Anne London-Weinstein

The appellant appealed a lower court decision upholding a firearms officer's refusal to issue him a firearms licence.

The refusal was based on the appellant's history of mental health issues, including a diagnosis of schizophrenia and past psychotic episodes, as well as police reports of family conflict.

The appellant introduced fresh evidence of his current stability, employment, and discipline.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the lower court did not err in concluding the firearms officer's decision was reasonable given the legitimate concerns regarding public safety and the appellant's denial of his mental health history.

Following a family law trial where the applicant mother was largely successful on issues of primary parenting, residence, and decision-making, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondent father had some success on minor issues, and both parties had behaved unreasonably at times.

The court found the applicant was the largely successful party and awarded her costs of $13,895 on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant, a former provincial legislator charged with offences related to the Freedom Convoy protest, applied for a change of venue from Ottawa, arguing pervasive bias prevented a fair trial.

The Crown argued the court was bound by a prior coordinate decision denying a change of venue for another convoy participant.

The court found it was not bound by the prior decision due to significant differences in evidence, notably a targeted social media campaign against the applicant.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that existing procedural safeguards, including robust jury screening, were sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for two counts of causing a disturbance and one count of assault arising from two separate incidents at a Tim Horton's and a Walmart where he refused to wear a mask.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons and failed to analyze the essential elements of the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's oral reasons were adequate when read in the context of the evidence and submissions, and that the findings of guilt were supported by the evidence.

In a voir dire during a first-degree murder trial, the defence challenged the admissibility of the accused's utterances upon arrest and his formal police statement, alleging breaches of s. 10(b) of the Charter and lack of voluntariness.

The court found that a five-minute delay in providing the right to counsel upon arrest was justified by specific officer and public safety concerns.

The court also held that the accused's spontaneous utterances and his subsequent formal statement to police were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, despite the accused being a youthful Indigenous offender and the interviewing officer making ambiguous comments about the accused's integrity and future prospects.

The applicant mortgagee brought a motion for payment out of court of the proceeds from a municipal tax sale of a property.

The property was sold by the township for tax arrears, and the remaining funds of $94,444.92 were paid into court.

The court determined that the applicant had first priority as mortgagee and awarded it $78,528.35 for the mortgage, plus prejudgment interest and costs.

The respondent mortgagor was entitled to the residual amount of $8,986.33.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim and dismiss the action due to the plaintiff's failure to advance the litigation, including failing to attend an examination for discovery.

The plaintiff's counsel also sought to be removed from the record due to an irreparable breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship, as the plaintiff had retrieved its file and ceased communication.

The court granted the motion to remove counsel and gave the plaintiff 60 days to appoint new counsel or file a notice of intention to act in person, failing which the defendants could renew their motion to strike the claim.

The applicant, an alleged leader of the Freedom Convoy 2022, sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds.

He argued a material change in circumstances based on his five months in custody, health issues, and a new bail plan with four proposed sureties.

The court found a material change in circumstances and conducted a fresh review.

Despite the serious nature of the mischief and counselling charges, and new perjury charges arising from his first bail hearing, the court concluded that the proposed strict bail plan, which included relocating to Alberta and strong supervision by new sureties, adequately addressed the secondary and tertiary ground concerns.

The applicant was granted release on bail.

The applicant insurer brought an urgent motion to stay a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) order that denied an adjournment of an upcoming hearing, pending a judicial review application.

The applicant argued that denying the adjournment violated procedural fairness and the right to counsel of choice, as newly retained counsel was unavailable for the scheduled dates.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried but concluded the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm, noting other counsel from the firm might be available.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the respondent, who had been waiting for benefits.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The court determined costs following a motion and cross-motion regarding parenting time, child support, and financial disclosure.

Success was divided, with the moving party securing unsupervised parenting time and the responding party succeeding on issues of baby-proofing, COVID-19 protocols, child support, and financial disclosure.

Given the divided success and the moving party's failure to provide court-ordered financial disclosure, the court declined to order costs to either party.

The applicant, charged with human trafficking and sexual assault offences, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained.

The applicant proposed a new surety who worked from home and could provide 24/7 supervision without internet access.

The court found this constituted a material change in circumstances that addressed the original bail judge's concerns regarding the secondary ground.

The court also found the original judge erred by violating the presumption of innocence in assuming the applicant would not follow conditions simply because he was charged with human trafficking.

The court concluded that a strict release plan with the new surety and a GPS monitor addressed both secondary and tertiary grounds, and ordered the applicant's release.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of a known third-party suspect.

The Crown opposed, arguing there was no air of reality to the proposed evidence.

The court applied the sufficient connection test and found that, taking the proposed evidence at its highest, there was an air of reality linking the third party to the shooting.

The application was granted, allowing the defence to cross-examine Crown witnesses and lead evidence regarding the alternative suspect.

The Crown brought an application to remove the accused's counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The defence counsel's daughter and colleague had previously provided legal advice to the complainant upon her arrest for impaired driving.

The defence counsel intended to cross-examine the complainant using records from that impaired driving charge.

The court found that a solicitor-client relationship existed between the complainant and the firm, creating a clear conflict of interest.

The application was granted and counsel was removed to preserve the public perception of fairness in the administration of justice.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision detaining him on secondary and tertiary grounds for charges relating to domestic violence and firearms.

The reviewing judge found the bail judge erred in law by faulting the proposed sureties for not knowing about unproven allegations, effectively violating the presumption of innocence, and by failing to consider the strength of the Crown's case.

Conducting a de novo hearing, the reviewing judge found the proposed sureties were suitable and that the secondary and tertiary grounds did not justify detention.

The applicant was ordered released on bail.

Following a conviction for mischief, the Crown applied for a psychiatric assessment under s. 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code to determine if the accused was not criminally responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder.

The self-represented accused opposed the application.

The court reviewed a previous psychiatric report and the accused's trial testimony, which demonstrated persistent persecutory delusions.

The court found reasonable grounds to doubt the accused's criminal responsibility and ordered the assessment.

The self-represented accused, who is on the autism spectrum, sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on potential prejudice against persons on the autism spectrum.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan, the trial judge permitted the challenge, finding a reasonable possibility that bias or prejudicial attitudes exist in the community.

The judge also exercised her discretion to allow the accused and the Crown to alternate posing the challenge for cause questions to the jurors, departing from the general rule that the trial judge should pose the questions, in order to maintain the appearance of objective neutrality and accommodate the accused's strong preference.

The Crown sought to establish the voluntariness of statements made by the accused to police during a neighbourhood canvass and a subsequent interview at the police station.

The accused argued she was a suspect at the time of the interview and should have been cautioned.

The court found that, viewed objectively, the police did not have sufficient information to regard the accused as a suspect at that early stage of the investigation.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the lack of threats, promises, or oppression, the court ruled the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order on charges of robbery and failing to comply with a release order.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on the proposed surety's reduced work hours and the applicant's experience in custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Applying the Palmer criteria flexibly, the court admitted the fresh evidence and conducted a hearing de novo.

The court concluded that with two strong sureties and a GPS monitoring bracelet, the risk of re-offending or interfering with the administration of justice was sufficiently mitigated.

The applicant was granted bail on strict house arrest conditions.

In a murder trial where the Crown alleged the two accused killed the victim (the wife of one of the accused) to continue their affair, the Crown sought to introduce discreditable conduct evidence and hearsay statements of the deceased.

The court admitted statements made by the accused to a psychic regarding their hatred for the victim, finding the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect in a judge-alone trial.

The court also admitted the deceased's hearsay statements to a friend that she would not divorce, under the present state of mind exception, but excluded other statements regarding financial control and taking the children due to threshold reliability concerns.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder, the accused sought to introduce evidence of his co-accused's prior discreditable conduct involving knife attacks against her former spouse.

The accused argued this evidence supported his defence that the co-accused acted alone.

The co-accused opposed the admission, arguing it was highly prejudicial.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it sufficiently probative to the accused's right to make full answer and defence, and held that any prejudice to the co-accused could be mitigated by a limiting instruction in a judge-alone trial.