Lorne Sossin

This decision addresses a request by the respondent (defendant in the original action) to limit the scope of a new trial on liability and damages, which had been ordered by the Court of Appeal in a prior decision.

The court dismissed the request, emphasizing that the evidence and issues were complex, interrelated, and interdependent.

Limiting the trial to specific issues would risk artificial credibility assessments and unreliable fact-finding.

The appellant, Narine Loojune, appealed an order that substituted the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as guardian of property for his catastrophically injured nephew, Dataram Loojune.

The substitution was ordered due to the appellant's repeated failure to comply with court-ordered obligations to account for his nephew's property.

The appellant sought to adjourn the appeal to submit fresh evidence alleging fraud by a PGT employee and argued the motion judge applied the wrong legal test and was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment application, finding no credible evidence to support the claims or impact the appeal.

The court affirmed the motion judge's application of the "best interests" test and found no evidence of fraud, harassment, or judicial bias.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs to the PGT.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim against the respondents (lawyers of his former employer) without leave to amend.

The motion judge found the claims were covered by absolute privilege as they related to lawyers' work in contemplation of litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the respondents had no duty to the appellant and their interactions were through litigation, and upheld the refusal to grant leave to amend.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding him liable for the respondent's severe ankle injury under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal, including alleged errors in factual findings, disregard for evidence timing, failure to appreciate an affidavit's relevance, and errors in credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's detailed reasons, factual conclusions, evidentiary decisions, or credibility findings, emphasizing the deference owed to the trial judge.

The appellant, Best Theratronics Ltd. (BTL), appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay an outstanding debt to Kirloskar Technologies (P) Ltd. (KTPL), its former agent in India.

BTL argued it should be relieved of the debt due to a perceived risk of prosecution under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) related to alleged corrupt practices by KTPL in India, and sought to delay payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the alleged criminal conduct was unrelated to the debt at issue and that BTL failed to provide sufficient evidence to support its public policy argument against enforcing the contract.

The court reiterated that public policy considerations for setting aside contractual provisions should be applied sparingly.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula appealed its conviction for damaging Piping Plover habitat under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The appeal raised issues regarding the interpretation of "damage" under the Act and the admissibility of expert evidence from a Ministry biologist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower court's interpretation of "damage" as including actions that make habitat less attractive, useful, or valuable from the species' perspective, and affirming the admissibility of the expert's evidence, despite concerns about impartiality, as the trial judge's decision was entitled to deference and the evidence of another expert was sufficient.

The appellant, J.W., appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his discreditable conduct (public nudity) that occurred several years after the charged offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge incorrectly admitted this evidence, as its probative value did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The court emphasized that the similarities between the discreditable conduct and the charged offences were generic and lacked a sufficient nexus, and that the trial judge did not adequately assess the moral and reasoning prejudice, even in a judge-alone trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their summary judgment motion and granting summary judgment and a permanent stay to the respondents.

The core issue was the appellants' failure to immediately disclose settlement agreements with other defendants, which altered the litigation's adversarial landscape.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that these contingent settlement agreements, which included provisions for private evidence gathering and financial incentives for cooperation, changed the adversarial relationship into a cooperative one, triggering the immediate disclosure rule from Handley Estate.

The court reiterated that immediate disclosure is mandatory, regardless of contingencies or confidentiality clauses, and that a stay of proceedings is the appropriate remedy for such an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a six-month custodial sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The sentence was imposed after a miscommunication within the Public Prosecution Service of Canada led to the prosecution seeking a nine-month sentence at trial, despite an internal intention to propose a joint submission for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, set aside the custodial sentence, and substituted a conditional sentence of 150 days, finding it appropriate given the appellant's personal circumstances, efforts to address addiction, employment, family responsibilities, and remorse.

A police services board and a detective appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for false arrest, negligent investigation, and malicious prosecution, with significant damages awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff cross-appealed the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on lack of reasonable and probable grounds and malice, and the cross-appeal, affirming the costs award.

The appellant, Christian Masci, sought leave to appeal the total five-year sentence imposed following his convictions for pointing a firearm, possessing a firearm, and attempting to obstruct justice.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

The court affirmed the sentencing judge's decision to impose consecutive sentences for the separate events, particularly the firearm possession offences, emphasizing that such decisions are entitled to deference and that the total sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in not excluding evidence (a shotgun and cell phone) under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

This evidence was obtained following a s. 8 Charter breach due to a one-year delay in filing a s. 489.1 Criminal Code report after a search incident to arrest.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the R. v. Grant factors, concluding that the seriousness of the breach was lessened by officer oversight and the impact on the appellant's Charter interests was minimal, as the items would have been lawfully detained for trial regardless.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned the appropriate measure of damages for a vendor's breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property.

The appellant purchaser sought to recover the significant capital appreciation realized by the breaching vendor two and a half years after the breach, when the vendor resold the properties for $56 million more than the original contract price.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming the general principle that damages for breach of a real estate contract are assessed at the date of breach, unless the innocent party can demonstrate a later date is fair due to an inability to re-enter the market and mitigate.

The court found the appellant, a long-term investor, was not a speculator and failed to prove its loss or justify a departure from the date of breach.

The appeal on damages and costs was dismissed, as was the cross-appeal on costs thrown away.

The appellant, convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm, appealed his conviction and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings on causation were supported by evidence and the verdict was reasonable.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the three-year custodial sentence and three-year driving prohibition, finding the trial judge properly considered mitigating factors and collateral immigration consequences.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a force majeure clause in commercial leases between school boards and a multi-purpose sporting facility.

Due to province-wide COVID-19 lockdowns, the facility was unable to open, and the school boards sought rent abatement under the force majeure clause.

The application judge found the clause applied and rent was abated.

The appellant (landlord) argued that the clause required the landlord to explicitly "claim" a force majeure event for rent abatement to occur, which they had not done.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation.

The court affirmed that the landlord's objective inability to provide the leased premises due to the lockdown triggered the rent abatement, regardless of an explicit claim by the landlord.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a proposed class action and constitutional challenge as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying action asserted a global conspiracy related to COVID-19, seeking billions in damages from various domestic and foreign entities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion, legal analysis, or factual findings, and affirmed that the case was a clear instance for applying Rule 2.1.01.

This appeal concerns the interaction between a provincial legislative scheme governing child protection (CYFSA) and a federal legislative scheme for removing those without citizenship or immigration status from Canada (IRPA).

Specifically, it addresses a disclosure order granted to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in a child protection status hearing.

The motion judge granted the disclosure, which was upheld by the Superior Court.

The appellants (the parent, the Children's Aid Society, and the Office of the Children's Lawyer) argued that the disclosure order improperly prioritized the Minister's interests over the children's privacy and best interests.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge had jurisdiction to order disclosure, she erred by not requiring the Minister to establish a prima facie basis for the scope of submissions or the requested disclosure.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted to the motion judge for reconsideration based on a new framework requiring the Minister to justify the scope of submissions and disclosure.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of trafficking cocaine.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's admission and use of audio recordings and transcripts, the expert evidence relating to cocaine, and the conviction on an alternative theory of liability not explicitly advanced by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the audio recordings and transcripts, nor in the reliance on expert evidence to link drug lingo to cocaine.

Regarding the alternative theory, the court found no prejudice to the appellant, as the indictment's language covered the "offer to traffic" which was completed on an earlier date than specified for delivery, and this was part of a continuous chain of events.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a registered massage therapist, appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of complainant credibility in the absence of expert evidence and the sufficiency of reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the complainants' reactions were psychologically normal for sexual assault victims and that the reasons for conviction, based on the strength of the Crown's evidence and similar fact evidence, were sufficient.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision to continue his detention on a charge of second-degree murder, arguing that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to a trial judge's ruling granting leave to raise a third-party suspect defence.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing the decision de novo, assumed a material change but ultimately found that the apparent strength of the prosecution's case remained very strong despite the third-party suspect evidence.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that detention was still necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the horrific nature of the crime, the vulnerability of the victim, and the overwhelming forensic evidence against the applicant.