Lynne C. Leitch

The appellants appealed an order requiring them to produce an edited copy of a Mary Carter Agreement to the respondent municipality.

The appellants argued that they were only required to disclose the existence of the agreement, not its terms.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the terms of a Mary Carter Agreement that change the litigation landscape must be disclosed to the court and to non-settling parties to ensure procedural fairness and maintain the integrity of the adversarial process.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed her claim of discrimination based on disability.

The applicant alleged the police discriminated against her by refusing to investigate her complaints of psychotronic mind control due to a perceived mental illness.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's conclusion that the police properly refused to investigate because the complaints did not constitute a crime was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Several proposed intervenors brought motions to vary a motions judge's decision denying them intervenor status in a judicial review application.

They argued the motions judge erred by considering the overlap in their proposed submissions and the burden on the court process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions, finding the motions judge applied the correct legal principles and made no error in principle or palpable and overriding error of fact in exercising his discretion.

The Association of Justices of the Peace of Ontario sought judicial review of the provincial government's decision to reject the recommendation of the Justice of the Peace Remuneration Commission regarding the appropriate Industrial Aggregate Index rate for a 2008 salary increase.

The Commission's majority had recommended a compromise rate of 3.3%, which the government rejected in favour of the minority's 2.7% recommendation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the government met the standard of simple rationality by providing legitimate reasons for its decision, including that the majority failed to answer the specific question referred to it and failed to properly weigh the required statutory criteria.

The appellants brought motions to stay the construction of two wind turbine projects pending their appeals of the Environmental Review Tribunal's decisions upholding the Renewable Energy Approvals.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction under the Rules of Civil Procedure or the Environmental Protection Act to stay the Director's approvals directly, treating the motions as requests for interlocutory injunctions.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried but concluded the appellants would not suffer irreparable harm prior to the appeal hearing, as the turbines would not be operational by then.

The motions were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault under s. 266 of the Criminal Code arising from a domestic dispute in which he grabbed a tape recorder from the complainant’s hand.

The trial judge had concluded that the act of grabbing the object constituted a non-consensual touching and therefore an assault.

On appeal, the court considered whether taking an object from another person’s hand necessarily constitutes the application of force required for assault and also addressed allegations of judicial bias arising from comments made by the trial judge during the proceedings.

The court held that although the trial judge’s comments were unnecessary, they did not meet the high threshold for a finding of reasonable apprehension of bias.

However, the court found that the trial judge erred in law by concluding that grabbing the recorder constituted an assault in the absence of evidence of force applied to the complainant.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, uttering threats, and assault.

He argued that as a front-seat passenger he did not operate the vehicle and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence affecting credibility findings.

The court held that the trial judge made no reversible error in assessing credibility and was entitled to accept the taxi driver’s evidence that the appellant grabbed and turned the steering wheel, causing the vehicle to veer into oncoming traffic.

The court found the conduct analogous to circumstances where a passenger assumes control of a vehicle and thereby operates it.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, although the sentence appeal was allowed on joint submission to vary probation to reflect community service already completed.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against a co-borrower on two demand loans, while the defendant brought a cross‑motion seeking dismissal of the claim.

The defendant argued the claim relating to a revolving loan was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and asserted defences of change of position, estoppel, and breach of a duty of good faith.

The court held that interest payments automatically debited from a co‑borrower’s account constituted acknowledgements extending the limitation period for a demand loan.

The court further held that internal bank documentation errors and statements by tellers did not amount to representations releasing the defendant from liability, and the change of position defence was unavailable in a contractual debt claim.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the bank.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of negligence claims arising from a single‑vehicle accident at a rural intersection.

The plaintiffs alleged that the municipality’s reconstruction of the roadway created a dangerous condition, including an inadequate clear zone and steep embankment adjacent to the roadway.

The municipality relied on the statutory bar in s. 44(8)(b) of the Municipal Act, 2001, arguing the accident occurred on an untravelled portion of the highway.

The court held that determining whether the clear zone and drainage ditch embankment constituted an untravelled portion of the highway required factual findings regarding reasonable foreseeability and road design standards.

Because these issues formed part of a broader factual matrix that could not be fully appreciated on the record, the municipality failed to meet the summary judgment test.

An accused previously found unfit to stand trial as a young person sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court order finding that the Crown had established a prima facie case under s. 672.33 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown had proceeded ex parte and without notice to the accused, relying solely on an affidavit from a police officer asserting that reasonable grounds existed to believe the accused committed the offences.

The reviewing court held that the Youth Court initially had jurisdiction but lost it by proceeding ex parte, failing to require an extension of time, and relying on evidence that did not meet the admissibility requirements of s. 672.33(4).

Although the order was quashed, the Superior Court held that it lacked jurisdiction on certiorari to enter an acquittal.

The matter was remitted to the Youth Court to determine any application to extend time and to reconsider the prima facie issue on proper evidence.

The appellant appealed summary conviction offences for impaired operation and having care or control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The appellant had been found asleep in the driver’s seat of his parked truck and argued he intended only to sleep and drive later after sobering up, thereby rebutting the statutory presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Relying on Supreme Court of Canada authority interpreting the requirement of a realistic risk of danger, the court held that a stated intention to drive later does not automatically rebut the presumption.

Even without a contemporaneous intention to drive, a realistic risk of danger may arise where an intoxicated person remains in a position to set the vehicle in motion.

The court concluded the presumption was not rebutted and upheld the conviction.

A lender brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of a loan exceeding $1.6 million and dismissal of the borrower’s counterclaim.

The borrower, a First Nation, alleged that the lender negligently advanced loans and acted in an advisory capacity when financing land purchases intended for a reserve, creating a fiduciary or special relationship beyond a typical debtor‑creditor relationship.

The borrower asserted that the lender’s conduct contributed to financial losses and raised an equitable set‑off defence grounded in alleged breaches of duty.

The court held that the evidentiary record raised genuine issues regarding whether the lender assumed an advisory role and whether exceptional circumstances created a fiduciary relationship.

Because those issues required a detailed factual assessment and credibility determinations, summary judgment was inappropriate.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to comply with undertakings and refusals arising from an examination for discovery in a motor vehicle accident action.

The requests included production of treatment records, social assistance files, a pain diary, a supplementary affidavit of documents, and Facebook materials.

The court held that the plaintiff could not be compelled to obtain clinical records where the provider refused release pending payment, and that social assistance files were not relevant to the issues in dispute.

The court also found the plaintiff’s pain diary was protected by litigation privilege and that the defendants failed to establish relevance for additional Facebook production.

Although the court confirmed the plaintiff’s obligation to provide a supplementary affidavit of documents under Rule 30.07, the motion as framed was dismissed.

The applicant sought approval of an infant settlement for an accident benefits claim, approval of a contingency fee agreement to apply to both the accident benefits claim and a future tort action, and a sealing order for the court file.

The court declined to approve the settlement or the legal fees due to insufficient affidavit evidence from the litigation guardian and counsel as required by Rule 7.08.

The court also refused to approve the contingency fee agreement for the tort action, finding the fairness and reasonableness requirements were not met on the current record.

The request for a sealing order was dismissed as the applicant failed to meet the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The appellant physician appealed decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons finding her guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence following the death of a patient who underwent high-volume liposuction.

The Committee found she breached standards of practice regarding extraction volumes, informed consent, and post-operative care, and that her website advertising violated regulations banning testimonials and superlatives.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Committee's findings on the standard of practice, its evidentiary rulings, and its conclusion that the advertising ban was a justified limit on freedom of expression under s. 1 of the Charter.

The penalty restricting her practice to acting as a surgical assistant in a hospital was also upheld as reasonable.

The plaintiff lender brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a personal guarantee executed by the responding party in connection with a corporate promissory note.

The guarantee was provided as consideration for the lender’s agreement to subordinate its security interest to permit refinancing of a related corporation.

The responding party argued he signed the agreement under time pressure without independent legal advice and raised defences of economic duress and unconscionability.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, finding that valuable consideration supported the guarantee and that the allegations of duress were unsupported by evidence.

Summary judgment was granted enforcing the guarantee.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing claims and cross‑claims arising from a motor vehicle collision where a driver turning left collided with an oncoming vehicle and pedestrians were injured.

The court considered whether there was a genuine issue requiring a trial under Rule 20.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The responding defendant argued the oncoming driver may have contributed to the accident by slowing or failing to keep a proper lookout.

The moving defendants relied largely on unsworn statements and an affidavit from counsel rather than firsthand evidence.

The court held the evidentiary record was insufficient and that a trier of fact could potentially find contributory negligence by the oncoming driver.

The applicant insurer appealed an arbitrator's award finding that the injured party and his girlfriend were 'spouses' under the Insurance Act, which would make the applicant liable for statutory accident benefits.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator erred in law by failing to properly apply the criteria for a conjugal relationship to the full three-year period prior to the accident.

The court found that the couple, who were teenagers living primarily with their respective parents during the relevant period, did not live together continuously in a conjugal relationship for three years.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Court of Justice order confirming the Chief Firearms Officer’s refusal to issue a broad authorization to transport a restricted firearm under the Firearms Act.

The requested authorization sought permission to transport the firearm to unspecified border crossings, shooting clubs, competitions, gunsmiths, and other locations without specific limitations.

The court applied a reasonableness standard under ss. 77 and 79 of the Firearms Act and considered whether the appellant demonstrated that the CFO’s refusal was unreasonable.

It held that the statutory scheme governing restricted firearms transportation requires specific authorized purposes and locations, and that the CFO may refuse authorizations for good and sufficient reasons under s. 68.

The court concluded the requested authorization was excessively broad and that the CFO’s refusal fell within the range of reasonable outcomes.

The appellant, a registered massage therapist, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Massage Therapists of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct and imposing a 12-month suspension and an indefinite restriction on needling the subclavius muscle.

The misconduct arose after the appellant performed acupuncture on a patient's subclavius muscle, causing a punctured lung (pneumothorax), and subsequently failed to refer the patient to a hospital when she presented with symptoms of the condition.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal's conclusions regarding the appellant's incompetence, failure to maintain professional standards, and disgraceful conduct were reasonable and supported by expert evidence.

The Court also upheld the penalty, noting it was within the reasonable range and justified by the need to protect the public.