S. Whitzman

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct—specifically, an incident of physical abuse against another child—to cross-examine the complainant's mother if she testified for the defence.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to the mother's credibility, not for propensity reasoning.

The court found the evidence constituted other discreditable conduct and applied the balancing test from R. v. L.B. The application was dismissed, as the potential prejudicial effect of distracting the jury with a collateral issue outweighed the weak probative value of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code because the Certificate of Analyst presented at trial contained a different lot number than the other documentation.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably relied on the totality of the evidence, including the qualified technician's testimony and a newly prepared certificate, to conclude the Crown proved the target value of the alcohol standard beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective and failed to object to inadmissible bad character evidence.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the Crown had improperly elicited highly prejudicial bad character evidence, including allegations of violence, misogyny, and homophobia, without seeking a ruling on its admissibility.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding that credibility was the central issue at trial and it was not apparent that the trial judge had disregarded the inadmissible evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of excess blood alcohol.

The trial judge had ruled that the qualified technician's viva voce evidence regarding the certification of the alcohol standard solution was hearsay and inadmissible without a Certificate of Analyst.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law.

The court held that the presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code can be proven by the viva voce evidence of an intoxilizer technician without the need to tender a certificate of an analyst.

A finding of guilt was entered.

The offender was convicted of sexually assaulting a 23-year-old patron at a male strip club where he worked as a dancer.

The victim had consumed alcohol but was not incapacitated.

The offender performed unprotected fellatio and vaginal intercourse on the victim despite her saying no.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought 12 to 15 months.

The court found the unprotected nature of the assault, the semi-public location, and the offender's persistence after being told no to be aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to two years less a day in custody, followed by 24 months of probation, and ordered to comply with SOIRA for 20 years.

The accused applied to exclude evidence of a marihuana grow operation discovered during a police search of his residence, alleging a violation of his rights under s. 8 of the Charter.

Police responded to a 911 call regarding a male and female fighting.

Upon arrival, the officer was told by a female occupant that her special needs son had made the call while playing with the phone.

The officer conducted a safety sweep of the residence to ensure all occupants were accounted for and safe, discovering marihuana plants in plain view in the furnace room.

The court found the safety sweep was objectively reasonable given the nature of the priority call and the lack of precise information, concluding there was no s. 8 breach.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

A spouse in a 30‑year common law relationship sought temporary spousal support following separation, alleging the respondent failed to make full financial disclosure and understated his income through a closely‑held corporation.

The respondent asserted a dramatic decline in business income and inability to pay support.

The court held that incomplete disclosure justified drawing an adverse inference and applying the Federal Child Support Guidelines methodology using the respondent’s three‑year average Line 150 income.

The court rejected the claimed current income and ordered temporary spousal support based on the historical income average, together with extensive disclosure obligations and valuation of the respondent’s business and income.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had found that the police failed to make the formal breath demand as soon as practicable under the Criminal Code, constituting a s. 8 Charter breach, but admitted the certificate of analysis under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the appellant argued that the failure to make the demand promptly should disentitle the Crown from relying on the presumption of identity and that the certificate should have been excluded.

The court held that the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) remains available even if the demand was not made as soon as practicable, and that the proper remedy for any breach lies under the Charter exclusion analysis.

Applying the Grant framework, the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence was entitled to deference and disclosed no error.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for dangerous driving under s. 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, arguing the trial judge erred in finding identity beyond a reasonable doubt and provided inadequate reasons.

The appellant contended the trial judge improperly relied on the contents of a telephone statement to establish identity and that the circumstantial evidence permitted other reasonable inferences.

The appeal court held there was sufficient independent evidence on a balance of probabilities to admit the statement and that, when combined with other circumstantial evidence, the only rational inference was that the appellant was the driver involved in the incident.

The court also found the trial judge’s reasoning was apparent from the record and adequate for appellate review.