Jennifer Woollcombe

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges including sexual assault.

Before sentencing on the convictions, the trial judge declared a mistrial on the convictions after admitting he had visited the dating website where the accused and complainant met and had discussed it with the investigating officer in chambers.

The trial judge concluded he was functus officio regarding the acquittals.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge's independent research and comments created a reasonable apprehension of bias that tainted the acquittals.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the summary dismissal of his mandamus application, which sought to overturn the Crown's decision to stay his private prosecution.

The appellant alleged that the Attorney General was in an inherent conflict of interest, constituting an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that there was no evidence of an abuse of process to justify reviewing the Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion under section 579 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 7.5-year sentence for four bank robberies and related firearms offences.

He argued the trial judge erred in accepting eyewitness identification from four bank tellers and recognition evidence from a police officer, citing discrepancies and flawed photo line-up procedures.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the criteria for assessing photo identification evidence and was alive to the frailties of eyewitness testimony.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range and the trial judge did not err in applying the totality principle to the mandatory consecutive sentences.

The appellant, who was 16 at the time of the offence, appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his adult sentence of life imprisonment without parole for seven years.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence that he suffered from Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD), arguing it affected his ability to foresee the consequences of stabbing the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the fresh evidence lacked the cogency to affect the verdict, as the expert could not conclude the FASD impacted the appellant's state of mind at the time.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the fresh evidence did not alter the appellant's moral blameworthiness or the appropriateness of the adult sentence.

The Crown brought a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal of the respondent's acquittals.

The proposed appeal was based on a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from a post-judgment conversation between the trial judge and the investigating officer.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding that although the Crown initially pursued the wrong remedy, there was an arguable appeal on the merits and no undue prejudice to the respondent.

The interests of justice favoured allowing the appeal to proceed.

The respondent, convicted of first-degree murder, sought a declaration that he could apply for a ministerial review of his conviction under s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code without first seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application judge granted the declaration, finding that the Minister of Justice is not precluded from determining that an applicant has exhausted their rights of appeal despite not applying for leave to the SCC.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed, and the respondent cross-appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, agreeing with the application judge's analysis.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and administering a stupefying substance, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's testimony on the basis that he tailored his evidence to fit arguments raised during a voir dire regarding his police statement.

The Court of Appeal held that this reasoning improperly turned the appellant's statutory right to be present at his trial against him, undermining his right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of unlawful confinement and firearms offences following a home invasion.

During closing addresses, the Crown improperly suggested to the jury that the complainant's prior statements to police and at the preliminary inquiry, which were not in evidence, were consistent with her trial testimony and therefore proved she was telling the truth.

The trial judge refused a mistrial application and failed to provide a limiting instruction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the Crown's comments invited the jury to make erroneous use of the evidence and the trial judge's failure to correct the error was fatal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly concluded the appellant became the aggressor when he exited his vehicle, vitiating his self-defence claim and changing his purpose for possessing the knife to a dangerous one.

The applicant applied to re-open his abandoned appeal from a manslaughter conviction relating to the death of his infant grandson.

He argued that new understandings of Shaken Baby Syndrome following the Goudge Inquiry suggested his conviction might be a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the case did not turn solely on Shaken Baby Syndrome but on cumulative circumstantial evidence, including an unexplained skull fracture, and the applicant failed to provide an innocent explanation for the injuries.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how to treat a witness's gratuitous personal opinions and the manner in which he gave evidence.

The appellant also argued that the Crown asked an improper question during re-examination about a trip to Windsor shortly after the killing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were correct and the re-examination question was proper given the defence's cross-examination.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing her s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant understood her rights and therefore no breach occurred.

The court further noted that even if a breach had occurred, the breathalyzer results would have been admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on two counts of first-degree murder and convictions for the included offence of infanticide.

The Crown argued that infanticide is not a partial defence to murder, but only an included offence if murder is not proved.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that infanticide operates as both a substantive offence and a partial defence to murder.

The Court also clarified that the mens rea for infanticide is akin to manslaughter, and that the Crown bears the burden of negating the defence of infanticide beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to the trial judge's treatment of identification evidence.

The trial judge had rejected the complainant's in-dock identification but convicted based on circumstantial similarities.

The Court of Appeal found significant discrepancies between the complainant's description and the appellant, particularly regarding height and clothing, as well as contextual issues of time and place.

The Court concluded the trial judge's evaluation of the evidence was flawed, rendering the verdict unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder following the beating death of a young man by a group of attackers.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including the admission of after-the-fact conduct, the voluntariness of police statements, alleged Charter breaches, jury instructions, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no reviewable errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that trial counsel provided effective representation.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on firearms offences after the trial judge excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police lacked objective reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to give weight to the informer's credibility and by compartmentalizing the surveillance evidence.

The Court found that the totality of the circumstances, including the reliable tip and corroborating surveillance of a rental car and suspicious handling of a shoebox, provided reasonable grounds for the arrest and subsequent search.

The appellant pleaded guilty to infanticide in 1998 based on the pathology opinion of a paediatric forensic pathologist.

Following a Coroner's Review and a public inquiry, new expert evidence revealed there was no reliable pathological evidence to support the conclusion that the cause of death was asphyxia.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding a miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1994 for the death of her newborn child, based heavily on the flawed forensic pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, which revealed serious errors in Dr. Smith's conclusions, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence demonstrating that the cause of death could not be ascertained and that there was no evidence of asphyxia.

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty but for the flawed expert opinion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the use of his DNA, which was on file from a 1995 sexual assault conviction, violated his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that individual items of evidence, including DNA findings, need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a convicted offender loses any reasonable expectation of privacy in identifying information derived from lawfully obtained DNA.

The court also found no error in the jury charge, as the trial judge properly instructed the jury to consider all evidence cumulatively to determine if the essential element of identity was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault in 1995 based on the testimony of a single witness.

After a remand from the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court of Appeal considered the admissibility of fresh evidence.

The Court found that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to use available evidence that could have undermined the credibility of the Crown's sole witness, including evidence of a motive to lie and failure to report the incident.

The Court admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, concluding that the ineffective assistance resulted in a miscarriage of justice.