Colin Henderson

During jury selection for a second-degree murder trial, the accused requested the trial judge use the expanded stand-by power under s. 633 of the Criminal Code to ensure at least one Black juror was selected.

The Crown opposed the request.

The trial judge conducted a detailed analysis of the legislative history and conflicting jurisprudence regarding s. 633.

The court concluded that while s. 633 can be used to enhance jury diversity to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, the specific grounds advanced by the defence—that a Black juror could help others understand cultural norms—did not constitute reasonable cause.

The request was denied.

The accused, a Black man charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on anti-Black racism.

The court determined the specific anti-bias instructions and questions to be posed to the jury panel.

The court also ruled that, under the new legislative regime, the trial judge rather than defence counsel would ask the challenge for cause questions to preserve objective neutrality and underscore the court's commitment to an impartial jury.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of second-degree murder.

He argued that inconsistencies between two key witnesses regarding the shooter's identity precluded committal, relying on principles from eyewitness identification cases.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, holding that the Crown's case was circumstantial, not based on direct eyewitness identification.

The court found that the preliminary inquiry judge properly considered the whole of the evidence and that a reasonable inference was available that the applicant shot the deceased.

The accused, charged with manslaughter alongside two co-accused, sought to bring several pre-trial applications, including a recusal motion, a jurisdictional challenge against transferring the trial out of Brampton, a section 10(b) Charter application, and an application for removal of counsel.

Due to counsel's medical issues and scheduling conflicts, the court had to set a firm timetable for the filing of materials and the hearing of these applications to ensure the scheduled trial date could be maintained.

The court ordered strict deadlines for the filing of application records and factums, scheduling the recusal application first, followed by the substantive applications.

The case involves three accused charged with manslaughter.

Due to courtroom shortages in Brampton, the trial was scheduled to be held in Kitchener.

Counsel for one of the accused suffered medical issues, leading to an adjournment.

Counsel subsequently indicated an intention to bring motions to transfer the trial back to Brampton or be removed from the record, but later attempted to unilaterally delay bringing these motions.

The case management judge rejected this delay, emphasizing the need for efficiency under the Jordan framework, and ordered strict deadlines for the defence to perfect any such applications.

During a trial for multiple counts of kidnapping, robbery, and firearm offences related to cargo thefts, the Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence across counts to prove identity.

The offences were alleged to have been committed by a rotating group of individuals.

The court applied the test from Perrier, finding that the offences were strikingly similar and that there was 'some evidence' linking each accused to the specific offences with which they were charged, primarily through cell phone tower data showing symmetry of movement.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect and ruled the similar fact evidence admissible across counts.

During a complex criminal trial involving multiple kidnappings and robberies, the Crown sought to introduce PowerPoint presentations as demonstrative aids to summarize voluminous cell phone records and plot cell tower locations.

The defence objected, arguing the presentations were misleading and distorted the evidence.

The court initially excluded the proposed presentations, finding they were confusing, assumed facts in dispute, and acted as a roadmap for the Crown's case.

However, the court subsequently admitted revised presentations that focused on individual phones, accurately distilled the records without assuming disputed facts, and were accompanied by cautionary instructions to the jury.

The accused brought pre-trial Charter motions seeking to exclude evidence from two separate police interactions.

For a July 2009 traffic stop, the court found the stop was unlawful due to a lack of credible police evidence regarding the reason for the stop, resulting in an arbitrary detention.

The evidence from that stop was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to serious state conduct involving a failure to take notes.

For an August 2009 interaction where police approached a parked vehicle in a high-crime area, the court found no detention occurred, as the accused was free to leave and voluntarily provided his identification.

Consequently, there were no s. 8 or s. 10(b) breaches, and the accused's statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

During pre‑trial proceedings on a multi‑count indictment involving robbery, firearms, kidnapping, and related offences, the court conducted a voluntariness voir dire concerning a police statement made by one of the accused.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary because the accused allegedly did not receive a proper caution or right to counsel, and contended that breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter undermined the accused’s right to silence.

The Crown argued the statement was voluntary and that no inducements, oppression, or improper police conduct occurred.

The court held that the accused had been informed of the right to counsel, had consulted counsel, and understood the right to remain silent.

Considering the totality of the circumstances and the confessions rule, the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and the statement was admissible.

In a pre-trial motion, the Crown sought to admit a police statement made by one of the co-accused.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to police inducements, oppression, and trickery during the interrogation.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found that the police conduct was appropriate, the accused's will was not overborne, and no shocking trickery was used.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

In a multi‑accused jury trial involving numerous serious offences including robbery, kidnapping, firearms offences, and conspiracy, the court determined several pre‑trial jury selection issues.

The Crown sought an order empanelling fourteen jurors and selecting two alternate jurors under s. 631 of the Criminal Code due to the expected length and complexity of the trial.

The court granted the application, finding additional jurors advisable to reduce the risk of mistrial if jurors were excused.

The court also permitted a race‑based challenge for cause under s. 638(1)(b) given that the accused were members of visible minority groups, and established appropriate challenge questions referencing potential bias.

Finally, the court ruled that rotating triers would be used and ordered the exclusion of other jurors from the courtroom during the challenge process in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

During a pre‑trial voir dire, the Crown sought to admit two statements made by one accused following separate arrests.

The defence challenged the voluntariness of the second statement given during a police interview after consultation with counsel.

The court reviewed the confession rule and assessed inducements, oppression, operating mind, and the overall interview context.

Although the accused was properly cautioned and treated appropriately before the interview, the officer’s aggressive tone, physical positioning, and comments undermining confidence in defence counsel raised concerns.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court found a reasonable doubt about voluntariness and excluded the November 18, 2009 statement while admitting the earlier statement.

The Crown sought to admit a roadside statement made by a vehicle passenger identifying himself to police during a traffic stop.

The defence argued the Crown had not proven the accused was the declarant and that the statement was involuntary because no caution was given.

The court held that for admissibility the Crown need only show “some evidence” that the accused was the declarant, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the evidence, identity was established and the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt because there were no inducements, oppression, or lack of operating mind.

The absence of a caution did not render the statement involuntary where the accused was not detained or suspected of an offence.

The accused, a packaging manager employed by a major retailer, was charged with fraud after directing supplier companies participating in a rebate program to issue cheques to a company he controlled rather than to his employer.

Over several years, the accused deposited approximately $3.9 million into his own account.

The defence asserted that a confidential agreement with a company vice-president authorized him to retain rebate funds exceeding a certain threshold.

The court rejected the credibility of this claim, relying on witness testimony, documentary evidence, and the absence of any written authorization.

Applying the framework in R. v. W(D), the court found the defence evidence neither credible nor capable of raising a reasonable doubt and concluded that the accused intentionally deprived his employer of the funds.