Kenneth Marley

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder after stabbing his intimate partner 21 times.

The Crown sought a 16-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 13 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the attack, the offender's prior assault on the victim, and his criminal record as aggravating factors.

However, the court also weighed the offender's early guilty plea, remorse, and cooperation with police as mitigating factors.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 14 years.

The accused were charged with numerous offences related to dog fighting, firearms, and drug trafficking.

They brought a pre-trial application seeking a stay of proceedings, arguing their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The total time from charge to the anticipated end of trial was calculated at 30 months and 28 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the delay was primarily caused by late disclosure and the Crown's ill-advised decision to join a co-accused late in the proceedings.

Finding no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay, the court granted the application and stayed all charges.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a commercial fishing corporation on four strict liability charges relating to inaccurate logbooks and Daily Catch Reports submitted by its vessel captain.

The trial judge had acquitted the corporation on the basis of due diligence, finding there was little more the owner could have done from shore.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by applying an incorrect standard of care and failing to consider what a proper system of compliance would entail.

The court found the corporation's blind trust in a captain with a known history of non-compliance did not amount to due diligence.

Convictions were entered and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, arson causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, failing to stop for police, and arson of a dwelling after dousing individuals with gasoline during a violent altercation.

The court rejected the accused’s testimony under the R. v. W. (D.) credibility framework and accepted the eyewitness evidence that the accused intentionally poured gasoline on the complainant and another individual.

However, the court held the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally ignited the complainant, noting multiple possible ignition sources and uncertainty about how the fire began.

The accused was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of arson causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, failing to stop for police, and arson of a dwelling, as well as the included offence of simple assault relating to the second complainant.

During a criminal trial involving allegations of attempted murder, arson causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, and flight from police, the Crown sought to admit a statement made by the complainant identifying the accused shortly after being burned in a house fire.

The statement was relayed through a neighbour and tendered under the res gestae or spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

The defence challenged admissibility based on the complainant’s intoxication, inconsistencies in witness recollection, and the Crown’s failure to comply with procedural rules governing pre-trial applications.

The court held the statement was sufficiently reliable and contemporaneous with the traumatic event to meet the res gestae exception, and that the procedural non-compliance caused no prejudice to the defence.

Leave was granted to hear the late application and the hearsay statement was admitted, though the court cautioned that its weight might be reduced due to the complainant’s intoxication.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon (a truck) against his domestic partner, assault causing bodily harm against a fellow inmate, and driving over 80.

The Crown and defence jointly proposed a sentence of 46.5 months (including pre-sentence custody credit) followed by three years of probation.

The court accepted the joint submission but had to decide two contested issues: whether to impose a no-contact order with the domestic partner despite her wish to maintain the relationship, and whether to order restitution to insurance companies.

The court imposed the no-contact order to protect the victim and her children, prioritizing public safety over her autonomy, but declined to order restitution due to the accused's inability to pay and the uncertainty of the amounts.

The accused was convicted of multiple counts of drug trafficking (heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine) and simple possession after concealing the drugs in his anal cavity.

The accused had a significant prior criminal record for drug trafficking and showed no remorse or effort toward rehabilitation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the accused to a global term of 10 years' incarceration, reduced to 7 years, 3 months, and 24 days after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court also ordered a lifetime weapons prohibition, forfeiture of seized property, and a DNA sample.

The accused was charged with theft of a motor vehicle over $5,000, uttering threats to cause death, and operating a motor vehicle while disqualified.

The only contested issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator.

Although the court treated the in‑dock eyewitness identifications as unreliable and gave them little weight, it relied on circumstantial evidence including the accused’s clothing, physical condition, proximity to the crash scene, the presence of pliers used to break the vehicle window, the absence of footwear, and the timing of police pursuit and arrest.

Considering the totality of the circumstantial evidence, the court found the Crown had proven identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, charged with multiple offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for possession of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking, brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of drug evidence discovered while he was detained in a police “dry cell.” Police had obtained a general warrant under s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code authorizing detention until the accused passed drugs concealed in his anal cavity.

The accused argued that the warrant and the delay in bringing him before a justice violated ss. 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter and s. 503 of the Criminal Code.

The court held the warrant was valid and that the “dry cell” detention constituted the least intrusive method available to recover the drugs given the accused’s concealment method.

Even if Charter breaches occurred, the court concluded the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) given the seriousness of the offences and police good faith.

The three accused were charged with robbery with a firearm and related offences.

At their jury trial, the sole Crown witness claimed complete memory loss.

The Crown sought to introduce her preliminary hearing transcript.

The trial judge ruled the transcript admissible but subject to strong Vetrovec warnings.

Recognizing the severe prejudice to the defence, who had elected a jury trial expecting to cross-examine the witness, the judge allowed the accused to re-elect a judge-alone trial, finding the Crown's refusal to consent to the re-election was an abuse of process.

Sitting as a judge alone, the trial judge found the witness's uncorroborated evidence insufficient and acquitted all accused.

The accused brought a Charter application under s. 24(2) seeking exclusion of drugs seized from his clothing during execution of a search warrant at a residence suspected of drug trafficking.

Police detained the accused after observing marijuana, cash, and a crack pipe in plain view, conducted a pat-down, and then performed a strip search based on prior knowledge that the accused concealed drugs on his person.

The accused argued the search was unconstitutional and that the resulting evidence should be excluded.

The court found the detention, arrest, and search were supported by reasonable and probable grounds and that the strip search was justified in the circumstances.

Even if there had been a breach, the evidence would not be excluded under the s. 24(2) analysis.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter seeking exclusion of evidence obtained during the execution of a telewarrant at his residence on drug trafficking charges.

The defence argued the telewarrant lacked sufficient grounds because it relied heavily on information from a confidential informant and contained an error regarding the accused’s vehicle.

The court applied the Debot framework assessing the compelling nature of the tip, the credibility of the source, and police corroboration.

Despite a mistake in the information to obtain, the court found the informant’s observations, partial corroboration by police records and surveillance, and prior reliability of the source sufficient to justify the warrant.

The court concluded the totality of the circumstances supported issuance of the telewarrant and refused to exclude the evidence.

Two accused were jointly charged with multiple drug trafficking and firearms offences following a police traffic stop and brief pursuit.

Controlled substances were discovered in plain view on the centre console of the vehicle, and a civilian witness observed the passenger discard a plastic bag containing a handgun nearby.

The court held that both accused had joint knowledge and control of the drugs and were guilty of possession and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The driver was convicted of fleeing police and dangerous driving but acquitted of the joint firearm offences due to reasonable doubt regarding knowledge of the firearm.

The passenger was found guilty of all firearm-related offences and possession while prohibited.