Right to counsel

During a jury trial, the Crown sought to play the defendant's entire video-recorded police statement to challenge him on prior inconsistent statements and demonstrate his demeanour.

The defence argued that parts of the statement should be edited to prevent infringing the defendant's rights to counsel and silence, as he had answered some questions and not others.

The court ruled that playing the entire statement would not prejudice the defendant or create an unfair trial, noting that the statement had previously been ruled voluntary.

With the exception of one agreed-upon redaction, the court permitted the whole video statement to be played to the jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to provide a breath sample into an Approved Screening Device.

He argued his refusal was equivocal because he believed he was not the driver and wanted to speak to counsel first, and that the demand was not made forthwith.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions that the refusal was unequivocal, the demand was made forthwith, and no Charter breach occurred since the offence was complete before the right to counsel was engaged.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that a 33-minute delay in administering an approved screening device (ASD) test at the roadside violated his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

He also argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and relied on inadmissible evidence compelled by statute.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the 20-minute investigation to form reasonable suspicion and the 13-minute ASD administration were reasonable.

While the trial judge erred in considering the appellant's compelled admission of drinking as direct evidence of impairment, the error was harmless given the overwhelming admissible evidence of impairment.

The applicant, charged with trafficking in crack cocaine, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence seized from her vehicle, alleging violations of her s. 8 and s. 10(b) rights.

The court found no s. 8 violation, concluding the search was lawful pursuant to a warrant and as a search incident to arrest, despite the searching officer being unaware of the warrant.

The court found that the applicant's s. 10(b) rights were breached due to an inadequate informational caution upon arrest and an unjustified delay in facilitating access to counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the reliable, non-conscriptive evidence seized from the vehicle should not be excluded, as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single-vehicle collision where his passenger was seriously injured.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired driving causing bodily harm, rejecting his evidence that the passenger grabbed the steering wheel.

However, the court acquitted the accused of refusing to provide a breath sample, finding that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was infringed due to a delay in facilitating contact and a failure to provide a second consultation when he was confused about the legal advice received.

The evidence of his refusal was excluded under s. 24(2).

The Crown sought to introduce a statement made by the accused, whose first language is Pashto, during a murder investigation.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in violation of sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter due to a language barrier.

The court found that the accused understood English sufficiently, was provided with an interpreter and duty counsel, and gave the statement voluntarily without any police oppression or inducements.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The Crown brought a motion during a voir dire to admit a video statement given by the accused to the police following his arrest for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The court found that the police officer conducting the interview lied to the accused about the nature of the allegations and provided false legal advice, suggesting that consensual sex with the complainant would not be a criminal offence.

The officer also attempted to undermine the advice given to the accused by duty counsel.

The court held that the accused was deprived of the ability to make a meaningful choice about whether to confess due to police trickery and misinformation.

The statement was ruled inadmissible.

The applicant brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained during a smuggling investigation on the St. Lawrence River.

Police officers detained the applicant on a dock but failed to inform him of the reasons for his detention before arresting him for obstruction when he attempted to walk away.

The court found the detention was arbitrary and the subsequent arrest unlawful, violating sections 9 and 10(a) of the Charter.

Consequently, the search incident to arrest violated section 8, and the ID, currency, and fingerprints seized from the applicant were excluded under section 24(2).

However, the court found no section 8 violation regarding the search of a nearby boat that yielded marijuana, as the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vessel.

The accused was arrested following a controlled delivery of a package containing heroin.

During a police interview, he made inculpatory statements.

On a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the statements, the accused argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached and that police offered an inducement regarding leniency for his sister, rendering the confession involuntary.

The court found no Charter breach, as the accused spontaneously spoke upon arrest without being questioned.

The court also applied the Oickle framework and concluded that the police comments did not amount to a strong inducement or quid pro quo that overbore the accused's will.

The statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

The appellant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol content over 80 milligrams.

At trial, her counsel abandoned Charter applications regarding the breath demand and right to counsel.

On appeal, the self-represented appellant attempted to raise these Charter issues for the first time.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, applying the general rule against raising new issues on appeal, noting the trial record did not support the alleged violations and the Crown would be prejudiced.

The accused brought an application to exclude evidence under ss. 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10 following her arrest for impaired driving after a single-vehicle accident.

The accused argued her statements at the scene were statutorily compelled, her arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and she was arbitrarily detained without being advised of her right to counsel.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence that the statements were compelled, that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the constellation of facts, and that the brief investigative detention prior to arrest did not engage s. 10 Charter rights.

During a trial for importing drugs, a voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the accused to Canada Border Services Agency officers at the airport.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the statements made by both accused due to incomplete and unreliable officer notes that lacked context.

Furthermore, the court found that the officers breached one of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights by unreasonably delaying her opportunity to contact counsel.

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

In a pre-trial motion, the Crown sought to admit a police statement made by one of the co-accused.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to police inducements, oppression, and trickery during the interrogation.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found that the police conduct was appropriate, the accused's will was not overborne, and no shocking trickery was used.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

The accused was arrested for attempted murder and firearm offences following a shooting in downtown Toronto.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the accused's post-arrest statements, including an 80-minute video interview, arguing breaches of s. 10(b) of the Charter and lack of voluntariness.

The court found a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to an unjustified three-hour delay in facilitating access to duty counsel while gunshot residue tests were conducted.

The court also found the statements were involuntary due to police threats to lay additional charges, inducements, and the 18-year-old accused's learning disabilities and physical distress.

All post-arrest statements were excluded.

The applicant, charged with passport and immigration offences, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the admissibility of statements and documents obtained by Canada Border Services Agency officers at an airport.

The court found that the applicant was not detained and voluntarily provided documents prior to 8:00 p.m., rendering that evidence admissible.

However, after 8:00 p.m., the officers conducted a warrantless search of the applicant's wallet that exceeded his consent, and detained him without providing rights to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the documents found in the wallet and the subsequent statements, finding serious Charter breaches that undermined the applicant's rights.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in his prosecution for murder and break and enter.

The total delay from arrest to the scheduled trial date was over 53 months.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, noting that significant portions were attributable to the applicant's difficulties in retaining counsel of choice and his subsequent challenges to the jury roll.

The court concluded that the institutional delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances and that the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the applicant's s. 11(b) interests.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault following a stabbing incident.

Upon his arrest at an apartment, the police advised him of his right to counsel.

The accused declined to call a lawyer immediately, stating 'not right now.' The police then cautioned him and asked if he wished to say anything, prompting the accused to provide a spontaneous exculpatory statement claiming self-defence.

The accused sought to exclude the statement, arguing it was involuntary and obtained in violation of his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found the statement was voluntary and that the police complied with their Charter obligations, as the accused's decision to delay contacting counsel did not trigger an immediate police duty to hold off questioning.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to police during his transport and subsequent interview regarding the death of his daughter.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of his ss. 7 and 10(b) Charter rights.

The Superior Court of Justice found the transport utterances inadmissible because the accused was not informed he was a murder suspect, vitiating his right to make an informed choice to remain silent.

While the station interview did not violate s. 10(b), the court excluded it under its residual discretion, finding its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value due to the accused's repeated requests for counsel and the lack of inculpatory responses to police theorizing.

The accused brought pre-trial motions challenging the admissibility of a firearm seized pursuant to a telewarrant and utterances made to police during the search.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding the confidential informant's tip was sufficiently compelling, credible, and corroborated to justify the warrant, resulting in no section 8 Charter breach.

Regarding the utterances, the court found statements made to one officer were voluntary and admissible, but statements made to another officer were obtained in violation of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights because the officer failed to advise him of the availability of duty counsel via a toll-free number.

The latter statements were excluded under section 24(2).

The applicant, charged with drug offences and theft of electricity related to a marijuana grow operation, sought to exclude house keys seized by police during his arrest outside the residence.

The applicant argued the keys were obtained through an unlawful arrest and warrantless search, breaching his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found that the applicant had abandoned the keys by tossing them onto the lawn upon seeing the police, meaning no search occurred and no s. 8 rights were violated.

The court further held that even if the arrest was arbitrary and a breach occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police conduct was not deliberate and the evidence was highly reliable real evidence essential to the prosecution.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.