R. v. Stewart, 2017 ONSC 4843

R. v. Stewart, 2017 ONSC 4843

Citation: R. v. Stewart, 2017 ONSC 4843 Court File No.: 112/16 Date: 2017-08-18 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: Her Majesty the Queen (Respondent) – and – John Bradley Stewart (Appellant)

Counsel: Heather Davies, for the Crown Nick Cake, for the appellant

Heard: August 8, 2017

Garson J.

On appeal from the Conviction and Sentence of the Honourable Madam Justice J. LeRoy on May 11, 2016 and August 23, 2016.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1The appellant appeals both his conviction and sentence on one count of assault contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 [Code].

2The appellant was convicted of one count of assault and was given a suspended sentence with 12 months of probation (along with some ancillary orders).

3For the purposes of this appeal, I need only briefly outline the circumstances surrounding this matter. Many of the facts were not disputed.

4On June 9, 2015, an altercation took place outside of the Morrissey House pub in London, Ontario. The complainant, Mr. Pinney, was sitting on a retaining wall looking at his phone and having a coffee and a cigarette before starting work at Morrissey House.

5According to the complainant, the appellant, John Stewart, approached him on his bicycle and pushed him from the retaining wall and proceeded to strike him roughly 20–30 times until a co-worker (Mike Gingerich) arrived on the scene, intervened, and told him to leave. The complainant also testified that the appellant threw his coffee on him.

6According to the appellant, the complainant yelled out “hey faggot” as he was riding by and this caused the appellant to approach the complainant. When the appellant’s attention was drawn to a camera in the vicinity, the complainant punched the appellant in the stomach and tried to punch him in the face. At this point, the appellant proceeded to defend himself. The complainant “turtled” on the ground, and the appellant struck him roughly 5–6 times with a closed fist. The appellant stopped delivering blows because he figured the complainant was not getting up (not because of the intervention of Mr. Gingerich). He told the complainant that he “deserved that for hitting me” [the appellant].

7Both parties acknowledge exchanging vulgar and offensive texts prior to this incident, including the previous day where the complainant texted the appellant calling him “a whiney, petulant, petty and drunken ass clown”. The complainant posted on Facebook shortly after the incident that he could have easily “kicked [the appellant’s] ass” but chose not to.

8Mike Gingerich testified that he arrived to hear the complainant saying that “this man is assaulting me” and to observe the complainant laying on the ground and kind of tucked into a ball with the appellant delivering 3–4 punches to the complainant with a closed fist. He heard the appellant state to the complainant “you had this coming to you Jeff”. He did not observe the appellant throw any coffee on the complainant. He did not observe how the altercation started.

9The injuries suffered by the complainant and photographed by the police are not in dispute nor is the fact that such injuries (black eye lasting a week and a half and scarring from leg scrapes) are more than merely transient or trifling in nature.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Conviction

10The appellant raises three main grounds of appeal against conviction:

(a) the trial judge erred in her assessment of the complainant’s and the appellant’s credibility and misapprehended portions of the evidence and testimony;

(b) the trial judge failed to consider the appellant’s defence that the complainant consented to the altercation and the defence of self-defence; and

(c) the trial judge erred in applying the test in R. v. W.D. and engaged in an unbalanced scrutiny of the evidence.

11Although not specifically pleaded, the appellant also suggested that the reasons of the trial judge were insufficient to support the pathway to conviction.

Sentence

12The appellant raises the following ground of appeal against sentence:

(a) The trial judge failed to impose a proper sentence and to properly consider in her Reasons for Sentence the defence’s request opposing a DNA order in these circumstances.

CONVICTION APPEAL

Standard of Review – Conviction

13A trial judge’s finding of fact and assessment of credibility are entitled to a significant degree of deference from a reviewing court. Absent palpable and overriding error or otherwise being clearly wrong, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence, such findings and assessments should not be disturbed: see Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235; R. v. Horton, 2014 ONCA 616, 116 W.C.B. (2d) 228.

14A legal error made in the assessment of credibility may displace the deference and require appellate intervention: see R. v. Luceno, 2015 ONCA 759 at para. 34, 331 C.C.C. (3d) 51. Similarly, applying different or uneven standards to the assessment of the complainant and the appellant may constitute a legal error: see R. v. Rhayel, 2015 ONCA 377 at paras. 95–98, [2015] O.J. No. 2675.

15A trial judge’s reasons are to be read as a whole and the trial judge need not detail her finding on each piece of evidence so long as there is a logical link between the findings on the evidence and the verdict. The trial judge occupies a unique position in being able to see and hear witnesses and a lifeless transcript and selective review of the trial record cannot replicate the unfolding of the narrative at trial: see R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3; and R. v. Howe (2005), 192 C.C.C. (3d) 480 (Ont. C.A.).

Discussion

16It is not the role of an appellate court to essentially re-try the case and substitute its own opinion of the credibility of witnesses. Nor is it proper to embark on a fresh analysis of the factual arguments made at trial and considered by the trial judge: see R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190; R. v. Drabinsky, 2011 ONCA 582 at paras. 39–40, 107 O.R. (3d) 595.

17Intervention is limited to those circumstances where the reasons disclose that the trier was not mindful of applicable legal principles or reached a verdict unsupported by factual findings: see R. v. Binaris, 2000 SCC 15 at paras. 36–37; [2000] 1 S.C.R 381.

18I now turn to the four grounds of appeal.

(a) Credibility Assessment

19The appellant argues that the trial judge misapprehended certain evidence.

20The main misapprehensions deal with the evidence of the complainant’s coffee and the text message exchanges between the parties. There is also a concern about utterances the complainant may have made when Mike Gingerich arrived on scene.

(i) The Coffee

21The appellant argues that inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence between the coffee being beside him and subsequently in his hand should cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant.

22I disagree. The trial judge was clearly alive to the inconsistencies in the evidence regarding the coffee. She was alive to the fact that Mr. Gingerich did not see the complainant covered in coffee.

23In any event, this inconsistency is far from “glaring” and speaks to a peripheral matter. The gist of the allegations before the trier dealt with whether the parties were engaged in a consensual fight and whether there was any legal justification for the blows delivered by the appellant to the head and shoulder area of the complainant.

24A trial judge need not recite in her reasons every inconsistency in a witnesses’ evidence. When her reasons are reviewed as a whole, it is clear to me that she did not misapprehend the evidence about the coffee.

25In any event, any misapprehension must relate to a material issue and not a collateral or peripheral matter: see R. v. Morrissey (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 514 at 541, O.J. No. 639 (C.A.); R. v. Lohrer, 2004 SCC 80 at para 2, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 732.

(ii) Texting between the Parties

26At trial, the appellant argued that the prior vulgar texts amounted to an invitation for confrontation, coupled with the vulgar comment allegedly made at the start of the incident, gave the appellant the right to confront the complainant. The appellant also relied upon complainant’s attendance at the home of the appellant late one evening to discuss the complainant’s displeasure with the appellant’s behaviour towards a mutual friend.

27In her review of the evidence at p. 3, line 10 of her Reasons for Sentence, the trial judge was aware of the history between the parties and the string of vulgar text messages. She did not misapprehend or misinterpret what took place. She was entitled to conclude on the evidence before her that these exchanges did not constitute any express or implied invitation for physical confrontation.

28I reject the submission that the string of earlier text messages and earlier attendance by the complainant at the appellant’s residence constituted aggression sufficient to conclude that the complainant would lash out in a pre-emptive fashion at the appellant.

29The trial judge expressly rejected the evidence of the appellant. She expressly accepted the evidence of Mr. Gingerich, the independent witness. At p. 7, line 30 of her Reasons for Sentence, she also accepted the evidence of the complainant whom she describes as a “credible witness”.

30Her findings of fact are based on reasonable and permissible inferences drawn from the evidence.

31Substantial deference must be afforded to findings of credibility made by the trial judge. The trial judge provided ample justification and explanation for the basis for such findings.

32This was a classic case about credibility. I can find no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge’s assessment and findings regarding credibility.

33There was more than sufficient evidence to support the complainant’s version of events. The trial judge properly assessed both the credibility and reliability of the evidence of the complainant in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Morrissey.

34More importantly, there was an independent third-party witness who materially corroborated much of the evidence of the complainant and refuted much of the evidence of the appellant. He observed the appellant repeatedly strike the complainant with a closed fist as the complainant laid on the ground tucked into a ball. He heard the appellant say “you had this coming to you Jeff”. The fact that the complainant did not recall yelling out to Mr. Gingerich is not a material inconsistency as the complainant did not give any evidence on this point.

35The trial judge rejected the evidence of the appellant based on a considered and reasoned acceptance beyond a reasonable doubt of the conflicting and credible evidence of the complainant and Mr. Gingerich. The existence of the confirmatory evidence of Mr. Gingerich stands as independent evidence that supports and confirms the trial judge’s belief in and acceptance of the complainant’s evidence: see R. v. J.J.R.P. (2006), 215 C.C.C. (3d) 252 at para 53; [2006] OJ No 4749 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. A.N., 2017 ONCA 647 at para. 19.

(b) Consent and Self-Defence

(i) Consent

36The trial judge found that this was not a consensual fight. I agree.

37The repeated blows to the head and shoulders of a “turtled” person on the ground are actions inconsistent with a consensual fight. The trial judge specifically found at p. 8 line 9 of her Reasons for Judgment that the appellant was “looking for a fight”. Even if the trial judge had found that the complainant consented, the act of “turtling” by the complainant in these circumstances amounted to an express withdrawal of any consent. In any event, such consent is vitiated by the clear intent of the appellant to cause bodily harm and the fact that he did so: see R. v. Paice, 2005 SCC 22 at para. 12, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 339; R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714, 66 C.C.C (3d) 454.

38The argument that the appellant held an honest but mistaken belief in consent must also fail. Simply put, once the trial judge found that the complainant did not consent, there was no evidence available to the appellant to support this defence.

(ii) Self-Defence

39The new test for self-defence pursuant to s. 34(1) of the Code (amended in 2013) has been simplified into three requirements:

(b) a reasonable belief;

(c) a defensive purpose; and

(d) a reasonable response.

See R. v. Bengy, 2015 ONCA 397 at para. 28, 325 C.C.C (3d) 22.

40Under the previous provisions, self-defence was not available to a party to a consensual fight since neither party was the victim of an unprovoked assault: see Paice at para. 20.

41The trial judge properly took into account the fact that although the appellant did not necessarily have a duty to retreat, she was entitled to consider in accordance with s. 34(2)(b) whether the use of force was “imminent and whether there were other means available to respond to the potential use of force”.

42She was further entitled to consider under s. 34(2)(g) and (h):

(g) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or threat of force; and

(h) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force that the person knew was lawful.

43Her conclusion that the appellant was not justified in using the force in acting in defence of himself based on reasonable grounds and reasonable force and taking into account the appellant’s role in the altercation was an eminently reasonable and just conclusion.

44She was mindful of the communication between the parties prior to the incident, which was properly taken into account under s. 34(2)(f.1).

45Simply put, this was not a case where the defence of self-defence was available on the facts as found by the trial judge.

(c) W.D. Analysis

46The appellant argues that the trial judge engaged in an uneven or imbalanced assessment of the evidence.

47I disagree. At p. 7 of her Reasons for Sentence, she properly articulated the three-part test set out in R. v. W.D., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, 63 C.C.C. (3d) 397. She further makes clear her ability to accept all, some, or none of a witness’s evidence.

48The test is not simply whether another judge could have exercised his or her assessment of the evidence differently or whether the trial judge failed to comment on every statement or account of each witness. Rather, the appellant must demonstrate that her reasons clearly reflect the application of different standards in assessing the evidence of the witnesses: see R. v. Chanmany, 2016 ONCA 576 at paras 26–28, [2016] O.J. No. 3859.

49The unbalanced scrutiny argument remains a difficult argument to advance and attracts a healthy level of deference on review.

50By accepting the evidence of Mr. Gingerich, the trial judge also accepted:

i) that the appellant delivered at least 3–4 blows to the complainant with a closed fist while he was “turtled”; and

ii) that the appellant stated to the complainant “you had this coming”.

51It is clear on the evidentiary record before me that the trial judge was entitled to and did disbelieve the accused, based in large part on her belief in the complainant and the independent witness. Further, the evidence that she accepted was more than sufficient to satisfy her beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant.

52She was mindful of the need at p. 7 line 18 of her Reasons for Conviction, to avoid the trap of a credibility contest where one simply chooses between the competing versions of events.

53She did not unfairly, unevenly or haphazardly scrutinize the evidence of the witnesses by holding them to differing levels of account.

(d) Sufficiency of Reasons

54It is well established that a trial judge on a criminal trial has a duty to give reasons. This duty informs the parties why the decision was made, provides public accountability, and permits effective and meaningful appellate review: see R.E.M., at paras. 11, 14.

55Although not specifically pleaded in the formal grounds for appeal, the appellant now argues that the reasons given by the trial judge were inadequate. Adequacy must be assessed in the context of the evidence and arguments at trial.

56In R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 at para. 46, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, Binnie J. set out the following test:

Where it is plain from the record why an accused has been convicted or acquitted, and the absence or inadequacy of reasons provides no significant impediment to the exercise of the right of appeal, the appeal court will not on that count intervene.

57Therefore, the trial judge must give reasons that provide a logical pathway or connection between the decision and the basis for that decision.

58I am mindful that by some estimates, more than 95 percent of all criminal cases are dealt with in the Ontario Court of Justice. This is a high volume court and trial judges deliver both oral and written judgments on a daily basis. It would be wrong to require them to explain in detail every essential point upon which they based their decision or verdict: see R. v. Boucher, 2005 SCC 72 at para. 29, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 499.

59The appellant is entitled to know why the judge decided what she did. The requirement is not one of perfection or exactitude, but rather one of fairness. The appellant must know that his arguments were heard, properly understood, and fairly dealt with. A trial judge sitting alone need not expressly state the findings on each piece of evidence or controverted fact, provided the findings as a whole logically connect the evidence to the outcome.

60An examination of the Reasons for Judgment reveals that the trial judge articulates her conclusions and the basis for reaching such results. She was mindful of the applicable legal principles and her conclusions were consistent with her factual findings. She seized the substance of the issues that needed to be addressed. She was alive to the contradictions in the evidence and was not required to produce a verbatim recital of each piece of conflicting evidence in her Reasons for Judgment.

61Her reasons demonstrate that she understood and considered the arguments and positions raised by the appellant in reaching her decision.

62The evidence in this matter was capable of supporting the conviction. The reasons, read as a whole, adequately explain the pathway to conviction.

Conclusion – Conviction Appeal

63In the result, the appeal against conviction is dismissed.

SENTENCE APPEAL

64The appellant argues that the sentence imposed was disproportionate to the gravity of the offence and the limited criminal antecedents of the appellant.

65The parties presented a joint submission to the trial judge for a suspended sentence with probation and a section 110 order. The parties differed in the length of probation (18 months for the Crown and 12 months for the appellant). The Crown requested a DNA order, which the appellant was opposed to, continuing his assertion that this was close to a consensual fight and not worthy of a DNA order.

Standard of Review

66A sentence should only be varied where there has been an error in principle, an relevant factor that impacts on the sentence imposed has been overlooked, or the sentence is manifestly unfit: see R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089; R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, 129 D.L.R. (4th) 657; R. v. M (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327; R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163.

67Any error in law or principle may permit appellate intervention and allow the reviewing judge to substitute his or her views or opinion for that of the trial judge.

68Proportionality, both with respect to the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offender, is paramount in measuring the fitness of a sentence: see Lacasse at paras. 51–54.

Discussion

69The Reasons for Sentence demonstrate that the trial judge was aware of the defence request for no DNA order and ultimately determined that such an order was appropriate in the circumstances.

70The wide latitude afforded the sentencing judge includes the latitude of whether or not to order a DNA sample.

71Although I may have chosen to exercise my discretion differently, there is nothing in her Reasons for Sentence that demonstrates a failure to consider or overemphasize any relevant factors nor was the sentence imposed demonstrably unfit.

72This was a joint submission with some minor differences. The trial judge acceded to the sentencing request. She was correct in doing so. Joint submissions should not be departed from unless the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or otherwise be contrary to the public interest: see R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 204.

73Her decision to impose a period of 18 months of probation is well within the acceptable range of sentence in these circumstances.

74As for the DNA order, the trial judge properly balanced the privacy interests of the appellant against the public interest by considering his criminal record and the nature of circumstances of the offence. There was nothing unusual or compelling before the trial judge with respect to the impact of such an order or the appellant’s privacy and security of his person. In light of the minimal intrusion in the ordinary course, the trial judge was entitled to exercise her discretion to make the order after weighing and balancing the necessary factors.

75Her discretion merits substantial deference on review.

Conclusion

76In the result the appeal against sentence is dismissed.