Roberto D. Aburto

The applicant, a non-profit environmental education centre, sought a declaration that its property was exempt from municipal taxation under section 3(1)5 of the Assessment Act as an 'educational seminary of learning'.

The respondent assessment corporation opposed the application, arguing the centre lacked a structured curriculum, regular students, and formal instructors.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the application, finding that the primary purpose of the centre, determined objectively, was educational.

The court held that a flexible approach to the definition of a 'seminary of learning' was appropriate, and the centre's workshops, symposiums, and experiential learning programs sufficiently constituted a focused educational agenda.

The defendants brought a motion to adjourn a three-week trial scheduled to commence in one month, citing the plaintiffs' late production of documents and two expert reports.

The plaintiffs agreed to withdraw one expert report if the trial proceeded.

The court applied the factors from Ariston Realty and Igbinosun, finding that the defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating why they could not proceed or how their defence would be significantly compromised.

The court emphasized the prejudice of delay to the plaintiffs in an eight-year-old action and dismissed the motion, without prejudice to the defendants seeking relief at trial regarding the late productions.

The defendants, an athlete and a national sports organization, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for damages arising from alleged harassment and assault.

The defendants argued the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff had already pursued a complaint under the organization's internal disciplinary code, making the civil action an abuse of process or collateral attack.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the internal disciplinary process did not have the authority to award compensatory damages for tortious conduct, and therefore did not oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

Following a decision regarding the sale of historic properties, the successful applicant Township sought costs of $170,647.85 based on an unaccepted offer to settle.

The respondent Society, a charitable organization, argued each party should bear its own costs.

The court noted both parties had engaged in blameworthy conduct but found the Township's offer to settle was reasonable.

Balancing the Society's charitable status with the costs consequences under Rule 49.10 and Rule 57 factors, the court ordered the Society to pay the Township's costs fixed at $75,000.

The applicant sought leave to amend its notice of application to add the interim Chief Building Official as a respondent and to appeal his alleged 'decision' that the applicant was not an 'aggrieved person' regarding a prior Unsafe Order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the proposed amendments were not legally tenable.

The court held that the interim official's communication was not an appealable 'decision' under section 25(1) of the Building Code Act, as standing is a determination for the court, not the official.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the action arising from a fatal helicopter incident involving a foreign soldier during a NATO mission in Afghanistan.

They argued the claim was barred by the six‑month limitation period in s. 269 of the National Defence Act and that the Ontario Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the claim against the Crown under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

The court held that the discoverability principle applied to the statutory limitation period, meaning the action was not statute‑barred.

However, the court found it lacked jurisdiction over the claim against the Crown because the claim arose outside Canada.

The action was therefore dismissed only as against the Attorney General of Canada.

Property owners sought declarations that a proposed paintball facility on land zoned “rural” was a permitted use under a municipal zoning by-law.

The municipality maintained the proposed use constituted a commercial recreational activity requiring rezoning.

Applying modern principles of statutory interpretation to municipal by-laws and considering the zoning by-law within the broader framework of the municipality’s Official Plan, the court held that a “Private Park” under the by-law referred to passive recreational open space intended for limited private use rather than commercial recreation offered to the public.

The court concluded the proposed paintball facility more closely resembled a “Place of Recreation” where recreation is provided for a fee and therefore constituted a new commercial use.

As new commercial uses in the rural designation required a zoning amendment, the applicants’ request for declaratory relief was refused.

Following a successful jurisdiction and crown immunity motion, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court considered allegations of abusive conduct by the self‑represented plaintiffs, including abusive phone messages, disorganized pleadings, and scandalous allegations against parties, counsel, and courts.

The defendants argued that the complexity of crown immunity issues and the plaintiffs’ conduct significantly increased litigation costs.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ conduct justified substantial indemnity costs.

Costs of $23,896.92 were awarded to the defendants.

Following a prior decision finding the plaintiff in contempt of court for breaching an order restricting communications with the defendants, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court noted that the plaintiff left numerous lengthy abusive voicemail messages in breach of a court order and had also attempted to bring an unmeritorious cross‑motion for contempt.

The court found that the plaintiff’s conduct unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding and significantly increased the defendants’ legal costs.

Applying principles governing substantial indemnity costs in cases involving vexatious or abusive litigation conduct, the court concluded that such elevated costs were warranted.

Costs of $14,981.47 were awarded to the defendants on a substantial indemnity basis.