S. Shikhman

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle while his blood‑alcohol level exceeded the legal limit.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting a Charter s. 10(b) claim, refusing disclosure of technical "COBRA" data relating to the approved instrument used to measure breath samples, and finding that missing maintenance records did not rebut the statutory presumption of accuracy under the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings, evidentiary rulings, and interpretation of the statutory presumption were supported by the evidence and consistent with applicable law.

The absence of maintenance records did not establish malfunction or improper operation of the approved instrument.

No reversible error was demonstrated.

The accused applied under ss. 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude drugs found in the trunk of a vehicle following his arrest for multiple counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The defence alleged the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds and argued that officers fabricated surveillance observations and notes after the arrest.

The court rejected the defence theory, finding that key allegations of fabrication were never put to the officers in cross‑examination contrary to the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

After reviewing the surveillance evidence, confidential informant information, and officer testimony, the court concluded that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and that the search of the vehicle was lawful as incidental to arrest.

The evidence of the accused and a co‑accused was rejected as improbable and inconsistent with the credible testimony of the officers.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice for three counts of sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the burden of proof and presumption of innocence, misapprehended the evidence, and applied a different standard of scrutiny to Crown and defence witnesses.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the principles in R. v. (W.D.) and was entitled to accept the complainant’s evidence and reject the accused’s evidence.

No material misapprehension of evidence or error in credibility assessment was established.

The court also found no error in the nine‑month concurrent sentences imposed within the joint submission range.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The primary issue was whether the Crown had proven that the breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” for the purpose of the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c)(ii).

The appellant argued that unexplained delays in preparing the Intoxilyzer and transferring custody undermined the presumption.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered the entire timeline and reasonably concluded that the delay was explained by necessary procedures including changing the alcohol standard solution and warming the machine.

The conviction was upheld.

The Crown brought pre-trial motions to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased to her daughter, and a statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for murder.

The court admitted the deceased's statements under the state of mind and principled exceptions to the hearsay rule, finding they were relevant to her fear of the accused and desire to separate, and possessed sufficient indicia of reliability.

The court also admitted the accused's statement to police; although the officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel by questioning him prematurely, the court found the subsequent spontaneous utterance was not tainted by the breach.