendant and a defence witness, Bonnie Kerr, provided explanations for the drugs and the defendant's cellphone activity, which the court found to be unreliable and incredible.

Despite strong suspicion of the defendant's involvement, the court determined that the circumstantial evidence, particularly regarding the defendant's knowledge of the drugs in the vehicle and the intent to traffic, did not meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court rejected the incoming text messages as hearsay for the truth of their contents due to insufficient indicia of necessity and reliability.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty on both counts.

The self-represented applicant appealed a Make Safe Order and demolition permit issued by the City of London for properties owned by Rygar Properties, which were previously listed on the City's heritage inventory.

The applicant argued the permit violated the Planning Act and Building Code Act, and that the City committed 'demolition by neglect'.

The court dismissed the application, finding the City acted reasonably, in good faith, and within its statutory authority when issuing the orders and permits.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, Ahmed Saghier, appealed his convictions and sentence on four counts of assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, the timing of reporting, the admission of hospital records, and the sufficiency of reasons.

The appellant also argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider a conditional sentence.

The Superior Court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or her decision to admit hospital records.

The court affirmed that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and that her sentencing discretion was properly exercised, as the imposed sentence was within the acceptable range for domestic violence cases involving multiple injuries.

The plaintiff rear-ended the defendant Middel after Middel was forced to brake suddenly when an unidentified vehicle cut him off.

Middel moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against him.

The co-defendant insurer, RBC, cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing Middel was at least 1% liable, which would release RBC from uninsured/unidentified motorist coverage, or alternatively, that the OPCF-44R family protection coverage was not triggered due to lack of independent corroboration.

The court granted Middel's motion, finding him 0% liable as he reacted reasonably to the sudden emergency.

The court dismissed RBC's cross-motion, holding that Middel's evidence constituted independent and material corroboration of the unidentified vehicle, thereby triggering the OPCF-44R coverage.

The plaintiff sued police officers and the London Police Services Board for negligent investigation, false imprisonment, breach of Charter rights (warrantless entry), excessive force, and negligent transport, seeking damages for injuries sustained during arrest and transport.

The court dismissed claims for negligent investigation, false imprisonment, excessive force, and negligent transport.

However, it found a breach of the plaintiff's s. 8 Charter rights due to the officers' warrantless entry into his home, which was deemed to be in bad faith.

Damages were awarded for psychological injuries (PTSD and depression) causally linked to the incident, and for vindication and deterrence of the Charter breach, totaling $32,500.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm after a single-vehicle accident where his car struck a house, injuring his passenger.

The Crown presented evidence of the defendant's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) and the circumstances of the accident, including his attempt to hide beer bottles.

The defence argued a Charter s. 10(b) breach regarding privacy during legal consultation at the hospital and offered an alternative explanation for the accident involving the passenger grabbing the steering wheel due to a cat on the road.

The court dismissed the Charter argument, finding police took reasonable steps for privacy in an emergency setting.

The court also rejected the defence's explanation for the accident, finding the passenger's testimony unreliable and accepting her prior inconsistent statement to a witness as substantive evidence.

The court concluded that the defendant's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol, which was a significant contributing cause of the accident and the passenger's injuries, and found the defendant guilty.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of uttering threats entered in the Ontario Court of Justice.

He argued that the trial judge misapplied the third branch of the W. (D.) credibility framework and effectively reversed the burden of proof by treating the case as a credibility contest and by improperly favouring police evidence.

The court held that the trial judge’s reasons, read as a whole, demonstrated an understanding and proper application of the W. (D.) analysis and that the judge was entitled to prefer the officers’ testimony.

Minor inconsistencies in the officers’ evidence were not material, and credibility findings were owed deference.

The appellate court found no palpable and overriding error or misapprehension of the evidence.

The parties separated in 2000 and have litigated child support and section 7 expenses extensively.

The respondent mother sought retroactive child support and section 7 expenses for the parties' two children dating back to 2002, including substantial post-secondary education costs.

The court found that the mother had incurred unreasonable expenses and failed to require the children to contribute to their own education.

The court imputed income to the mother due to underemployment and lifted the corporate veil to include the father's corporate retained earnings in his income, less a reasonable allowance for retirement savings.

The father was ordered to pay a calculated portion of the reasonable retroactive and ongoing expenses, resulting in divided success.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident injured in a bus accident in New York State, brought a motion to affirm the jurisdiction of the Ontario Superior Court.

The defendants, a Michigan trucking company and the estate of its driver, brought a cross-motion to stay the action on the basis of forum non conveniens.

While the court found it had jurisdiction simpliciter based on several connecting factors, it granted the defendants' cross-motion and stayed the action, concluding that New York was the more appropriate forum given that the accident occurred there, New York law applied, and 35 other passengers had already commenced actions in New York.

The insurer moved for summary judgment dismissing a long-term disability claim on the basis that notice and proof of claim were delivered outside the contractual deadlines in a group policy.

The insured asserted relief from forfeiture, relying on confusion about coverage, misleading information from the employer, and the absence of actual prejudice given the extensive medical record.

The court held that timely notice was a matter of imperfect compliance for which equitable relief could be available, and applied the three-part s. 98 Courts of Justice Act framework.

It found the insured's conduct reasonable, the breach relatively modest, and the disparity between the forfeited benefits and the damage caused by the breach significant.

Summary judgment was dismissed and a binding determination granting relief from forfeiture was made.

The plaintiff brought a Rule 21 motion seeking determination of legal questions concerning entitlement to attendant care benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule for Accidents on or after September 1, 2010 (SABS-2010).

The issues were whether expenses for attendant care provided by the plaintiff’s mother and roommate were “incurred” within the meaning of s. 3(7)(e) and whether attendant care services could be provided remotely through electronic communication such as telephone calls, texting, and FaceTime.

The court held that the services provided by the mother and roommate did not satisfy the statutory requirement that the provider be acting in the course of the employment, occupation, or profession in which they would ordinarily have been engaged, because neither sustained an economic loss nor was working in the relevant profession at the time.

However, the court concluded that attendant care services may be provided remotely through electronic means where reasonable and necessary supervision is involved.

The defendant Ministry of Transportation brought a motion seeking orders requiring the plaintiff to complete a further future cost of care assessment at her home and to attend a defence psychological examination under Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action arose from a motor vehicle accident and was scheduled for trial in less than three months.

The court held that the moving party failed to demonstrate that additional occupational therapy assessment time or a further psychological examination was necessary to ensure trial fairness.

The existing medical evidence and prior defence examinations were sufficient to permit the defence to respond to the plaintiff’s claims.

The motion was dismissed, although leave was granted for the defence psychiatrist to provide a limited supplemental report responding to a recent expert report.