Richard Addelman

The accused admitted to killing the victim but sought a finding of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

Both the Crown and Defence agreed the accused should be found NCR due to schizophrenia.

The court initially found the evidentiary record insufficient and appointed amicus to cross-examine the forensic psychiatrist, specifically regarding the accused's police interview and potential motive.

After hearing supplemental evidence, the court was satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the accused was in active psychosis and lacked the capacity to appreciate the moral wrongfulness of his actions.

The accused was found NCR and the disposition was deferred to the Ontario Review Board.

The accused, O.W., was charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder in connection with a fatal shooting.

The Crown’s case was entirely circumstantial, relying on evidence of means, opportunity, motive, and post-offence celebratory conduct.

The central issue was the identity of the second shooter.

The court found significant gaps and inconsistencies in the evidence, particularly regarding motive and animus, and concluded that the Crown had not proven O.W.’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

O.W. was acquitted on both counts.

The court considered a Crown application to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased to a friend, Rebecca Guindon, identifying O.W. as the perpetrator of a prior shooting, in a trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that the statements lacked sufficient procedural and substantive reliability to be admitted for their truth under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court also rejected their admissibility under the "state of mind" exception, finding the statements incapable of supporting the inferences the Crown sought regarding motive or animosity between the deceased and O.W.

The court considered the admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence in a judge-alone trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence that the accused, O.W., threatened the deceased with a firearm on Instagram Live hours before the homicide, and a video showing O.W. associating with J.A. (the co-accused) who brandished a handgun.

The court found both pieces of evidence highly probative to issues of motive, animus, intent, and identification, and held that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, especially given the reduced risk of prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The application to admit the evidence was granted.

The accused, A.M., pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code involving an 11-year-old victim.

The assaults occurred multiple times over five months, were penetrative, and caused the victim pain and significant emotional and psychological harm, including self-harm and suicidal thoughts.

The accused was in a position of trust.

The Crown sought a four-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought two years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, considering aggravating factors such as the victim's age, abuse of trust, and severe impact, and mitigating factors including the accused's lack of prior criminal record and guilty plea.

The court imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment, along with various ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, Section 161 order, non-communication order, and SOIRA order.

The accused, Anthony Ifill, was found guilty of sexual assault against an 11-year-old victim.

The court considered sentencing principles, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as paramount for child sexual offences, as per R. v. Friesen.

Despite the passage of 30 years since the offence, the court found this was not a mitigating factor due to the lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility.

Aggravating factors included multiple incidents, escalation of seriousness, lack of insight, and profound victim impact.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record and pro-social conduct.

The defence sought a conditional sentence, while the Crown sought 18-24 months custody.

The court determined that no exceptional circumstances existed to justify a conditional sentence and imposed a 16-month custodial sentence, followed by 2 years of probation, a DNA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, a victim fine surcharge, SOIRA designation for 20 years, and a 10-year prohibition from certain activities involving persons under 16.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay was 36 months and eight days.

The court deducted three months and 18 days for defence-caused delay, and three months and four days as a discrete exceptional event due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court declined to deduct delay caused by federal agencies vetting disclosure.

The remaining net delay was 29.5 months, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts.

The application was dismissed.

Hayden Bieber pleaded guilty to impaired operation of a conveyance, possession of property obtained by crime, possession of a weapon dangerous to public peace (all Criminal Code offences), and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking (Controlled Drugs and Substances Act).

The offences occurred following a traffic stop where police found drugs, cash, and brass knuckles.

Bieber, 25, had no prior criminal record and had made significant efforts towards rehabilitation, including abstaining from drugs for a year and attending Narcotics Anonymous.

The Crown sought a 4-year incarceration, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years less a day, or a sentence in the upper reformatory/lower penitentiary range if incarceration was necessary.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence for fentanyl trafficking, finding that a conditional sentence was inappropriate despite Bieber's rehabilitative efforts and lack of criminal record.

The judge imposed a global sentence of 36 months (3 years) of imprisonment, after applying credit for pre-sentence release conditions and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on incarceration.

Ancillary orders included a DNA sample, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and forfeiture/destruction of seized substances.

Marcus Gil pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of fentanyl (276.2 grams), its proximity to a children's daycare, and the offender's criminal history and breach of probation.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, expressed remorse, young age (22), and strong family support.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives due to the ongoing opioid crisis and the destructive effects of fentanyl.

A total sentence of eight and a half years imprisonment was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in six years and ten months to serve.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearm prohibition, a DNA order, and forfeiture of seized items.

Derek Robertson was found guilty of fraud against two couples, the Demers and Langfords, for failing to complete architectural drawings for new homes and misusing funds intended for third-party fees.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victims' age and the financial and emotional impact, and mitigating factors, such as Robertson's lack of criminal record, significant mental health issues (pervasive depression), and the unsophisticated nature of the fraud.

The Crown sought 6-9 months imprisonment, while the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 24 months probation and restitution orders of $5,000 each to Mr. Demers and Mr. Langford, emphasizing rehabilitation, the principle of restraint against jail, and the offender's limited means and mental health challenges.

The appellant appealed his conviction for party liability in the use of a firearm during a drive-by shooting.

The trial judge found that the appellant, who was driving the vehicle, knew of the shooting moments before it occurred and assisted by positioning his car alongside the victim's vehicle before driving away evasively.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's findings were amply supported by evidence and sufficient to establish party liability under section 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant's argument that he lacked the requisite mens rea was rejected as an unreasonable verdict argument.

The accused, Forhad Choudhury, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was approximately 47 months.

Applying the R. v. Jordan framework, the court found that a significant portion of the delay (approximately one year related to setting the first trial date) was attributable to the defence due to unavailability and implicit waiver.

Another period of delay (approximately five months after a guilty plea was struck) was attributed to the Crown due to an incorrect legal position on the definition of possession of a firearm.

However, even with this attribution to the Crown, the net delay remained below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

Consequently, the court found no breach of the accused's s. 11(b) rights, and the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

Elia S. Awad was found guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine) and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court considered sentencing principles, mitigating factors (strict bail conditions, employment, family support, mental health issues) and aggravating factors (sophisticated mid-high level drug trafficker, extensive criminal record including prior drug offences).

The Crown sought an 8-year sentence, while the Defence sought 3 years.

The court imposed a sentence of six years imprisonment, to be served concurrently for both charges, reduced by credits for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of five years, one month, and nineteen days.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg/100ml.

The court found that the investigating officer breached the accused's ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) Charter rights by delaying the approved screening device (ASD) demand and failing to provide rights to counsel while waiting ten minutes for the ASD to arrive.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, noting the seriousness of the state conduct and inadequate police training regarding Charter rights at the roadside.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused sisters were charged with importing opium, conspiracy to import opium, and possession for the purpose of trafficking following a controlled delivery of a package containing opium to one of their apartments.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, including intercepted text messages and a pattern of receiving packages from foreign locations.

The court found that while it was highly probable the accused were involved in illicit activities, the circumstantial evidence left reasonable doubt regarding their agreement to import the specific packages and their knowledge of the contents.

Both accused were found not guilty on all charges.

The Crown brought a motion under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code for an order remanding the offender for an assessment by a designated expert, Dr. Philip Klassen, for a dangerous offender application.

The offender consented to the assessment but requested that Dr. Paul Fedoroff conduct it instead.

The court held that while the defence may make submissions, the Crown is generally entitled to choose the assessor if the proposed candidate is qualified and available.

The court designated Dr. Klassen, noting concerns that Dr. Fedoroff's previously stated position on treatability could prematurely preclude a dangerous offender designation.

The applicant sought a stay of charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to trial was approximately 36 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court deducted one month for defence-caused delay, resulting in a net delay of 35 months.

While the case was not complex enough to justify delay under the post-Jordan framework, the court found that the delay could be justified by exceptional transitional circumstances, as the bulk of the delay occurred before Jordan was released, and the parties' conduct was assessed against pre-Jordan expectations under R. v. Morin.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

Crown appeal against sentence imposed on a long-time cocaine distributor for a criminal organization.

The respondent was sentenced to seven years and 69 days imprisonment following guilty pleas to conspiracy to traffic cocaine, trafficking in cocaine, committing an indictable offence for the benefit of a criminal organization, possession of oxycodone, and multiple breaches of recognizance.

The Crown challenged three aspects of the sentencing: the application of pre-sentence custody credit to the criminal organization offence, the concurrent sentencing of breach and possession offences, and the fitness of the five-year sentence for the trafficking offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal while granting leave to appeal.

The accused was convicted of being a party to the offence of intentionally discharging a handgun while reckless as to life or safety, breaching firearm prohibition orders, careless storage and use of firearms, pointing a firearm, possession of firearms without a licence, occupying a motor vehicle with a firearm, and possession of loaded prohibited firearms.

The accused was the driver in a drive-by shooting incident on Bank Street in Ottawa.

The Crown sought a sentence of 8 years, while the defence sought the mandatory minimum of 5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7.5 years, taking into account sentencing principles of deterrence, denunciation, and retribution, while considering rehabilitation and the accused's role as the driver rather than the actual shooter.

The accused brought a constitutional challenge under s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms against a conviction under s. 244.2(3)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code for intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless as to the life or safety of another person.

The accused was the driver of a vehicle from which his co-accused fired a shot at another vehicle.

The accused argued the mandatory minimum sentence of five years constituted cruel and unusual punishment, relying on the principle of parity with his co-accused who received a lesser sentence.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding it was bound by precedent and that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate given the gravity of the offence and the accused's instrumental role in its commission.