Second degree murder

On a bail application under s. 522 of the Criminal Code by an accused charged with second degree murder, the court held that detention was not justified on the secondary or tertiary grounds under s. 515(10).

The court gave significant weight to the accused's Indigenous background and the systemic and personal circumstances recognized by Gladue, while also finding that an unusually stringent release plan with multiple sureties, house arrest, abstinence conditions, and culturally appropriate supports adequately protected public safety.

The court further rejected the Crown's position that s. 515(2)(e) required a cash deposit because the accused was ordinarily resident in Ontario and within 200 kilometres of the place of custody.

Judicial interim release was granted on strict terms.

The appellant was charged with second degree murder.

At trial, he admitted guilt to manslaughter but argued he lacked the mental state for murder.

During deliberations, the jury asked the trial judge to explain the difference between manslaughter and second degree murder and to provide a specific definition of manslaughter.

The trial judge explained the difference lay in the mental state but declined to provide examples or a specific definition of manslaughter.

The jury convicted the appellant of second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge responded correctly to the jury's questions and there was no reasonable possibility the jury misunderstood what had to be proved for a conviction.

The appellant entered his estranged wife's apartment uninvited and discovered her in bed with her new boyfriend.

The appellant attacked them both, repeatedly stabbing and killing the boyfriend.

At trial, the judge accepted the defence of provocation and convicted the appellant of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the manslaughter conviction and substituted a conviction for second degree murder, finding no air of reality to the provocation defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the discovery of an estranged spouse's involvement with another person does not constitute an 'insult' within the meaning of section 232 of the Criminal Code, nor did the appellant's actions meet the requirement of suddenness.

The appellant was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown argued he was the sole perpetrator, while the defence suggested others were involved.

The trial judge initially instructed the jury that they must acquit if they had a reasonable doubt the appellant was the actual shooter.

Following a jury question, the judge amended the instruction to include liability if the appellant was 'otherwise an active participant'.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and appealed, arguing the amended instruction undermined trial fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions adequately conveyed the alternate routes to liability and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder based largely on the testimony of a jailhouse informant who claimed the accused admitted to wiping down the crime scene to remove DNA.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning but failed to mention the informant's potential motives to lie, such as a reward and pending charges.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial due to the inadequate warning.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, and the accused sought to introduce fresh DNA evidence showing his DNA on additional items in the room, contradicting the wiping down theory.

The Supreme Court admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably have affected the jury's assessment of the informant's credibility, and dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming the order for a new trial.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder following a third trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of prior consistent statements admitted during the re-examination of a key Crown witness.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that while the prior consistent statements were improperly admitted, the error was harmless and the curative proviso applied.

Furthermore, because the statements had no probative value and did not bolster the witness's reliability, no limiting instruction was required.

The Crown appealed as of right from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had allowed the accused's appeal from a conviction for second degree murder based on the trial judge providing the jury with a transcript of the Crown's closing address.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal substantially for the dissenting reasons of Laskin J.A. in the court below, restoring the conviction.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from the killing of a close friend, arguing the jury charge inadequately addressed the alternative defence theory that mental disorder negated the mens rea for murder and manslaughter, and misstated the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly instructed the jury under the Hilton approach that evidence of mental disorder remained relevant to intent even if the not criminally responsible defence failed.

It further held that, read as a whole, the charge clearly distinguished the balance of probabilities burden applicable to the mental disorder defence from the Crown’s burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order transferring a 17-year-old charged with second degree murder from ordinary court to youth court under the Young Offenders Act.

The appeal turned on whether the respondent had shown likely rehabilitation within the seven-year dispositional period, given psychiatric evidence of schizophrenia and possible conduct disorder.

The court held that the youth court judge misconstrued and misapplied the psychiatric evidence by making a definitive finding excluding conduct disorder despite significant evidentiary gaps.

Because the respondent failed to establish likely rehabilitation within the statutory period, the transfer order was set aside and the matter was directed to remain in ordinary court.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for second degree murder and the 14-year parole ineligibility period.

The court held that an unavailable witness’s prior statement was admissible under the principled hearsay exception because necessity and threshold reliability were established, and any possible concern in the jury charge was cured by repeated limiting instructions.

The court also upheld the admission and treatment of evidence concerning refusal to provide biological samples and subsequent conduct involving destruction of saliva evidence as after-the-fact conduct.

In any event, the court held that any assumed errors would have engaged the proviso because the Crown case was overwhelming.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from a fatal confrontation in his residence, where he asserted self-defence and the trial judge left provocation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that the self-defence charge was adequate, but found reversible error in the response to the jury's question on provocation and in the treatment of after-the-fact conduct because the jury was not properly instructed on innocent explanations and conduct consistent with innocence.

The court further held that Crown counsel's cross-examination was repeatedly improper, including questioning on silence, disclosure, and criminal record details, and that the curative instructions did not adequately remove the prejudice.

Considering these errors cumulatively, the court concluded the appellant did not receive a fair trial and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction for second degree murder following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on intent and on the cumulative effect of intoxication, provocation, and excessive force in self-defence.

The charge improperly compartmentalized the defences and referred to them as alternative defences, creating a risk that the jury would not appreciate their combined effect.

The court was not satisfied that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial on second degree murder was ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder arising from a circumstantial case that they killed the deceased in order to steal and export his newly purchased vehicle.

The Court of Appeal rejected challenges to jury selection, exclusion of alleged third-party suspect evidence, and numerous aspects of the jury charge, including instructions on separate liability, recent possession, reasonable doubt, circumstantial evidence, manslaughter, and post-offence conduct.

The court also held that the co-accused's cut-throat closing address did not warrant severance or a mistrial, and that any improper advocacy was adequately corrected by the trial judge.

The convictions were upheld and the Crown's contingent cross-appeal was not addressed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her habeas corpus application with certiorari in aid following committal for trial on a charge of second degree murder.

She alleged denial of natural justice at the preliminary inquiry based on limits on cross-examination, continuation of the inquiry during her absence, inadequate assistance while unrepresented, and failure to conduct a fitness hearing during the inquiry.

The court held there was no denial of natural justice and no loss of jurisdiction, noting that irrelevant questioning was properly curtailed, witnesses heard in her absence were later recalled for cross-examination, and fitness had already been addressed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for second degree murder arising from a spousal shooting in a case where intent was the sole issue and the Crown’s case was entirely circumstantial.

The majority held that the trial judge erred by providing the deliberating jury with only the Crown’s closing address after the jury requested it, without also providing the defence closing address.

The court found that closing addresses are persuasive advocacy, and fairness required balanced access where the case turned on competing inferences rather than direct evidence.

The majority concluded the imbalance created serious prejudice and that the curative proviso could not be applied.

A dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from an entirely circumstantial prosecution based on motive, forensic evidence, and prior statements attributed to the deceased.

The principal issue was whether the jury charge was deficient for failing to distinguish direct from circumstantial evidence and for using pre-Lifchus language on reasonable doubt.

The court held that no formulaic circumstantial-evidence instruction was required so long as the jury was clearly told that guilt had to be the only reasonable inference proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also held that the Crown's speculative suggestions, the manslaughter instruction, and the cautions concerning hearsay evidence did not cause unfairness warranting a new trial.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for second degree murder and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge wrongly excluded post-arrest utterances that were capable of supporting defence psychiatric evidence on cocaine intoxication and cocaine psychosis, and also erred in refusing to leave provocation with the jury because there was some evidence on which a properly instructed jury could find the partial defence.

The court rejected the argument that a later hospital statement was admissible to rebut recent fabrication, found no reversible error in the intoxication charge, and declined to interfere on motive.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered, making it unnecessary to address sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to introduce rebuttal evidence relating to an alibi defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the rebuttal evidence was properly admitted as it went to the context and essential fabric of the alibi defence, and the Crown could not have known in advance what testimony the appellant would give.

The Court further held that even if part of the rebuttal evidence was improperly admitted, the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code would apply given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred by not leaving manslaughter as an available verdict for the jury.

The Court of Appeal had allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's cross-appeal and dismissed the accused's appeal, restoring the trial conviction.

The majority held that based on the totality of the evidence, the trial judge did not err in refusing to leave manslaughter with the jury.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal by a judge alone on a charge of second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Chief Justice McGillivray in the Court of Appeal.

The Court declined to express an opinion on the applicability of section 16(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to the evidence of the child witness.