B.A. Glass

The defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault after choking his female friend in response to her throwing a dresser drawer down the stairs, which struck him on the head.

Both parties were intoxicated.

The Crown sought a 9-month custodial sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence, citing four years of strict bail conditions and the victim's provocation.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months of probation, noting the provocation and the defendant's remorse, along with a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The defendants abandoned a motion to introduce fresh evidence and set aside the trial judgment based on allegations of fraud.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale for the abandoned motion.

The court awarded the plaintiff substantial indemnity costs, noting the seriousness of alleging fraud and subsequently abandoning the motion when the affiant recanted.

The court fixed costs at $20,000 plus disbursements, reflecting a reduction for delays caused by the plaintiff's counsel's health issues.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder for stabbing his wife to death.

The Crown sought 15-18 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 10-13 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the stabbing, the offender's lack of remorse, the vulnerability of the victim, and the jury's recommendation of 25 years.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 17 years, along with ancillary orders.

The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing the victim approximately 30 times.

The jury recommended a 10-year parole ineligibility period, while the Crown sought 14 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the attack, the defendant's extensive criminal record, and victim impact statements.

The court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 13 years, along with ancillary weapons, DNA, and non-communication orders.

During a jury trial, the Crown sought to play the defendant's entire video-recorded police statement to challenge him on prior inconsistent statements and demonstrate his demeanour.

The defence argued that parts of the statement should be edited to prevent infringing the defendant's rights to counsel and silence, as he had answered some questions and not others.

The court ruled that playing the entire statement would not prejudice the defendant or create an unfair trial, noting that the statement had previously been ruled voluntary.

With the exception of one agreed-upon redaction, the court permitted the whole video statement to be played to the jury.

The defence applied for a directed verdict for second degree murder on a first degree murder count, which was previously dismissed.

The court issued supplementary reasons to correct factual errors in the original decision regarding the evidence presented at trial.

Despite excising the incorrect references to the evidence, the court concluded there was still sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, and the application remained dismissed.

The court issued supplementary reasons to a ruling that dismissed a defence motion to read the defendant's statement into the record.

The court corrected its previous observation that the defence had ambushed the Crown with the motion, noting that the defence had verbally advised the Crown prior to the close of the Crown's case.

The original decision dismissing the motion remained in place, as the re-examination question did not infer that a statement had been provided.

The accused was charged with first degree murder for the stabbing death of his wife.

After the Crown closed its case, the defence applied for a directed verdict of second degree murder, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The court reviewed the evidence globally, including the accused's journal entries expressing frustration with his wife, his delay in calling 911 after the stabbing, and his medical knowledge of vital organs.

The court concluded there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to reasonably find planning and deliberation, and dismissed the application.

During a trial, the defence brought a motion requiring the Crown to produce the defendant's complete police statement to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown's re-examination of the lead investigator left the jury with the prejudicial understanding that the defendant had provided a statement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Crown's questions did not infer any statement was given to the police, and noted that the defence had improperly delayed bringing the application until after the Crown closed its case.

Following a trial in which the plaintiffs succeeded on Family Law Act claims for loss of companionship, guidance, and care, the court determined costs.

The defendant argued that no costs should be awarded because each plaintiff recovered less than $100,000 and should have proceeded under the Simplified Procedure rules.

The court held that where claims formed part of broader litigation involving companion actions and allegations of contributory negligence, it was reasonable to proceed as ordinary actions.

Exercising its discretion, the court rejected the defendant’s objections to the plaintiffs’ bill of costs and awarded partial indemnity costs together with disbursements and additional costs for the costs hearing.

The plaintiffs were awarded $35,000 each in Family Law Act damages following a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant argued the plaintiffs should be denied costs because their recovery fell below the $100,000 Simplified Rules threshold.

The court rejected this argument, finding it was reasonable to proceed under the ordinary procedure because the claims were part of larger companion actions involving allegations of contributory negligence.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $30,000 in fees plus disbursements and HST on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs advanced Family Law Act claims for loss of care, guidance, and companionship following the death of a sibling in a motor vehicle accident.

Liability was not disputed, leaving quantum as the sole issue.

The court reviewed jurisprudence concerning the scope of compensable loss under s. 61 of the Family Law Act, emphasizing that such awards must be assessed objectively and do not compensate grief or emotional anguish.

Considering the unusually close lifelong relationship among the siblings, but distinguishing the case from those involving dependency or daily interaction, the court assessed damages for loss of companionship at $35,000 for each surviving sibling.

The applicants sought damages after the respondent marina sold their stored vessel for $2,000 to cover alleged storage arrears.

The court found that the respondent failed to comply with the notice requirements under the Repair and Storage Liens Act, having sent notice to the wrong address and improperly claiming interest.

Furthermore, the sale price of $2,000 was commercially unreasonable given the vessel's appraised value of $46,750.

The court awarded the applicants damages totaling $60,863.05 for the loss of the vessel, personal property, and related expenses.

The applicant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault but successfully appealed based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel, resulting in an order for a new trial.

The applicant brought an application seeking to return to the pre-election stage to elect a trial by judge and jury and have a preliminary inquiry.

The court granted the application under section 24(1) of the Charter, finding that the lack of adequate legal representation included the initial election process, and denying a re-election would infringe the applicant's rights under sections 7 and 11(f).

The Crown sought to admit a statement made by the accused during a polygraph interview.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary because the police officer used unsettling questions and failed to inform him that he had passed the polygraph test before continuing the interrogation.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found that the accused had an operating mind, was not subjected to threats or inducements, and understood his rights to leave or contact counsel.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.