C. Hicks

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of section 577(a) of the Criminal Code, which allows the Crown to prefer a direct indictment.

The applicant argued that the provision violates section 7 of the Charter by permitting arbitrary exercise of Crown discretion without requiring reasons.

The court dismissed the application, finding that binding precedent establishes the constitutionality of direct indictments and that prosecutorial discretion remains subject to review for abuse of process.

During a trial for a shooting that resulted in one death and two injuries, the Crown sought to introduce photographs of a mark on a hallway baseboard taken seven years after the incident, along with related property manager testimony and expert opinions from a forensic video analyst and a firearms expert.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding that its probative value in determining whether the accused fired a weapon and in assessing witness credibility significantly outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The expert opinions met the threshold requirements for admissibility.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to re-open its examination-in-chief of a witness to refresh her memory using a prior statement, after having closed its examination but before cross-examination began.

The witness had given testimony inconsistent with her prior statement regarding the actions of the accused after the shooting.

The trial judge granted the request, applying the Coffin procedure and finding that allowing the Crown to refresh the witness's memory would not cause prejudice or trial unfairness, as the defence could cure any prejudice through cross-examination.

During a second trial for second-degree murder, the Crown applied under section 715 of the Criminal Code to admit the prior trial testimony of a key witness who had left Canada for Ghana just before the trial commenced.

The court reviewed the principles from R. v. Potvin and subsequent jurisprudence regarding the principled approach to hearsay and the Crown's obligation to make reasonable efforts to secure testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown failed to establish necessity as it had not pursued alternatives like commission evidence or offered to fund the witness's return, and that admitting the evidence would operate unfairly against the accused.

The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing the victim approximately 30 times.

The jury recommended a 10-year parole ineligibility period, while the Crown sought 14 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the attack, the defendant's extensive criminal record, and victim impact statements.

The court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 13 years, along with ancillary weapons, DNA, and non-communication orders.

The Crown sought to admit several statements made by the accused to first responders and police following the death of her severely disabled daughter.

The defence conceded there were no threats or inducements but argued the accused lacked an operating mind and that the police failed to keep an accurate record of the utterances.

The court found that the accused's responses were appropriate and demonstrated she had the minimum cognitive ability to understand what she was saying and to whom.

The court also held that the lack of complete recordings went to the weight of the statements, not their admissibility, and ruled all statements admissible.

The accused was charged with the first degree murder of her severely disabled daughter.

The defence brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of first degree murder, conceding there was evidence for second degree murder but arguing there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The court reviewed the evidence, including the accused's fabricated story of a home invasion, the staging of the crime scene, and the mode of killing by asphyxiation.

The court held that the complexity of the fabricated story and the staging of the scene provided sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The accused is charged with the first-degree murder of her severely disabled daughter.

The Crown brought an application to use a couch and a mannequin as demonstrative evidence during the testimony of a firefighter who first discovered the victim.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the firefighter could clearly describe the victim's position without the props, meaning the demonstrative evidence had minimal probative value.

Furthermore, the court held that using the props carried a real risk of prejudicial effect by potentially overemphasizing the victim's initial position or artificially inflating the witness's credibility.

In a jury trial arising from a planned home invasion robbery, the court delivered written reasons for several evidentiary and procedural rulings made during the trial.

The accused sought a mistrial based on the Crown’s opening statement, challenged the admissibility of autopsy photographs and expert textile‑damage evidence, and requested a directed verdict removing first‑degree murder from the jury’s consideration for two accused.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, admitted the photographs and expert evidence, and held that there was sufficient evidence on which a jury could find the relevant accused to have been substantial and integral causes of death under the constructive first‑degree murder provisions of the Criminal Code.

Additional rulings addressed corrective jury instructions, the absence of a required Vetrovec warning for a key civilian witness, and a defence request that the Crown or court call additional witnesses.

The jury ultimately convicted one accused of first‑degree murder and the others of second‑degree murder.

The Crown applied for a ruling that a post‑arrest statement made by an accused during a police interview was voluntary and admissible at trial in a first‑degree murder prosecution.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to alleged physical intimidation, suggestions that the accused needed to speak, implied threats regarding the accused’s girlfriend, and inducements suggesting a robbery admission could avoid a murder charge.

The court reviewed the full interview and applied the voluntariness principles from leading Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

It held that the accused had been properly cautioned, had consulted counsel, and chose to speak despite knowing his right to silence.

The court concluded the will of the accused was not overborne and that the statement, except for a later portion conceded by the Crown as induced, was voluntary and admissible.

The accused brought a pretrial motion seeking permission to pose a race‑based challenge for cause question to prospective jurors using a multiple‑choice format designed to detect conscious and unconscious racial bias.

The Crown did not oppose a race‑based challenge for cause but objected to the proposed form of questioning.

The court reviewed jurisprudence including the Parks question and later cases considering expanded questioning formats.

The judge concluded that while a race‑based challenge for cause was appropriate, there was no evidentiary basis to depart from the established Parks formulation in favour of a multiple‑choice question.

The court held that the standard Parks question, modified to refer to judging the evidence “fairly,” adequately addressed concerns about potential juror bias without unnecessarily complicating the jury selection process.