F. Davoudi

The Crown sought to admit statements made by three defendants charged in relation to a first degree murder.

The defendants argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of their Charter rights.

The court found all three statements were voluntary.

Mr. Kerr's statement was admitted despite a minor s. 10(b) breach.

Mr. Samuel's statement was admitted as no Charter breaches were established.

Ms. Owen's statement was excluded under s. 24(2) because she was arbitrarily detained and denied her right to counsel during the execution of a search warrant, and the court rejected the Crown's argument that the 'actus reus exception' precluded exclusion.

The offender pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing bodily harm after placing his infant child face down on a thick blanket, resulting in catastrophic and permanent brain damage.

The court considered the offender's breach of trust as a parent, the profound impact on the vulnerable victim, and the offender's repeated breaches of bail.

The court also factored in the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody during the COVID-19 pandemic as a mitigating factor.

The offender was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment before credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by three years of probation.

The applicant, a Black woman, was referred to secondary inspection upon arriving at Toronto Pearson International Airport from Aruba.

Border services officers discovered cocaine hidden in lotion bottles in her luggage.

The applicant brought a pretrial motion alleging she was racially profiled and that her rights under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter were violated.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence of conscious or unconscious racial bias in the officer's decision to refer her to secondary inspection.

The court also held that the routine questioning and search at the border did not violate her Charter rights, and that her statements to the officers were voluntary.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder for stabbing his wife to death.

The Crown sought 15-18 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 10-13 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the stabbing, the offender's lack of remorse, the vulnerability of the victim, and the jury's recommendation of 25 years.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 17 years, along with ancillary orders.

During a jury trial, the Crown sought to play the defendant's entire video-recorded police statement to challenge him on prior inconsistent statements and demonstrate his demeanour.

The defence argued that parts of the statement should be edited to prevent infringing the defendant's rights to counsel and silence, as he had answered some questions and not others.

The court ruled that playing the entire statement would not prejudice the defendant or create an unfair trial, noting that the statement had previously been ruled voluntary.

With the exception of one agreed-upon redaction, the court permitted the whole video statement to be played to the jury.

The defence applied for a directed verdict for second degree murder on a first degree murder count, which was previously dismissed.

The court issued supplementary reasons to correct factual errors in the original decision regarding the evidence presented at trial.

Despite excising the incorrect references to the evidence, the court concluded there was still sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, and the application remained dismissed.

The accused was charged with first degree murder for the stabbing death of his wife.

After the Crown closed its case, the defence applied for a directed verdict of second degree murder, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The court reviewed the evidence globally, including the accused's journal entries expressing frustration with his wife, his delay in calling 911 after the stabbing, and his medical knowledge of vital organs.

The court concluded there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to reasonably find planning and deliberation, and dismissed the application.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an O'Connor application seeking the production of the deceased's OHIP records.

The court found no foundation that the records were likely relevant to the issues at trial, noting that the best evidence of the deceased's mental health was an existing psychologist's report.

The court concluded the application was based on speculation and sought to enlarge collateral issues.

The first stage test was not met, and the application was dismissed.

The Crown sought to introduce a statement made by the accused, whose first language is Pashto, during a murder investigation.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in violation of sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter due to a language barrier.

The court found that the accused understood English sufficiently, was provided with an interpreter and duty counsel, and gave the statement voluntarily without any police oppression or inducements.

The statement was ruled admissible.

A jury trial arising from the kidnapping, extortion, assault, and unlawful confinement of the complainant.

The court issued written reasons for numerous pre‑trial and mid‑trial rulings including mistrial motions, evidentiary disputes, cell tower evidence admissibility, video‑link testimony under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code, interpretation issues under s. 14 of the Charter, and jury charge requests.

The court dismissed several defence mistrial applications, permitted certain Crown evidence including cell tower records as factual evidence, allowed video‑link testimony from a witness abroad, and provided jury instructions concerning fabricated statements and the Browne v. Dunn rule.

The jury ultimately convicted two accused and acquitted one.

In a criminal prosecution for kidnapping, extortion, and assault, the court conducted a blended voir dire regarding the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police following a 911 call and police entry into a residence where a bound complainant was discovered.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights, particularly the right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The court found that one police officer violated the accused’s right to counsel during investigative detention but declined to exclude certain statements after applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant.

Spontaneous utterances and statements made after proper cautions and waiver of counsel were admitted, while statements allegedly made to another officer in the police cruiser were excluded because the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to unreliable notes and evidentiary inconsistencies.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code seeking leave to cross‑examine the complainant about prior sexual activity with him and with other individuals.

The proposed questioning arose in the context of numerous text messages between the parties that appeared to reference sexual relations during the period when they lived together.

The court held that cross‑examination regarding alleged prior consensual sexual activity between the complainant and the accused was relevant to credibility and necessary to provide context for the text message evidence.

However, proposed questioning about the complainant’s sexual activity with other individuals was excluded as irrelevant and as improperly engaging the prohibited “twin myths.” Leave was therefore granted only in relation to prior sexual activity between the complainant and the accused.

The accused, Mechelle Rogers, was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found 1.5 kg of cocaine in the trunk of a vehicle in which she was a passenger.

At the close of the Crown's case, she brought a motion for a directed verdict.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict based on circumstantial evidence and the law of constructive possession.

The court found that while there was evidence she knew illegal activity was taking place, there was no evidence she knew the substance was cocaine or had any control over it.

The motion was granted and a directed verdict of acquittal was entered.