Stay of proceedings

Accuride Canada Inc. sought an initial order under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) due to insolvency, exacerbated by declining demand, increased costs, and the withdrawal of financial support from its U.S. parent, Accuride Corp, which had commenced Chapter 11 proceedings.

The Applicant's London Plant had been unprofitable for over a decade.

The Applicant requested a 10-day stay of proceedings to explore a going concern transaction or an orderly wind-down, along with approval for interim financing (Intercompany Loans secured by an Intercompany Charge), an Administration Charge, a Directors' Charge, and authority to make pre-filing payments to critical third-party suppliers.

The court granted the initial order, finding the Applicant met the CCAA requirements for insolvency and jurisdiction, and that the requested relief was appropriate and necessary to stabilize operations and preserve stakeholder value during the initial stay period.

The Court of Appeal heard motions in an appeal concerning the receivership of a debtor's property.

The appellant, a successful bidder, appealed two lower court orders that terminated its Stalking Horse Agreement and approved the debtor's refinancing transaction.

The motion judge referred several issues to a panel, including the appellant's standing and right to appeal, and whether the lower court erred in terminating the agreement and granting provisional enforcement.

The Court of Appeal continued the stay of provisional execution of the lower court orders, emphasizing the importance of maintaining the integrity of court-approved sale processes, especially given the absence of reasons from the motion judge for his initial decision.

The applicant, charged with an owner liability red-light camera offence under the Highway Traffic Act, brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of her s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The respondent argued that s. 11(b) did not apply to such offences or, alternatively, that the delay was reasonable.

The court found that s. 11(b) does apply to these quasi-criminal proceedings, as they possess the indicia of criminal prosecutions and the penalties are penal in nature.

However, upon calculating the delay, the court determined that the net delay, after accounting for defence delay, fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

Consequently, the applicant's motion was dismissed.

The applicant, J.Y., charged with sexual assault and mischief, sought a stay of proceedings for one sexual assault count (count 11) on the grounds of abuse of process.

The applicant argued that police assurances of no charge led him to participate in a College of Massage Therapists of Ontario (CMTO) disciplinary process, providing information that was later disclosed to the Crown and complainant, compromising his right to silence and trial fairness.

He also cited unreasonable pre-charge delay.

The court found a significant impairment of the applicant's right to a fair trial and that the state's reversal of its decision not to charge, without new evidence, undermined the integrity of the judicial process.

Finding no alternative remedy, the court granted the stay of proceedings for count 11.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent for "over 80" due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The delay was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The summary conviction appeal judge (SCAJ) found the Crown had not taken reasonable steps to mitigate delay by accepting consecutive trial dates instead of exploring earlier non-consecutive ones.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the SCAJ erred by failing to defer to the trial judge's assessment of local circumstances and the reasonableness of the Crown's actions in managing the pandemic-induced backlog.

The Court clarified that the heightened urgency for scheduling retrials (as per MacIsaac) does not apply to initial trials delayed by exceptional circumstances like COVID-19.

The stay of proceedings was set aside, and the conviction restored.

The accused, Ewan Smith, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated end of trial was 629 days.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, attributing 57 days to defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 572 days, which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Provincial Court.

The Crown argued for exceptional circumstances due to COVID-19 related delays in scheduling a judicial pre-trial and a Blitz Court date.

The court found 10 days of delay for the judicial pre-trial and 44 days for the Blitz Court date were deductible as exceptional circumstances attributable to the pandemic backlog.

With these deductions, the remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed as the defence failed to demonstrate the delay was unreasonable.

The accused, Richard Flaumenbaum, applied to stay proceedings for assault and sexual assault, alleging a violation of his Charter section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 22 months and 8 days, exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling for provincial court.

The court analyzed periods of delay, attributing significant portions to late Crown disclosure of crucial evidence (complainant's second videotaped statement and legible SAEK notes) and institutional delay due to lack of court time.

The defence's mid-trial Mills application was deemed legitimate and not defence delay.

After deducting 29 days for defence delay (late arrival at JPT) and 60 days for an exceptional circumstance (Crown counsel's illness), the net delay remained 19 months and 6 days.

The court found a Charter violation and entered a stay of proceedings.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal from convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court emphasized the high enforceability interest due to the seriousness of the sexual offences against a child in a position of trust, and found the grounds of appeal to be weak, thus outweighing the reviewability interest.

The defendants brought a second set of pre-trial motions seeking a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, recusal of prosecutors, declarations of Charter violations, and various disclosure orders.

The motions alleged prosecutorial and investigative misconduct, including failure to disclose relevant case law, prejudicial filing of witness statements, and late disclosure of a police statement.

The court dismissed the motions for a stay, recusal, and prevention of new witnesses.

It also largely denied the disclosure requests, finding no merit in the misconduct allegations and that most requested items were matters for cross-examination.

The appellant, Jack Stelwagen, appealed his sexual assault conviction on the ground of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had dismissed the s. 11(b) application, finding no breach.

The appellate court found that the trial judge made several analytic and computational errors in assessing defence delay and exceptional circumstances under the R. v. Jordan framework.

Specifically, the trial judge incorrectly attributed significant periods of systemic delay (due to judicial unavailability and per diem judge scheduling issues) to the defence or as exceptional circumstances.

The appellate court recalculated the delay, finding that after subtracting only two weeks of defence delay and approximately seven months of COVID-19 related exceptional circumstances, the total delay of approximately 19 months and 1 week still exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the appellant's s. 11(b) Charter rights, quashed the conviction, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of their s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by establishing exceptional circumstances, as the delay was primarily due to the Crown's failure to properly assess and streamline the co-accused prosecution, rather than case complexity or the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consequently, all charges against the applicants were stayed.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging an infringement of the right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, calculating the total delay and subtracting the period attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic as a discrete exceptional circumstance.

The remaining delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

Consequently, the court found no infringement of the applicant's Charter rights and dismissed the application for a stay.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to an alleged infringement of his s. 11(b) right to a speedy trial.

The total delay from the information to the anticipated trial conclusion was 1,120 days.

The court deducted 349 days for defence-caused delay and 140 days for COVID-19 related exceptional circumstances.

The resulting net delay of 631 days (20.74 months) exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court matters.

The Crown failed to demonstrate sufficient mitigation efforts for the post-COVID reopening delay.

Consequently, the court granted a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, Ernest Gyamfy, brought a Section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 701 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court deducted 59 days for defence delay related to retaining counsel but found no other defence delay.

The Crown argued for deductions based on Covid-19 and case complexity as exceptional circumstances.

The court found that Covid-19 did not cause any actual delay in this specific case, nor was the case particularly complex.

The court also noted that the Crown could have remedied the delay caused by the co-accused's inaction by severing the accused.

As the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, the court found a breach of the applicant's Section 11(b) rights and stayed the charges.

The accused, G.S., brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 635 days, exceeding the 18-month (547-day) presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The court deducted 14 days conceded by the defence and a further 72 days for defence-requested adjournments for resolution discussions post-Judicial Pre-Trial (JPT), finding this delay directly attributable to the defence.

The court also recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance, deducting 20 days for administrative scheduling policy changes and an additional 90 days for the systemic backlog's impact on court resources in Scarborough.

After these deductions, the net delay was calculated at 439 days, falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the Crown had taken reasonable steps to mitigate delay and that the defence had not demonstrated sustained efforts to expedite proceedings.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, A.S., brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay was 40 months and 15 days.

The court applied the Jordan framework, determining the presumptive ceiling was 30 months due to the matter having been in Superior Court.

After subtracting defence-caused delay (3 months and 27 days), the net delay was 36 months and 18 days.

The court found that the remaining delay of 33 months and 13 days (after deducting 3 months and 5 days for COVID-19 impact) exceeded the presumptive ceiling and was not justified by exceptional circumstances, including the Crown's decision to add indictable charges and then consent to re-election without a waiver.

The application for a stay of proceedings was granted.

The applicant, charged with firearm offences, brought a Charter application alleging unlawful detention, unreasonable search, and excessive force by police, seeking exclusion of evidence (a firearm) or a stay of proceedings.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the police had objectively reasonable grounds for investigative detention to prevent interference with a search warrant execution.

It was determined that no search occurred as the firearm fell from the applicant during a lawful struggle to gain control.

The court also found that rights to counsel were provided as soon as reasonable, and the force used (a "football tackle" and subsequent strikes) was objectively reasonable given the immediate danger posed by an unsecured firearm and the applicant's resistance.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging an infringement of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from the charge date to the anticipated trial conclusion was 27 months and 12 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay, attributing 16 months and 18 days to the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional discrete event.

After deducting this period, the remaining delay was approximately 11 months, falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found no evidence that the applicant took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it should have, concluding that the delay was primarily due to the unprecedented system-wide impact of the pandemic.

Consequently, the applicant's motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, Tuan Bui, applied for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 20 months and 14 days (622 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found a significant, unexplained 15-month delay in disclosure by the Crown, which was not excused by the COVID-19 pandemic or the alleged complexity of the case.

The court also determined that periods of defence unavailability did not cause the delay.

Consequently, the charges against the accused were stayed.

The Crown appealed a lower court's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had stayed the proceedings after a mid-trial family emergency caused an adjournment, attributing the subsequent delay to the Crown's failure to consent to a "mistrial" or continuation before another judge.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in law by misattributing the delay, as the judge's emergency was an exceptional circumstance, and neither striking a "not guilty" plea nor continuing the trial before a new judge was a legally available option once evidence had been heard.

The court emphasized that an adjournment was the only permissible remedy.

The appeal was granted, and a new trial is ordered.