COURT FILE NO.: 22-30006-BR
DATE: 2022/06/27
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
– and –
Ralph Andre
Applicant
Rob Thompson, for the Crown
Elliott Willschick, for the Applicant
HEARD: June 20, 2022
Publication is banned pursuant to s. 517(1) and 520(9) of the Criminal Code with respect to the evidence of the offences alleged against the Applicant. Counsel may circulate these reasons, use them in court, and they may be published in Westlaw and similar legal publishing services.
Subject to any further Order by a court of competent jurisdiction, an Order has been made in this proceeding directing that the identity of the complainant and any information that could disclose such identity shall not be published in any document or broadcast in any way pursuant to section 486.4 of the Criminal Code of Canada
endorsement on bail review application
Anne london-weinstein j.
[1] Mr. Andre is charged with a number of offences related to allegations of involvement in a large-scale human trafficking project. He brings a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46.
[2] He is charged with sexual assault, sexual exploitation, procuring, and receiving a financial benefit from an offence under s. 286.1, contrary to s. 286.2 of the Criminal Code. He is also charged with trafficking for sexual services, advertising for sexual services for money, breaching his undertaking by communicating with JF, and breaching an undertaking by communicating with his co-accused Mr. Pierre Benson. He is also charged with trafficking JF. There are ten counts in total. The charges are obviously very serious.
[3] Mr. Andre is 23 years old and has no criminal record.
History of the Proceedings:
[4] A brief review of the history of this matter and the nature of the allegations is necessary to understand the reasons for the original detention order and the reason the matter was dismissed upon first review.
[5] The allegations are that Mr. Andre, Mr. Pierre Benson and Ms. JF were all arrested on Highway 401 at Kingston on August 28, 2021. Mr. Andre was charged with obstruction of justice at that time. He was released on an undertaking.
[6] Police seized false identifications relating to JF and a second female in the car. Condoms and a satchel of money were located in the back seat of the car. A third male, Mr. Samuel Augustin was also in the car. He is a school friend of both Mr. Benson and Mr. Andre.
[7] The car was stopped by police as Mr. Benson was alleged to be engaged in dangerous driving on the highway. There were open bottles of alcohol in the car and cups with alcohol in the vehicle.
[8] The allegations are that Mr. Andre invited the complainant, HT, to a party in Toronto in December of 2019. Instead of Mr. Andre picking her up, Mr. Benson picked her up took her to an Airbnb where he is alleged to have sexually assaulted her. Mr. Andre arrived the next day and took her to the Best Value Inn in Richmond Hill where he sexually assaulted her. He then is alleged to have arranged for her first male sexual client.
[9] There are receipts and credit card statements corroborating attendance at the hotel.
[10] Mr. Andre and Mr. Benson are alleged to have taken sexually explicit photos of HT and posted them on a site for sexual services. The complainant alleges she was forced to provide sexual services and Mr. Andre and Mr. Benson took all of the money.
[11] Mr. Benson returned her to Kingston. She was later picked up by Mr. Andre who took her to Toronto where she was introduced to Charles Jacquet. She was left with him at an Airbnb. Evidence from the Airbnb suggests that Mr. Benson paid for that accommodation.
[12] Mr. Jacquet is alleged to have forced HT to perform sexual services to customers and provide Mr. Jacquet with all the money.
The Original Bail Hearing:
[13] At the original bail hearing, the defence proposed 24-hour supervision of Mr. Andre by his father and stepmother with no access to phones or the internet. A $5,000 pledge was offered. They live with their 11-year-old son and Mr. Andre in a bungalow in L’Assomption, Quebec, outside of Montreal.
[14] However, the bail judge had several criticisms of that plan. She was troubled by the fact that the allegations occurred while Mr. Andre was living with his parents. She was also concerned about the parents’ inability to prevent Mr. Andre from accessing the internet. She was concerned that if Mr. Marcel Andre took Mr. Ralph Andre to work with him, as proposed, that Mr. Ralph Andre might be able to access the internet by conning persons at his father’s work who may be unaware of his conditions. She was also concerned that his 11-year-old brother may be manipulated by Mr. Ralph Andre into letting him use the internet.
[15] His stepmother, Ms. Timolus, indicated that Mr. Ralph Andre has a computer in his room. Her evidence contradicted her husband in regard to her having an iPad. The court was troubled that either Mr. Marcel Andre did not know about his son’s computer and his wife’s iPad or was misleading the court.
[16] The court also took issue with the evidence of the parents as proposed sureties in relation to the issue of cell phones in the home. Mr. Marcel Andre referred to just three cell phones. Ms. Timolus testified there were five phones in the house. The court noted “Again, these differences about this important part of the release plan seems troubling.”
[17] The sureties’ evidence also contradicted each other as to when the youngest son has access to his computer.
[18] The court found that in other circumstances this contradiction would not be significant, but “in these circumstances, it is certainly noteworthy and again, undermines the weight and reliability of Mr. Andre Sr.’s evidence.” The court found that the cumulative effect of these conflicts in the evidence of the sureties about the potential access Mr. Ralph Andre could have to the internet was aggravating.
[19] The court also took issue with Mr. Marcel Andre indicating his son might continue his online courses which would defeat the purpose of a ban on internet access.
[20] The court found that Ms. Timolus’ role in the plan of supervision would be much less than that of her husband because of her work schedule. The court found that there might be problems with her understanding her son’s conversations in English since she did not speak the language and the relevant messages in evidence were in English.
[21] The Crown in this bail review has described the original plan as being a superior plan to the one currently offered, with the highest possible level of supervision. With respect, I do not agree. The original bail judge took issue with the credibility of the original sureties and pointed to many problems the court perceived with the original plan. In the case before me, none of those problems are apparent. There is a new surety, Ms. Natalie Di Lallo, 24/7 supervision at home, and consistent, uncontradicted evidence that all electronic devices will be kept away from Mr. Andre. The surety speaks and reads in English, which was a concern articulated by the bail judge.
[22] The court noted that the family has “come a long way since they immigrated here from Haiti.” The court noted that Mr. Marcel Andre has obviously been very committed to his son Ralph Andre all of these years.
[23] However, the court found that the seriousness of the allegations of human trafficking indicated a “lack of understanding about the extent to which his son was leading a double life that he had no knowledge of even though a good number of these offences occurred and that the trafficking continued under his own roof.”
[24] The court was troubled by the fact that Ralph Andre did not tell his parents about his charges in Kingston: “While I appreciate that Ralph is an adult, adult children living with their families usually are more engaged with their parents with exactly what is going on within their life if it is indeed a positive thing.” When Mr. Marcel Andre testified that as a surety it would be his job to make sure he knew what was going on at all times with his son, the court was unconvinced. The court found that “The bottom line is they [the parents] do not appear to be close in terms of being open about problems or [their] son’s activities.”
[25] The court found that Mr. Andre had not met his onus on the secondary grounds, that is the substantial likelihood of his reoffending. The court made the following observations about Mr. Andre:
• He is very resourceful as demonstrated by the predatory and widespread nature of the offences, all hidden from his parents while he lived at home with them, some of which are alleged to have occurred in their home.
• Mr. Andre demonstrated that he worked with Mr. Benson in forcing HT into the sex trade in early December. He and Mr. Benson told her they knew where she lived – “This implies direct cause to fear, not only for herself, but also for her dog and her roommate.” Mr. Andre picked her up and took her to Mr. Jacquet in Toronto at an Airbnb. Mr. Jacquet used her in the sex trade. The court found it was a reasonable inference that Mr. Andre and Mr. Benson made the connection directly or indirectly with Mr. Jacquet and ordered for this transfer to occur.” Mr. Jacquet then passed HT off to Mr. Zamor-Louis at the end of December who then used her similarly. All of this occurred within a one-month period and shows how organized and interconnected these serious trafficking activities were, and also indicates how difficult it is for victims of human trafficking to escape and how difficult it is for human trafficking to be detected.
• The accused’s note to himself about “pimp pay” and the people he was associating with in Kingston and his involvement at this point based upon the allegations with two human trafficking victims, indicate a lifestyle that is so far removed from this parent’s lifestyle and so hidden from them.
• The accused’s conduct in obstructing the police in Kingston, “his blatant breach” of his undertaking and his use of other human beings as objects “speaks to a level of depravity and disregard for the law and life, which seriously calls into question his willingness, if not his ability to comply with any conditions the court might impose.”
• The plan of release will only be as good as the accused’s commitment. There is no reliable evidence that the accused will comply with the plan.
• “While the stepmother and father’s affidavit refers to his lawyer having spoken to the accused and having been told he will not jeopardize their position and respect his parents, the accused’s conduct in human trafficking and in conducting this human trafficking business from their residence are actions that speak much louder than these words. I put no weight on these hearsay statements in the circumstances of this case.”
• The younger brother of the accused who worships him would be vulnerable to manipulation by the accused. Anyone at the office or a family gathering could be vulnerable to manipulation by the accused.
• The victims in this case are very vulnerable: “These women get moved around the country and are controlled with significant degree by the men who are pimping them. The witness could be quickly lost.”
• The sureties were inconsistent in their evidence regarding phones and computers in the home.
• In terms of the tertiary ground, the Crown’s case is strong, the offence is grave, the circumstances of the offence are aggravating in that they are national in scope and involve numerous occasions and was for a lengthy period of time.
[26] Mr. Ralph Andre was detained originally on October 26, 2021. He remained in custody. Mr. Andre brought a bail review in front of my sister O’Bonsawin J. on December 14, 2021. O’Bonsawin J. found the proposed surety to not be credible and found there was no material change in circumstances. The surety was a girlfriend of Mr. Andre’s who worked and also had a small child. O’Bonsawin J. dismissed the application finding that there had been no material change in circumstances.
Analysis:
[27] The provisions in s. 520 do not confer an open-ended discretion on the reviewing judge to vary the initial decision concerning the detention or release of the accused. They establish not a de novo hearing, but rather a hybrid remedy. R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 328,
[28] Varying the initial decision is only appropriate in three circumstances:
Where there is admissible new evidence that shows a material change in the circumstances of the case;
Where the impugned decision contains an error of law; or
Where the decision is clearly inappropriate.
The Palmer Criteria:
[29] The criteria from Palmer v. The Queen, 1979 CanLII 8 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, are relevant to the issue of what constitutes fresh evidence on a s. 520 review. The court is to adopt an approach which reflects a generous and liberal interpretation of the meaning of new evidence within the context of a bail review: see R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 328, at para. 131.
[30] The four Palmer criteria, restated in St-Cloud at para. 128, are:
The evidence should generally not be admitted if by due diligence it could have been adduced at trial;
The evidence must be relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the trial;
The evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief and
It must be such that if believed, when taken with the other evidence adduced, be expected to have affected three result.
[31] In the context of a bail review, this fourth Palmer criteria is modified as “the new evidence must be such that is reasonable to think, having regard to all of the circumstances that it could have affected the balancing exercise engaged in by the original bail judge” and meets the other three criteria: see St-Cloud, at para. 137. In those circumstances the evidence should be admitted. A reviewing judge may consider evidence that is truly new, or evidence that existed at the time of the initial release hearing but was not tendered for some reason that is legitimate and reasonable: see St-Cloud, at para. 132. A generous and liberal interpretation of the meaning of new evidence in the context of s. 520 and s. 521 of the Criminal Code is consistent with the principles developed by the Supreme Court: see St-Cloud, at para. 131. Where the new evidence meets those four admissibility criteria, “the reviewing judge is authorized to repeat the analysis under s. 515(10)(c). as if he or she were the initial decision-maker.”: see St-Cloud, at para. 138.
[32] In this case, the new proposed surety testified she did not offer to be a surety earlier as she was not working at home at the time and would have been unable to offer Mr. Andre adequate supervision given the degree of supervision required.
[33] At present she works at home and will do so for the foreseeable future. I accepted her evidence on this issue. I found that the reason for not offering to be a surety at the original hearing was completely legitimate and reasonable in the circumstances and could not have been adduced earlier by due diligence.
[34] While I found that the reasons for this surety being offered so much later in the process was reasonable and that the evidence could not be adduced with due diligence earlier, I note that the Palmer test within the context of a bail review deals with a liberty interest of an accused person, and not merely the introduction of new evidence in a civil context.
[35] The addition of this new surety addresses the very concerns expressed by the bail judge, that being the offences occurred in the home of the proposed sureties without their knowledge and the lack of control over access to the internet. This is not merely the addition of a surety who does not change the strength of the plan, or “re-shuffling the deck”, as described by Hill J. in R. v. Ferguson, [2002] O.J. No. 1969 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 17. Unlike the surety offered at the first bail review, this surety is strong, works at home on a full-time basis, is of sufficient maturity to exercise control over the accused and inspires confidence that the terms of bail will be followed.
[36] The new proposed surety is ideally suited to supervise Mr. Andre. She works at one full-time and two part-time jobs at home. She has a 20-year-old son who is in school and also works on the weekend. He has no criminal record.
[37] She knows Mr. Andre through working with his father, Marcel Andre, and has met Mr. Andre on two prior occasions. She met Marcel Andre when he was working at a palliative care facility. Ms. Di Lallo’s father was dying, and Mr. Marcel Andre cared for him. She later came to know Mr. Marcel Andre better and does accounting data entry work for his accounting firm.
[38] Ms. Di Lallo was credible, candid and no-nonsense in her evidence.
[39] The plan involves 24-hour daily supervision in a house where the electronics are not only limited in number, but tightly controlled. This is important as Mr. Andre must have no access to the internet while existing in a world where the internet and online life is everywhere. A GPS monitoring bracelet will again be offered.
[40] Ms. Di Lallo said that she would treat Mr. Andre “like a purse” in that wherever she goes, he must go with her. I believe her. She testified that Mr. Andre has agreed to all of the conditions which are proposed. She is fully aware of the charges facing Mr. Andre. She is fully aware that this matter will take a long time to reach a conclusion.
[41] Ms. Di Lallo testified that Mr. Andre will not be permitted to have guests, nor will he be able to have access to the internet in any fashion. There are two computers and two cell phones in the house. Ms. Di Lallo testified that she works in the living room. Her son locks his door. Both Ms. Di Lallo and her son will keep their laptops and phones with them at all times in order that Mr. Andre not be able to access the internet. There are motion sensors on the doors, a doorbell with a camera and a glass breaking sensor on all of the windows. These security measures report a breach of security to the police station.
[42] Ms. Di Lallo pledges $15,000 cash and $5,000 as a general pledge. This is a significant amount of money for her.
[43] Ms. Di Lallo testified in a straightforward and credible manner. I accepted her evidence. There is no basis to reject her evidence that if Mr. Andre breaches the terms of his release that she would report him to the authorities.
[44] I found that the addition of such a strong surety constituted a material change in circumstances that relates directly to the grounds Hackett J. cited as concerning: access to internet and the fact that the offences occurred in the family home. The plan involves 24/7 supervision and no access at all to the internet, and is relevant to both the secondary and tertiary ground concerns articulated by Hackett J. I therefore found there was a material change in circumstances, it is appropriate for me to intervene and reconsider Mr. Andre’s bail application.
[45] Hackett J. also found that the accused would not follow court-imposed conditions based on the fact he was charged with human trafficking. I have further comments to make regarding that finding later in these reasons.
[46] Mr. Andre was fortunate to have access to a new surety. This new plan of bail goes to the very heart of the bail judge’s concerns on the secondary grounds. There will be no access to the electronic devices under this new plan, which concerned the bail judge. Further, while Ms. Di Lallo knows Mr. Andre and his family, she is at arms length from him. I have zero doubt that she will enforce the terms of bail imposed.
[47] I have found that the addition of a surety and a plan of bail that is very restrictive and also comprehensive is relevant not only to the secondary ground, but also to the tertiary ground analysis. The GPS bracelet is relevant to all three grounds. The certainty of detection if the bracelet is activated is relevant to the primary grounds and the secondary grounds. The GPS bracelet also enhances the perception of the strength of the plan in the eyes of a public who is aware of how our system of bail works, including the right to reasonable bail and the presumption of innocence.
[48] In R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, at para. 30, the Court explained that bail denial to maintain confidence in the administration of justice is not a mere “catch all” for cases where the first two grounds have failed. It represents a separate and distinct basis for bail denial not covered by the other two categories. The same facts may be relevant to all three heads. This does not negate the distinctiveness of the grounds.
[49] A reasonable person’s confidence in the administration of justice may differ depending on the terms of release being proposed when a person charged with a very serious offence is released on bail. The public may very well, for example, not lose confidence in the administration of justice upon learning that an individual charged with a serious offence was released with a number of appropriate and relevant conditions on a strict plan of release. However, that confidence may be undermined if the public were aware that an individual charged with a serious offence was released on a less rigorous form of release plan: see R. v. Dang, 2015 ONSC 4254, 21 C.R. (7th) 85, at para. 58.
[50] The conditions imposed by the court are directly relevant to public perception of the administration of justice. While conditions of release are relevant to secondary ground concerns, they are also relevant to tertiary ground concerns: see R. v. McGrath, 2019 ONSC 4033, at para. 22 and Dang, supra.
[51] In my view, the fact that Mr. Andre will now be living with Ms. Di Lallo who will work at home and supervise him is a material change in circumstances which could have impacted the initial weighing by the original justice.
[52] In fact, in addition to the comments in Hall, which clearly contemplate relevance to all three grounds, in St-Cloud, the Court indicated that all the circumstances of each case must be considered when applying s. 515(10)(c), paying particular attention to the four listed circumstances: see St-Cloud, at para. 87. However, the four listed circumstances are not exhaustive, and no single circumstance is determinative. The justice must consider the combined effect of all the circumstances of each case to determine whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice: see St-Cloud, at para. 87; see also Dang, at paras. 46-47, 55.
[53] In order to answer this question, the court must assume the perspective of the public, that is the perspective of a reasonable person who is properly informed about the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of this case: see St-Cloud, at para. 87.
[54] In short, an accused’s person’s release plan may be relevant to whether public confidence in the administration of justice is capable of being maintained: see R. v. B.(A). (2006), 2006 CanLII 2765 (ON SC), 204 C.C.C. (3d) 490 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 501.
[55] Relying on Dang, I have also considered the fact that the accused is just 23 years old, has no criminal record, a new and excellent surety with an extremely strong plan of release, and that he has spent seven months in custody with one-third of that time spent in lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. Di Lallo spoke to the accused and she is of the view that this long period of time in jail will encourage him to follow the court-imposed conditions and to listen to her. I believe she is correct in this regard.
[56] Having found that there is a material change of circumstances which could have impacted the original bail judge’s analysis, I will reconsider Mr. Omar’s bail application.
Bail Reconsideration:
[57] There were no concerns on the primary ground.
[58] In regard to the secondary ground, I was also conducted a s. 525 detention review for the co-accused in this matter, Mr. Pierre. In that matter, Mr. Pierre was alleged to have breached his house arrest conditions by texting Mr. Andre when prohibited from doing so. The alleged subject matter of those texts demonstrated evidence of involvement in a large-scale human trafficking enterprise.
[59] In the case of Mr. Pierre, I found that the plan of two sureties, house arrest and a GPS monitoring device offered a high level of supervision. However, the plan in that case left Mr. Pierre alone for several hours each day. The plan was insufficient to offset the secondary ground concerns. In that case, I indicated that if there were an older adult who could live with Mr. Pierre and supervise him that he could be released.
[60] It is not every case which requires such heavy supervision by a surety. In the case of Mr. Pierre and Mr. Andre, they fall into a category of cases requiring a high level of supervision. In Mr. Pierre’s case, he was alleged to have disobeyed his bail conditions while on house arrest. In Mr. Andre’s case, he is also alleged to have texted his co-accused when prohibited from doing so, and the alleged subject matter of those texts complicates matters for him as the Crown theory is that the texts are evidence of his involvement in a large-scale human trafficking enterprise.
[61] In the case of Mr. Andre, I was presented with a mature surety who is in an ideal situation to supervise Mr. Andre. Ms. Di Lallo is in her fifties and has a 20-year-old son. She works from home and offers an ideal environment of supervision. She is the surety who was missing from Mr. Pierre’s plan.
[62] Having reconsidered Mr. Andre’s release plan, I found that the addition of Ms. Di Lallo more than satisfactorily addressed the secondary ground concerns in this case. There is not a substantial likelihood that Mr. Andre will commit additional criminal offences or interfere with the administration of justice on this proposed plan.
[63] In regard to the tertiary ground set out in s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code, I am required to consider whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice having regard to all of the circumstances including:
i) The apparent strength of the Crown’s case;
ii) The gravity of the offence;
iii) The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used; and
iv) The fact that the accused is liable on conviction for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment, or in the case of an offence which involves, or whose subject matter is a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 3 years or more.
[64] The allegations appear to be supported by corroborating documentation. It must be remembered however, that when assessing the strength of the Crown’s case, it is at its zenith in terms of strength at a bail hearing. No witnesses have been cross-examined. I am also required to consider potential defences. In this case, after assessing the information available to me I would say that the Crown’s case appears strong, although it is not an overwhelming case. This factor favours detention.
[65] The offence of human trafficking and sexual assault are both grave in nature. Receiving a material benefit from sexual services has a maximum sentence of 10 years, procuring has a maximum sentence of 14 years and sexual assault has a maximum sentence of 14 years when prosecuted as an indictable offence. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence involve sexual assault and the exploitation of human beings in a sexual manner. In this case, the scale of the operation involves more than one individual, and appears to not be limited to Ontario, but British Columbia as well.
[66] This factor favours detention.
[67] Upon conviction, the accused is liable for a very lengthy term of imprisonment.
[68] While I must consider the enumerated grounds, I am also required to consider all relevant factors. It is also not automatic that detention be ordered where the statutory grounds favour detention: see St-Cloud, at para. 69.
[69] The release of an accused person is the cardinal rule and detention the exception: see R. v. Morales, 1992 CanLII 53 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, at p. 728.
[70] I reconsidered Mr. Andre’s bail in this case due to a material change in circumstances. The defence did not argue that an error had been made in the original bail hearing. However, some of the comments of the original bail judge are reflective of an error in reasoning.
[71] The entitlement to reasonable bail as guaranteed by the Charter is linked to one of the cornerstones of our criminal justice system which is the presumption of innocence. A bail judge must be satisfied that interim detention is truly justified having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case.
[72] The bail judge in the original hearing found that, despite the fact that at 23 he has no criminal record, Mr. Andre would not follow court orders based on the fact that he is charged with human trafficking. The bail judge did not tie her comments to the evidence before her, but made her findings based on the charge of human trafficking.
[73] For example, the bail judge concluded that the accused was resourceful based on the predatory nature of the offences. The court wrote that his use of other human beings as objects “speaks to a level of depravity and disregard for the law and life, which seriously calls into question his willingness, if not his ability to comply with any conditions the court might impose.”
[74] The presumption of innocence applies at all stages of a criminal proceeding, including bail: see R. v. Pearson, 1992 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, at p. 685; R. v. Antic, 2017 SCC 27, [2017] SCC 27, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 509, at paras. 1, 6. The Charter protected right to reasonable bail is linked to one of the cornerstones of our criminal justice system, the presumption of innocence. In the context of bail, the presumption must be interpreted in light of issues related to bail, including securing the attendance of the accused at trial, protection of the public, and public perception of the administration of justice.
[75] In finding that Mr. Andre would not follow court-imposed conditions based on the fact that he is charged with human trafficking, the bail judge violated the presumption of innocence to which all accused are entitled, no matter what charge they face.
[76] Secondly, the bail judge was heavily focussed on the fact that Mr. Andre allegedly committed these offences while living at home with his parents. The court opined that adult children are generally more open with their parents about what is going on in their lives if the parent-child relationship is positive.
[77] The family in this case immigrated from Haiti and worked diligently to establish a solid financial base. It is not surprising that if Mr. Ralph Andre were involved in the allegations before the court, he would conceal any criminality from his extremely pro-social and hard-working parents. It would be obvious to him that they would not approve as they are hard working, honest persons who are not involved in a criminal lifestyle.
[78] It is worth noting that many of these offences are alleged to have been facilitated online. Short of demanding access to their adult son’s electronic devices, it is difficult to see how the parents could be faulted for failing to discover what their son was allegedly concealing.
[79] Sureties are often people who are close to the accused. They are often subject to a form of catch-22 reasoning. If the surety did not know about the allegations, as in this case, they are faulted for being out of touch with the accused, a suggestion which militates against them being able to exert control over an accused. If there is evidence that they were aware of the allegations and were unable to stop it, they are faulted for appearing to condone criminal activity, or for being unable to deter the accused’s allegedly criminal behaviour. The history of the relationship between a parent and an adult child is relevant to the question of whether the parent will be able to adequately supervise the adult child. However, adult children sometimes conceal a criminal lifestyle from pro-social parents. The fact that an adult child was previously able to conceal his alleged criminal lifestyle from a parent who was naïve in trusting their child should not automatically disqualify a parent from being an effective surety. If there is evidence that the parent will be a diligent surety now that they are aware of the true state of affairs and aware that they can no longer place blind trust in the adult child, that evidence should not be dismissed without consideration. That the relationship will be altered by virtue of the parent now being equipped with the tools of a surety, with the leverage to revoke bail, is also a relevant factor to consider.
[80] In regard to the tertiary grounds, while the statutorily enumerated tertiary ground factors do favour detention, detention is not automatic even where all of the factors favour detention: see St-Cloud, at para. 69. In this case, given that Mr. Andre does not have a criminal record, that he has been in jail for seven months and locked down for one-third of it, that his trial dates are in mid February of 2023 and the excellence of the bail plan proposed, I am satisfied that a well informed and reasonable member of the public, conversant with our system of bail and Charter principles, and knowing that release is the rule and detention the exception in our system of bail, would not lose confidence in the administration of justice by the release of Mr. Andre on very strict conditions today.
Anne London-Weinstein J.
Released: June 27, 2022
COURT FILE NO.: 22-30006-BR
DATE: 2022/05/27
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
– and –
Ralph Andre
Applicant
endorsement on bail review application
Anne London-Weinstein J.
Released: June 27, 2022