D. Scapinello

The accused applied for a bail review after being detained on the secondary ground following a contested bail hearing.

The reviewing court found a material change in circumstances because the proposed bail plan was significantly different and stricter than the one presented below, including residence with both parents as sureties, strict supervision, and employment with the father.

The court conducted a fresh hearing and assessed detention under the secondary ground in s. 515(10)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Despite the accused’s criminal record and history of breaches, the court found the revised bail plan sufficiently mitigated the risk of reoffending or interference with the administration of justice.

The application was granted and the accused was released on strict conditions including house arrest and two sureties.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had found that the police failed to make the formal breath demand as soon as practicable under the Criminal Code, constituting a s. 8 Charter breach, but admitted the certificate of analysis under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the appellant argued that the failure to make the demand promptly should disentitle the Crown from relying on the presumption of identity and that the certificate should have been excluded.

The court held that the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) remains available even if the demand was not made as soon as practicable, and that the proper remedy for any breach lies under the Charter exclusion analysis.

Applying the Grant framework, the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence was entitled to deference and disclosed no error.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The primary issue was whether the Crown had proven that the breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” for the purpose of the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c)(ii).

The appellant argued that unexplained delays in preparing the Intoxilyzer and transferring custody undermined the presumption.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered the entire timeline and reasonably concluded that the delay was explained by necessary procedures including changing the alcohol standard solution and warming the machine.

The conviction was upheld.