Bruce Engell

The applicants sought judicial review to quash O. Reg. 382/19, which amended transitional rules for planning appeals before the Ontario Land Tribunal, arguing it was ultra vires its enabling statute.

The regulation reimposed a more restrictive procedural regime on third-party appeals of municipal planning decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Attorney General had broad, express statutory authority under s. 43.1 of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, 2017 to make the transitional regulation.

The court held the regulation was consistent with the enabling statute and did not improperly deprive the applicants of vested substantive rights.

The court also declined to address procedural fairness issues, finding them premature as they should be raised in the applicants' pending motion for leave to appeal.

The Attorney General for Ontario brought a motion to strike out parts of an affidavit filed by the applicants in an application for judicial review.

The underlying application challenged the vires of O. Reg. 382/19.

The moving party argued the affidavit contained inadmissible legal argument, opinion, and irrelevant evidence that did not fall within the narrow exceptions for supplementing the record on judicial review.

The court adopted a hybrid approach, striking out paragraphs containing clear legal argument and opinion, while adjourning the balance of the motion to the panel hearing the application on its merits.

The City of Toronto and its Clerk brought an application for declaratory relief regarding the coming into force of by-laws establishing a 47-ward structure for the 2018 municipal election and the resulting composition of city council.

The respondents had previously raised concerns about a potential 'legal vacuum' in their unsuccessful motion for leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, declining to exercise its discretion to grant declaratory relief because there was no live legal dispute between the parties, affected voters had not been given notice, and the application effectively sought an inappropriate advisory opinion.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision approving a 47-ward structure for the City of Toronto's municipal elections.

They argued the Board erred in law by failing to prioritize voter parity and by not requiring a corresponding by-law changing the composition of City Council.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's application of the Carter principles for effective representation.

The court held that the moving parties were improperly challenging findings of fact and that the Board lacked jurisdiction to determine council composition.

The applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend a building permit issued by the town for the construction of a dock on a neighbouring waterfront property.

The applicant argued the proposed location differed from a previously approved site plan and would eventually house a boathouse that would obstruct his view.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried regarding the planning process, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm from the dock's construction, and the balance of convenience favoured the respondent property owner.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) regarding the validity of certain provisions of a City of Ottawa zoning by-law.

The OMB had found some provisions valid, some invalid, and sent others back to the City for reconsideration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that while the issue was important and the standard of review was reasonableness, the appeal was premature because the final language of the by-law had not yet been settled by the City's reconsideration.

The appellant municipality discovered an 1854 by-law purporting to establish a public road along the shoreline of Georgian Bay.

It registered the by-law in 2007 and sought a declaration that the road was a public highway owned by the municipality.

The respondents, who own cottage properties on the purported road, successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that summary judgment was appropriate, the 1854 by-law lacked sufficient certainty to establish a road, and the unregistered by-law was void against the respondents who had no actual notice of it.

The appeal concerned a municipal restructuring proposal that combined a minor land transfer between neighbouring municipalities with the annexation of multiple unorganized townships, thereby avoiding the need for majority support from electors in the affected unorganized territory.

The court held that municipalities must act within both the letter and the purpose of their enabling legislation, and that a by-law inconsistent with the policy underlying the Municipal Act is ultra vires and illegal.

The impugned by-law and resolution were found to be a device to circumvent the statutory consultation and support structure contemplated by s. 25.2.

The appeal was dismissed and the quashing order upheld.