Adam N. Weisberg

The offender was convicted of manslaughter after shooting the deceased 15 times with an illegal firearm.

The jury accepted the partial defence of provocation.

The court considered the offender's lack of criminal record, deep remorse, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (Duncan credit), as well as collateral consequences (fear for safety) and Morris factors (social context evidence).

The offender was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment, reduced to 4 years and 6 months after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking and possessing a loaded firearm after police stopped the rental vehicle in which he was a passenger.

The officers claimed they stopped the vehicle to check licensing and insurance under the Highway Traffic Act.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention based on racial profiling.

The court found that the officers concocted a reason to approach the vehicle and that the decision to detain was informed by the race of the occupants.

The court concluded that the stop was an unlawful pretext and a serious violation of section 9 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and the accused was acquitted.

The applicant, a Black man charged with second degree murder, brought an application to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on racial prejudice and pre-trial publicity.

The Crown consented to the challenge but opposed the applicant's proposed multiple-choice questions.

The court rejected the multiple-choice format, finding it too intrusive and potentially confusing.

Instead, the court approved standard yes/no questions designed to determine whether jurors could set aside any biases or opinions and decide the case based solely on the evidence and instructions.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of manslaughter against Ahmed Rafin following the fatal stabbing of Maahir Dosani during a schoolyard swarming incident.

The Crown argued unlawful act manslaughter, positing that Rafin either intentionally stabbed his attackers (with Dosani being an incidental victim) or committed offenses of weapon possession and threatening.

The defence contended that Rafin acted in self-defence and lacked the requisite intent.

The court found Rafin to be a credible witness, accepting his testimony that he displayed a knife to deter an angry, armed, and numerically superior crowd while attempting to retreat.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rafin committed an unlawful act causing Dosani's death, leading to an acquittal.

The defendant, Shem Bent, was found guilty after trial of discharging a firearm with intent to wound, contrary to s. 244(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court determined the firearm was a handgun, triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years.

The judge considered aggravating factors including the public nature of the offence, the deliberate possession and use of the firearm, and the prevalence of gun crime in the community.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's status as a youthful first offender, his remorse, and the "Duncan credit" for 5 years spent on restrictive bail conditions.

The court rejected the application of "Morris factors" as there was no connection between anti-Black racism and the offence.

A sentence of 5 years and 6 months in jail was imposed, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition, a compulsory DNA order, and a non-communication order with the victims.

The accused was charged with multiple offences relating to the trafficking of cocaine, firearms, and grenades following an undercover police operation.

He admitted to trafficking cocaine but claimed he was a 'blind courier' regarding the firearms and grenades, believing those packages contained cannabis products.

The court applied the W(D) principles and found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew he was delivering weapons.

The accused was found guilty of the cocaine charges and acquitted of the weapons charges.

A Charter s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay was dismissed due to exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic and case complexity.

Neelkanth Shah, an 18-year-old first offender, was sentenced for three bank robberies committed in early 2021.

The robberies escalated in severity, with the final one involving an accomplice, brandished knives, an accidental injury to a police officer, and trauma to a bank teller.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the use of a knife and the amount stolen, and significant mitigating factors, including Shah's sincere remorse, rehabilitative efforts while on strict house arrest bail, and strong community support.

The Crown sought 3-4 years' incarceration, while the defence argued for 31 months, leading to an actual sentence of two years after credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest.

The Crown appealed an order staying proceedings against the respondent for sexual assault, based on a breach of the respondent's s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The application judge found that the respondent's delay in electing mode of trial was reasonable due to outstanding essential disclosure, and that the COVID-19 pandemic did not contribute to the delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the pre-election delay was not attributable to the defence and that the pandemic was not an exceptional circumstance in this case.

The Crown sought directions regarding the disclosure of police records concerning a young person (M.A.) involved in an incident related to a murder charge against the accused.

The court determined that records pertaining to extrajudicial measures (EJM) taken with M.A. are presumptively non-disclosable under section 119(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) to protect the young person from stigmatization.

However, information about the underlying incident, such as a fight and its reason, and any animus between M.A. and the deceased, is disclosable and permissible for witness questioning, provided it does not reveal police involvement or EJM details.

The court suggested an Agreed Statement of Facts as a means to address the defence's need for full answer and defence without violating YCJA provisions.

The accused, charged with sexual assault against his former spouse, sought directions on whether affidavits filed by the complainant in their family law proceedings constituted 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued the affidavits contained personal information and required scrutiny under the s. 278 regime.

The court held that the affidavits were not records, as they were voluntarily filed in public adversarial proceedings, meaning the complainant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in them.

Consequently, a s. 278.93 application was not required for their use.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting the complainant.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, alleging misapprehension of evidence, uneven scrutiny of Crown and defence evidence, and erroneous reliance on the complainant's apparent lack of animus.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's memory and exculpatory text messages, applied an uneven standard of scrutiny to the evidence, and improperly used the complainant's apparent lack of animus to bolster her credibility.

These errors, in their cumulative effect, detrimentally impacted the reasoning process and rendered the conviction unsafe.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault after striking the complainant, causing severe brain injuries.

He appealed his conviction on five grounds, primarily challenging the trial judge's self-defence analysis, including misapprehension of evidence, defensive purpose, reasonableness of actions, and application of R. v. W.(D.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the appellant's actions were not reasonable in the circumstances, particularly considering his role in initiating the confrontation and available alternatives.

The appellant appealed his conviction, primarily challenging the lawfulness of a strip search conducted in the presence of a female officer, arguing it violated his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that exigent circumstances justified the female officer's continued involvement during the appellant's violent resistance, and that the evidence obtained from the search was admissible.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and sought leave to appeal his eight-year sentence.

The conviction appeal raised two issues: whether the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by using a 911 call to corroborate Crown evidence, and whether the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of the time required to stash a firearm and move a vehicle.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge double-counted breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or sentencing approach.

The accused, K.L., brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay in a sexual assault and exploitation case.

The total delay was 20 months and 13 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Crown argued the delay was an exceptional circumstance due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the case's complexity (novel defence argument, s. 276 application).

The court found the Crown failed to demonstrate reasonable steps to mitigate the nine-month delay in providing initial disclosure.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments regarding complexity and the pandemic as a blanket excuse, concluding the delay was unreasonable and staying the charges against the accused.

The appellant, S.S., appealed a Superior Court decision that denied him a preliminary inquiry.

S.S. was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, offences whose maximum penalties were increased after the alleged commission date but before his election.

The central issue was whether entitlement to a preliminary inquiry under s. 535 of the Criminal Code, which requires an offence punishable by 14 years or more, should be determined by the penalty at the time of the offence or at the time of the election.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the relevant maximum penalty is that which applied at the time of the offence, benefiting the accused under s. 11(i) of the Charter and s. 43(d) of the Interpretation Act.

The court also rejected the appellant's attempt to waive his Charter right to the lesser punishment to qualify for a preliminary inquiry.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and sought leave to appeal his life sentence.

The Court of Appeal found two fundamental errors in the trial: an erroneous instruction to the jury on reasonable doubt that reversed the onus, and an error in admitting statements made by the appellant to police in violation of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The court allowed the conviction appeal, set aside the conviction and aggravated assault finding, and ordered a new trial.

The sentence appeal was not reached.

The defendant brought a motion to deny standing to the complainant's counsel at a section 278.94 hearing, arguing that a prior Superior Court declaration of unconstitutionality in R. v. Reddick was binding on the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court rejected this argument, holding that ordinary principles of stare decisis apply to section 52 declarations and that a Superior Court declaration does not bind courts of coordinate jurisdiction.

The court found that the defendant must file a proper Notice of Constitutional Question to challenge the constitutionality of the section 278.94 procedure.

The motion was dismissed and the complainant's counsel was granted standing.

The offender, a 31-year-old first-time offender, was found guilty of sexual assault after forcing the complainant to have vaginal intercourse twice.

The Crown sought 28 months' custody, while the defence sought 14 to 18 months followed by probation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the highly aggravating circumstances of the major sexual assault and the offender's lack of remorse, while acknowledging his lack of prior record.

The offender was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary along with ancillary orders.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and appealed on four grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal on the ground that the trial judge materially misapprehended two aspects of the appellant's testimony, which significantly impacted the judge's credibility findings.

The court found that these misapprehensions were sufficiently material to warrant a new trial.

The other grounds of appeal, concerning a Section 11(b) Charter violation, restrictions on cross-examination of prior sexual activity under Section 276 of the Criminal Code, and the Crown's re-election to proceed by summary conviction, were dismissed.

A new trial was ordered.