Lucy Cecchetto

The appellants were convicted of various offences, including murder and criminal negligence causing death, relating to the death of their infant son.

The convictions were largely based on the expert testimony of a Crown witness.

Following the dismissal of their appeals by the Court of Appeal, fresh expert evidence became available that discredited the Crown's expert.

The Supreme Court of Canada admitted the fresh evidence and ordered a new trial on all counts, finding that the unreliable expert evidence was central to the Crown's case and could have affected the jury's verdicts on both the homicide and non-homicide charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and use of an imitation firearm arising from a home invasion.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence and Vetrovec concerns regarding a co-accused's testimony.

He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his trial lawyer prevented him from testifying in his own defence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no errors and the appellant failed to establish his ineffective assistance claim on a balance of probabilities.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial based on the ineffective assistance claim.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

He argued there was no evidence of the mens rea for first-degree murder adduced at the preliminary inquiry and that he should have been committed for manslaughter only.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict of guilty for first-degree murder, including evidence that the appellant continued to drive the taxicab while the victim was forcibly confined and assaulted, and later made statements implicating himself in the killing.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery after acting as the getaway driver.

At trial, he relied on an alibi that was disclosed to the Crown only days before trial.

The trial judge drew an adverse inference against the alibi due to the late disclosure, which hampered police investigation, and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his treatment of the alibi and in assessing credibility based on a co-accused's lack of motive to falsely implicate him.

He also appealed his six-year sentence, citing disparity with the co-accused's four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of the alibi or credibility assessment.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the disparity was justified by the co-accused's guilty plea and cooperation with police.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault against his stepson.

He argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the burden of proof and that his acquittal on one charge was inconsistent with the guilty verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury was properly instructed in accordance with W.(D). and Lifchus, and that there was a rational basis to reconcile the verdicts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and failure to comply with a probation order, as well as his sentence of seventeen months' imprisonment.

The appeal raised multiple issues, including the trial judge's decision to identify jurors by number, the admission of evidence regarding gang rivalry, the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness, and the jury instructions on reasonable doubt and the theory of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that the verdict was reasonable and the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for gross indecency and sexual touching involving his stepson, seeking to strike his guilty pleas.

He argued that his trial counsel was incompetent for failing to identify a s. 10(b) Charter breach and for pressuring him to plead guilty, and that his pleas were involuntary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's conduct did not fall below the reasonableness standard and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The court also upheld the global sentence of 21 months' imprisonment and three years' probation as fit.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their certiorari application regarding the validity of search warrants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in denying standing to one appellant and in dealing with the other appellant's application prematurely.

The Court held that the proper forum to determine the issues was the Provincial Court under sections 111 and 117 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the long-term offender provisions of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the curative proviso should apply.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that based on R. v. Johnson, it is only in the rarest of circumstances that a failure to consider long-term offender provisions would not affect the outcome.

A new sentencing hearing was directed.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after driving impaired the wrong way on a 400-series highway.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment and forcing him to proceed unrepresented after his counsel was removed from the record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant was manipulating the system to delay the trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the nine-year imprisonment term due to the severe aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence for sexual exploitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence for a reasonable trier to convict in what was primarily a credibility case.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the sentencing judge erred in attributing the complainant's weight gain to the sexual exploitation without new evidence, but ultimately concluded the sentence imposed was fit and appropriate.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of offences relating to the death of their eight-month-old son, who was found to have suffered extensive physical abuse during his life.

The father was convicted of second-degree murder and assaults, while the mother was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and failing to provide the necessaries of life.

On appeal, they argued the verdicts were unreasonable because the exact medical cause of death could not be determined, and challenged the admission of demeanour evidence, evidence of injuries to their second child, and various jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the Crown was not required to prove a specific medical cause of death, and that while there were minor errors in the admission of evidence and jury instructions, they did not occasion a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming evidence of ongoing abuse.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning, his rolled-up charge on intent, his dismissal of a Corbett application, and the length of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions, the Corbett ruling, or the sentence imposed.

The appellants were jointly tried and convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.

On appeal, the first appellant argued that his trial was rendered unfair because the trial judge permitted the co-accused's counsel to adduce highly prejudicial evidence of his violent disposition and bad character, ostensibly to support the co-accused's defence that he lied to police out of fear.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the propensity evidence lacked sufficient probative value to justify its severe prejudicial effect on the right to a fair trial.

The first appellant's appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The co-accused's appeal from conviction was dismissed, but his sentence for attempted murder was varied to correct an illegal period of parole ineligibility.

The applicant, convicted of murder and assault in the death of his infant son, brought an application seeking production of Crown materials regarding the competency and objectivity of the Crown's paediatric pathology expert, Dr. Smith, in other criminal cases.

The applicant intended to use this material to adduce fresh evidence on his pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Crown's disclosure obligations continue post-conviction, the applicant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the requested material could assist in the appeal and be received as fresh evidence.

The application was dismissed because the applicant offered no evidence to doubt the specific medical opinions given by the expert in this case, meaning evidence of the expert's conduct in other cases could not reasonably be expected to affect the verdict.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and indecent assault involving young boys over a 12-year period.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 7 years, considering the serious breach of trust, the appellant's prior convictions for similar offences, and victim impact statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range and revealing no basis to interfere.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a stabbing incident.

At trial, the Crown introduced statements made by the appellant to third parties, which contained both inculpatory and exculpatory elements.

The trial judge instructed the jury that only the inculpatory portions of these statements could be used for the truth of their contents.

On appeal, the Crown conceded this was an error, as exculpatory portions of statements introduced by the Crown become evidence for the accused.

The Court of Appeal found the error was highly prejudicial, as it deprived the appellant of the combined defences of self-defence and accident, and declined to apply the curative proviso.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed their sentences of 18 and 16 years imprisonment for a violent 11.5-hour carjacking, kidnapping, and robbery.

The Court of Appeal upheld the severity of the sentences and the parole ineligibility orders, finding the offences to be among the worst group of offences committed by the worst group of offenders.

However, the Court reduced each global sentence by two years to account for pre-trial custody that the trial judge had intended to credit but failed to deduct.

The Court also restructured the sentences for one appellant to correct an error regarding the mandatory minimum for robbery with a firearm.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the Crown's improper cross-examination rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the Crown's cross-examination was sarcastic, personally abusive, and improperly exploited bad character evidence.

The Crown also improperly required the appellant to comment on the veracity of other witnesses and mocked his religious beliefs.

Given the highly prejudicial nature of the cross-examination, the curative proviso could not be applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder after the victim was brutally beaten and robbed in an underground parking garage.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred by excluding out-of-court statements from a deceased third party who had confessed to the murder, by misdirecting the jury on reasonable doubt, and by misdirecting the jury on the elements of first-degree murder based on unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the third party's hearsay statements lacked threshold reliability, the reasonable doubt instruction was adequate, and unlawful confinement in the course of a robbery can provide the basis for first-degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.