Second degree murder

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder after stabbing his intimate partner 21 times.

The Crown sought a 16-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 13 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the attack, the offender's prior assault on the victim, and his criminal record as aggravating factors.

However, the court also weighed the offender's early guilty plea, remorse, and cooperation with police as mitigating factors.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 14 years.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, attempted murder, and firearms offences following a public shooting at a shopping mall.

The offender fired at an intended target but missed, instead striking and killing an innocent bystander.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 14 years for the murder, alongside concurrent sentences of 12 years for attempted murder and 8 years for the firearms offences.

The court rejected the application of the rule against multiple convictions for the attempted murder charge, noting the offences involved different victims.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to adduce the video recorded police statement of a deceased witness in a second-degree murder trial.

The defence opposed the application, arguing the statement lacked threshold reliability and could not be cross-examined.

The court found the statement met the test for procedural reliability under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, noting adequate substitutes for cross-examination such as hallway video footage and the solemnity of the interview.

The application was granted and the statement was ruled admissible.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for beating his wife to death with a metal mallet.

The court considered the brutal nature of the offence and the fact that the victim was his intimate partner and caregiver as significant aggravating factors.

The offender's major depressive disorder with psychotic features, his lack of prior criminal record, and his admissions to police were considered mitigating factors.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 14 years.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing his brother to death following a dispute over a loan.

The court considered the mandatory life sentence and determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

Weighing numerous aggravating factors, including the unprovoked nature of the attack outside the home and the presence of the victim's wife, against mitigating factors such as the offender's lack of a prior record and refugee background, the court fixed the period of parole ineligibility at 13 years.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of a known third-party suspect.

The Crown opposed, arguing there was no air of reality to the proposed evidence.

The court applied the sufficient connection test and found that, taking the proposed evidence at its highest, there was an air of reality linking the third party to the shooting.

The application was granted, allowing the defence to cross-examine Crown witnesses and lead evidence regarding the alternative suspect.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder following a shooting at a nightclub.

The accused admitted to shooting the deceased but claimed self-defence, arguing he feared for his life due to the deceased's history of violence and gang affiliation.

The court rejected the self-defence claim, finding the accused's response unreasonable given his role in instigating the confrontation and introducing a concealed firearm.

The court also rejected the partial defence of provocation, finding the accused did not lose self-control.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The accused was charged with second degree murder after brutally beating a 75-year-old woman on a walking trail.

The accused admitted to causing the victim's death but argued he lacked the requisite intent due to extreme intoxication from consuming magic mushrooms and marijuana.

The court rejected the defence of non-mental disorder automatism, finding no psychiatric evidence to support it.

The court concluded that the accused's coordinated actions before, during, and after the attack, along with the targeted and severe nature of the blows, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless as to whether death ensued.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The Crown's case was wholly circumstantial, relying on evidence of animus, opportunity, means, and post-offence conduct.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, engaging in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence to determine if reasonable inferences of guilt could be drawn.

The court concluded that the cumulative evidence could support a reasonable inference that the applicant was the shooter, and dismissed the application.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for the brutal beating of an 82-year-old woman during a home invasion.

The Crown sought 18 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years, citing the offender's Aboriginal background, mental illness, and the jury's recommendation.

The court found the offender posed a significant danger and set the base parole ineligibility at 18 years.

However, the court found that the 27 months the offender spent in administrative segregation constituted a gross violation of his s. 12 Charter rights against cruel and unusual treatment.

As a remedy, the court reduced the parole ineligibility period by 27 months, resulting in a final period of 15 years and 9 months.

The accused, a First Nations man charged with second-degree murder, applied for bail.

The Crown conceded the primary ground but opposed release on the secondary and tertiary grounds, citing the strength of the case, the gravity of the offence, and the accused's poor attitude during his police interview.

The court found the proposed sureties, the accused's uncle and aunt, were adequate to supervise him under strict house arrest conditions.

Applying the Gladue factors and the St. Cloud framework, the court concluded that detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

Bail was granted with strict conditions including electronic monitoring via cameras.

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder for shooting his father and subsequently attempting to burn the body.

The Crown sought 15 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 12 years, citing the offender's guilty plea, remorse, and significant rehabilitative efforts while in custody.

The court weighed the aggravating factors, including the domestic nature of the killing and the indignities to the body, against the mitigating factors.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 13 years.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, challenged the validity of a telewarrant to search his home and the admissibility of his statement to police.

The court found the Information to Obtain contained sufficient reliable evidence for the issuing justice to grant the warrant.

The court also held that the accused's statement was voluntary, as he possessed an operating mind despite his references to demons and curses, and that his rights to silence and counsel under ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter were not breached.

Both applications to exclude evidence were dismissed.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder after brutally stabbing the victim following a day of drinking.

The Crown sought 15 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the mandatory minimum of 10 years.

The court weighed the offender's difficult background as a refugee and his efforts at self-improvement against the brutal nature of the prolonged attack and his failure to seek medical help for the victim.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 13 years, along with DNA and firearms prohibition orders.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after stabbing the victim 34 times in his basement.

The defence conceded the accused killed the victim but argued he was not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code due to severe paranoid delusions and schizophrenia.

The court found the accused suffered from a disease of the mind but rejected the NCR defence, concluding the defence failed to prove the delusions caused the killing or rendered the accused incapable of knowing the act was morally wrong.

The court also excluded similar fact evidence of the accused's prior violence against women.

Finding a reasonable doubt on the element of forcible confinement required for first-degree murder, the court convicted the accused of second-degree murder.

In a second‑degree murder prosecution, the accused brought a motion to exclude proposed in‑dock identification evidence from a Crown witness.

The witness first identified the accused approximately ten and a half months after the homicide during testimony at another individual’s preliminary inquiry, after seeing the accused’s photograph in media reports following his arrest.

The identification arose through leading questions and occurred in circumstances suggesting contamination and suggestion.

The court held that the identification did not qualify as reliable recognition evidence and had no meaningful probative value while posing a substantial risk of prejudice.

Exercising its discretion, the court excluded the evidence from the jury.

A young person pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was to be sentenced under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The principal issue was the appropriate credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The Crown sought reduced credit prior to the guilty plea while the defence sought one‑for‑one credit for all time served.

The court held that absent exceptional circumstances youth courts should not reduce credit below one‑for‑one and found none present in the case.

The court imposed the statutory maximum youth sentence for second degree murder, with one‑for‑one credit for pre‑sentence custody, followed by conditional supervision.

The Crown sought certiorari and mandamus to review a preliminary inquiry decision that committed two accused to trial for second‑degree murder rather than first‑degree murder and discharged another accused.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence and improperly rejected inferences supporting constructive first‑degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code based on unlawful confinement.

The reviewing court held that the justice committed a jurisdictional error by failing to address evidence of unlawful confinement of a second victim, which could support first‑degree murder within the same transaction.

Mandamus issued requiring committal of two respondents to trial for first‑degree murder.

The application regarding the third respondent was dismissed because the justice properly applied the limited weighing permitted for circumstantial evidence and committed no jurisdictional error.

Following a jury conviction for second degree murder of the offender’s spouse, the court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 15 years while the defence argued for 10 to 12 years.

Applying ss. 718–718.2 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code and considering comparable jurisprudence, the court assessed aggravating factors including the brutal domestic killing, breach of trust, and the victim’s defensive injuries, as well as mitigating factors such as the offender’s lack of criminal record and positive community reputation.

The jury’s recommendation of 15 to 20 years was considered but not followed.

The court fixed the parole ineligibility period at 13 years.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry committal to trial for first degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, arguing there was no evidence the killing occurred while committing or attempting to commit sexual assault.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence suggesting a sexual motive, including prior romantic interest, communications between the parties, and statements made during a “Mr. Big” undercover operation.

The court held that while there was some evidence the accused murdered the deceased, the evidence did not reasonably support an inference that the murder occurred in connection with a sexual assault.

The preliminary inquiry judge therefore exceeded jurisdiction by committing the accused to trial for first degree murder.

The committal was quashed and the matter remitted with direction to commit the accused to trial for second degree murder.